Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

222. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations¹

Washington, February 12, 1957—7:42 p.m.

619. Following is Department’s present thinking re Cyprus:

As friend of parties involved and in earnest effort be helpful in developing arrangements which would have least adverse effects upon NATO and cooperation among its allies, US in recent past has put forward for consideration various proposals all of which have been strongly opposed by either Greeks British or Turks. These developments have underlined reluctance of Greeks British and Turks to make necessary compromise essential to agreed solution. In our view major issues of preserving NATO solidarity and forestalling communist penetration of Mediterranean are being subordinated to lesser issue of Cyprus and more narrow interests of three parties concerned therewith. Unless and until parties recognize magnitude of peril involved in continuation of Cyprus stalemate and are prepared make necessary compromises, US efforts toward finding solution will continue be frustrated.

Department has concluded that in present circumstances it cannot, without jeopardy to more important considerations, play affirmative role at this time with respect proposals which have been put forward by parties. It had intended making clear at outset GA debate that we would vote against any condemnatory resolution (such as British condemnation of Greek Government for interference Cyprus) or any other resolution of substantive character (such as one calling for immediate self determination). In view opposition to this position US now disposed abstain on any such resolutions and at appropriate stage in UN discussions we would explain our position. As debate develops it might prove advisable for US to take some initiative. We have in mind that future attitude would depend largely on development opportunities for constructive action and on whether our friends are able to avoid taking extreme and harmful positions. We would be governed mainly by our continued desire keep debate in low key and minimize US involvement in Cyprus.

Secretary on February 9 met with Birgi, Zorlu, Erim and Gork at Turk request and spoke along foregoing lines. He emphasized extreme dangers in Greek situation and importance to Turkey of Western oriented Greece. Turks declared they were not seeking impose difficulties upon Greece and asserted history of Cyprus question shows Turkey has played issue in lower key, has more rights and has made more sacrifices than Greece. Turks endorsed US not putting forward resolution itself and agreed debate should be kept to minimum and hoped no substantive action would be taken. They hoped that as various resolutions submitted our respective delegations would keep in touch on tactics. (Separate telegram contains fuller account this conversation.²)

On February 11 Secretary met with British Ambassador Caccia and discussed Cyprus matter in context personal note from Selwyn Lloyd³ asking in very strong terms that US not vote against resolution condemning Greek support of terrorism. Secretary reviewed situation as above and informed Caccia present US attitude re abstaining not only on UK condemnatory resolution but also on other substantive resolutions. Caccia asked whether US would in its statement say something in opposition to terrorist practices. Secretary thought we could do “something of the sort” but made no specific commitment. He indicated we probably would like to say something also of general character as in Potomac Charter re rights of peoples to governments their own choosing. (Separate telegram contains fuller account of conversation.⁴)

Department has not discussed its latest thinking with Greek representative. Foreign Minister Averoff has requested appointment with Secretary and it planned meeting will be arranged within few days. He plans speak along lines taken with UK and Turk representative but will not give assurances that US will abstain on all resolutions as debate develops. He will thus avoid any basis Greek claim that subsequent US attitude contrary to assurances given to GOG. Secretary will express hope any Greek resolution and manner in which it put forward will be as mild as possible and will express opinion preferable that UK not be named. He will emphasize that in final analysis solution Cyprus question will be understanding achieved outside UN among parties concerned. If one party takes extreme position it will be harder reconcile others later. Ambassador Allen may wish discuss matter along similar lines with GOG, emphasizing that while we wish be as helpful as possible to Karamanlis Government, situation is such that we cannot at this juncture give assurances which they have requested, including abstaining from voting.

Suggested US statement Cyprus debate will be contained in subsequent telegram.⁵

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–1257. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Jones and Rountree and signed by Dulles. Also sent to Athens and repeated to Ankara, London, and Paris Topol and pouched to Nicosia, Rome for McSweeney, and Valetta.
2. Telegram 1854 to Ankara, February 12. (Ibid.)
3. Document 219.
4. Telegram 5614 to London, February 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–1257)
5. transmitted in telegram 641 to USUN, February 18. (Ibid.,320.5747C/2–1857)