Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

223. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 13, 1957¹

Washington, February 13, 1957

SUBJECT

• Cyprus and the UNGA

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Evangelos Averoff, Greek Foreign Minister
• Ambassador George Melas, Greek Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary, IO
• Mr. Murat W. Williams, Deputy Director, GTI

When Mr. Averoff called on the Secretary this afternoon, he said first that he was grateful for Mr. Wadsworth’s message yesterday² regarding American neutrality in the Cyprus debate. He appreciated the delicacy of the problem for the United States and therefore asked only our neutrality and not our support. Of course, from a friend, Greece would have preferred support.

He added that the present problem in the United Nations was to get out of the debate without damage to a settlement and with some help towards it. “We want,” he said, “to have a discussion without insulting each other too much.”

The Foreign Minister said Greece must, of course, press its resolution for self-determination for Cyprus. As a second choice, he would want a resolution favoring renewal of negotiations. He insisted that a resolution calling for three-power talks with Turks and British would be dangerous, because Syria and Egypt were already insisting that they should be included since Cyprus was strategically important to them as well as to Turkey. Mr. Averoff reiterated that the best negotiations would be between the British Government and the Cypriots. A resolution to this effect should be sought, with a provision that the Secretary General should report to the next Assembly on the progress of negotiations.

Beyond the Assembly, he recognized Turkey’s three main arguments against self-determination and against possible enosis for Cyprus: (1) the strategic argument that Greek islands would “besiege” Turkey, which he would meet by proposing demilitarization of Cyprus with only NATO bases; (2) the argument of Turkey’s trading interests, which he thought could be met by arrangements for a customs union; and (3) the minority argument, which could be settled by providing to the Turkish minority all the privileges that Turkey herself wanted to fix under a UN guarantee, with possibility of dual nationality and protection against military service in Greece.

Mr. Averoff then said this was a period of high fever and one must seek to reduce the fever. If that is possible, one can—with good will—solve the problem.

He referred to the question of bases and said that though Greece in the past had not been opposed to British bases on Cyprus, Greece now felt that the bases on the island should be NATO bases, since UK bases only caused “foreign irritation”. (He reported that Nasser had said he had nothing against NATO bases in Cyprus, though he objected to British bases there.) Averoff also said the bases and the island might come under some NATO administration.

Steps towards a solution could be taken, said Mr. Averoff, either through NATO, which required “quiet, old-fashioned diplomacy” or through the return of Archbishop Makarios, whose influence was obviously very great on the island.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

In response to Mr. Averoff’s presentation, the Secretary remarked that the Greek Foreign Minister had gone much more deeply into the substance of the Cyprus controversy than he himself was prepared to go and had demonstrated the wide range of the problem. The Secretary added that he had been particularly impressed by Mr. Averoff’s remark that one must get the temperature down.

The Secretary made the following additional points:

(1) Debates in the UN were most useful if they avoided emotional attacks and merely exposed problems to world opinion. The educational value of debates was often much greater than the advantage gained by pushing through some resolution by a narrow margin.

(2) In the past few days we had told both Turkish and British representatives that in this matter big issues were being lost sight of and too much heat was directed to minor issues. If each party is ready to make concessions, the harm to them individually would be much less than the harm that might come to all from the greater dangers.

(3) Mr. Averoff’s willingness to find a solution within some NATO framework was welcomed.

(4) Although Mr. Averoff had remarked that in this dispute between our three friends there might be some embarrassment, we had shown lately that in order to do the right thing we were willing to take sides even against a friend.

The Secretary further remarked that Mr. Averoff had spoken in a spirit of great moderation.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–1357. Confidential. Drafted by Williams.
2. In Gadel 137, February 8, the Department instructed the Mission at the United Nations to make clear to the British, Greeks, and Turks that the United States planned to take no further initiative at this time. (Ibid.,747C.00/2–657)