220. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 9, 19571
SUBJECT
- Cyprus
PARTICIPANTS
- Nuri Birgi, Secretary General, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Fatin Rustun Zorlu, Deputy, Turkish Grand National Assembly
- Nehat Erim, Special Advisor to Turkish Prime Minister on Cyprus
- The Secretary
- William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary, NEA
- Owen T. Jones, GTI
Mr. Zorlu opened the meeting with a brief reference to proposed Turkish revisions to the United States resolution on Cyprus that had been circulated by the United States Delegation in New York last week. The Secretary did not comment on the Turkish suggestions. Instead he expressed doubt that it would be wise for the United States to present any proposal. He pointed out that we had tried hard to help the parties in arriving at a solution to the Cyprus problem and that all our efforts had come to nought. It was tragic to see this dispute go on for it not only involved the solidarity of NATO but threatened the position of the present Greek Government and endangered the entire Mediterranean area. These, he said, were the real stakes here. The three interested parties were putting something of lesser importance ahead of the greater issue and until they were prepared to make some compromises he did not feel the United States had any responsibility to continue its efforts to find a solution.
Mr. Zorlu responded by saying that he thought it was a good idea for the United States not to put forward a solution. He contrasted the passive Turkish attitude on the Cyprus matter over the last two or three years to the manner in which the Greeks had pressed the matter, supported terrorism, and maintained inflammatory radio broadcasts out of Athens. The Greeks had persisted in this course of action in the face of Turkish pleas that the present equilibrium not be disturbed. The Turks, Zorlu asserted, have more rights and are making more sacrifices on the Cyprus issue than the Greeks and they want to see this matter quieted down….
The Secretary then asked his Turkish visitors if they were satisfied that, given a continuation of the present situation in Cyprus, a Western-oriented government in Greece could be expected to [Page 447] continue. Mr. Zorlu asserted that the Greeks were only exploiting their internal political situation to attain their objectives in Cyprus and that public opinion would not be aroused in Greece if the Greeks did not get their own way on Cyprus. The Secretary declined to accept this judgment. He took a grave view of the Greek situation. He pointed to the serious implications of a Greek shift from the West and cautioned the Turks not to come to the United States for help if the United States were proven right in its estimate. Dr. Birgi broke in to acknowledge that Greek political disturbances growing out of the Cyprus issue were possible but went on to say that political instability was inherent in Greek political life and that even if the Cyprus problem were solved another situation would be created to feed this chronic restlessness. The Greeks had put their pretensions too high…. Dr. Birgi emphasized that Turkey is not seeking the defeat of Greece on this matter but rather a reasonable solution that would provide safety for the Turkish Cypriots and security for Turkey itself. The Secretary closed this part of the discussion by again pointing out that disaster was impending that was so great that Cyprus paled in comparison. The Greeks, Turks and British apparently did not share this view. They may be right. Since no one else shared our view on the gravity of the situation, the United States should then sit back and watch.
At this point Dr. Birgi asked the Secretary what was his advice to Turkey at the present time. The Secretary replied that first of all the UNGA debate should be kept as calm as possible. Birgi and Zorlu agreed with this and with the view that any substantive action by the UNGA would be damaging. After the UNGA debate, the Secretary suggested that the matter might be taken up by NATO. It was essential, he said, that NATO be capable of dealing with its own problems. It had expressed an interest in a lot of problems far away, such as Formosa, but had thus far shied away from immediate vital problems such as Cyprus. When Mr. Zorlu pointed out that NATO discussions had thus far been friendly and had been on subjects on which there had been a wide range of agreement and that the injection of the Cyprus issue would therefore be dangerous, the Secretary replied that if NATO was so fragile that it could not discuss matters vital to its future then this in itself pointed to a vital weakness in NATO. He went on to say this highlighted again the fact that the three countries were putting second things first and until the magnitude of the peril inherent in the Cyprus situation was realized no solution was possible.
When Dr. Erim referred briefly to the Radcliffe proposals and stated that the Greeks want only Enosis, the Secretary disagreed. The Secretary thought the Greeks would accept self-government, perhaps even without assurances of self-determination, but the point [Page 448] in the Radcliffe proposals that worried the Greeks was the broad powers reserved for the executive. The Secretary went on to say that it was hardly possible to prepare a constitution without some provision calling for the invasion of the rights of one branch of the government by another in the event of an emergency. If because of the lack of trust and confidence every such constitutional ambiguity were regarded as a booby-trap, then no effective constitutional framework could be established. The core of the present problem was this lack of mutual confidence.
The Secretary closed the meeting by paying tribute to the wisdom, orientation and dependability of present Turkish leadership. He lauded Dr. Birgi’s effective work at the London Conference and expressed the hope that on the Cyprus problem the Government of Turkey would manifest the same mature statesmanship.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–957. Confidential. Drafted by Jones on February 11.↩