Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

221. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 11, 1957¹

Washington, February 11, 1957

SUBJECT

• Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Mr. Rountree, NEA
• Mr. Williams, GTI
• Mr. Nunley, EUR
• Ambassador Caccia, British Embassy

Ambassador Caccia called at the Secretary’s request. The Secretary told Ambassador Caccia that Mr. Rountree plans to see Mr. Coulson and bring the British up to date on the recent discussions between US officials and King Saud.² The Secretary also reviewed briefly his talk with Ambassador Eban of Israel and described certain assurances which the US would be willing to give Israel if Israel will promptly withdraw from Egyptian territory.

The Secretary then opened a general discussion of the Cyprus problem, with particular reference to its current status in the UNGA. He referred to his recent talks with representatives of the Turkish Government and also made reference to the message from Foreign Minister Lloyd urging the US not to vote against the proposed UK resolution calling for a cessation of terrorist activities in Cyprus. The Secretary pointed out that the US has tried in various ways to be helpful on the Cyprus issue but has thus far been unable to find any satisfactory approach. Therefore, the present disposition of the US Government is to announce at the beginning of the Cyprus debate that the United States will not vote on any resolution at all. In other words, the US is inclined to abstain on any substantive resolution concerning Cyprus, whether sponsored by the Greek Government or the British Government.

Ambassador Caccia asked whether it will be possible for the US representative, during the course of the debate, to make a statement indicating US opposition to terrorist activities and external interference in Cyprus, perhaps along the same general lines as the statement made by Ambassador Lodge in the debate on Algeria. The Secretary replied that some general statement on terrorism may be possible. He added, however, that the US may also have to express its general support for the principle of self-determination, in approximately the same terms used in the Potomac Charter.³ Ambassador Caccia expressed the hope that any expression by the US on self-determination would include a recognition of the fact that the Radcliffe proposals are aimed at the achievement of self-determination for Cyprus. The Secretary said it would be impossible for the US to pass judgment on particular constitutional proposals, since the value of any constitutional system depends primarily upon its practical application. He pointed out that any constitution is capable of abuse, and made reference to the Soviet Constitution. The Secretary indicated that the content of the US statement has not yet been determined, but stressed the impossibility of dealing with any single aspect of the Cyprus problem outside the context of the total situation and said the principal purpose of any US statement will be to avoid making a bad situation worse.

The Secretary went on to emphasize the grave dangers to the whole Western world inherent in the present Cyprus situation. Unless some kind of solution to the Cyprus problem can be found, he said, Greece may be lost to NATO. This would breach the southern flank of NATO and might permit the Communists to cut across the Mediterranean. The Secretary expressed the view that there has been far too much emotionalism associated with the Cyprus question—so much, in fact, that the governments concerned have been unable to consider the issue in a broad perspective and seem unwilling to subordinate minor considerations to major considerations.

The Ambassador asked whether the Turks had indicated willingness to make any concessions on the Cyprus question. The Secretary replied that he has observed no definite indications of this kind, but feels there is some possibility that the Turks would be willing to accept a “NATO solution”. The Secretary expressed the view that it would be far better for all parties to deal with the problem through NATO than through the UN. He added that the Turks seem willing to agree to a solution based on partition.

Ambassador Caccia asked whether the Turks and others have considered the practical consequences of partitioning an island as small as Cyprus. He suggested that a proposal for partition is a “council of despair” and should be considered only as a last resort.

The Secretary then repeated the basic US objectives in the current UNGA debate on Cyprus. He pointed out that we do not believe any UNGA action is likely to contribute to a solution of the Cyprus problem and said that we may make a statement to this effect at the beginning of the debate. He reminded Ambassador Caccia that the US long opposed subjecting this issue to public debate, and now hopes that the debate can be terminated with a minimum of acrimony and without perpetuating UN involvement. For these reasons, the US is disposed to abstain on any substantive resolution presented, although the final US position will depend upon the course of events. The US may undertake some new initiative if it appears that doing so will serve a useful purpose.

Mr. Rountree emphasized the important difference between the current US disposition to abstain on any substantive resolution and the earlier US position, which was to oppose actively any such resolution. Ambassador Caccia, however, did not comment upon the implications of this change in US intentions.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–1157. Secret. Drafted by Nunley.
2. King Saud of Saudi Arabia made an official visit to Washington January 30–February 1.
3. For text of the Potomac Charter, a Declaration by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, June 29, 1954, see Department of State Bulletin, July 12, 1954, pp. 49–50.