Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

204. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, October 25, 1956—7 p.m.

2280. Paris for Dillon and Perkins. Principal officers only. Barbour and Holmes met with Nutting, who was accompanied by Young this afternoon. Nutting was profuse in his apologies about delay, saying that he literally had not been able to get the appropriate ministers together to consider the Greek proposal. He also expressed regret that the reply was so negative in character.

He handed over a memorandum, the text of which is being transmitted in the next following telegram.² It was interesting to note that the copy handed Barbour had as a heading the following: “revised formula for reply to Mister Juliett Holmes”, while the original did not bear this heading.

After reading the memorandum, Holmes observed that the 3-year period proposed by the Greeks, as compared with the 10-year period in HMG’s proposals of last June, was obviously a starting point by the Greeks and was certainly susceptible of negotiation. He also took issue with the statement that the Greek proposal did not take into account British continuing interest in Cyprus and the eastern Mediterranean or of Turkish interests. Clarification was asked on these and other points in the text, but none was forthcoming. Nutting said at this point that the Greek proposals were also less favorable than the British plan of last June in that they did not contain the security pacts. Holmes observed that he had no reason to believe that the Greeks would not be willing to accept such pacts.

Both Barbour and Holmes tried repeatedly to get over the point that it might be worthwhile for the British to make a counterproposal which would be acceptable to them and which would be as nearly acceptable to the Turks as possible. These suggestions met with no response.

Nutting made a great deal of the known adamant attitude of the Turks, bringing out a memorandum of conversation between Lloyd and Birgi shortly after the conclusion of the last Suez conference in which Birgi recited the well-known Turkish opposition to any change in the status quo.

Nutting indicated that it was a substantially firm decision by HMG that they would go ahead with the Radcliffe constitution, saying that it was better to take one step at a time. He felt certain that the truly liberal constitution which would be developed would be unsatisfactory to the Turks and they expected a serious disagreement with them about it. In response to a question, Nutting said that Radcliffe would probably submit this report and draft constitution to the government within about 10 days time. Holmes then asked whether or not it was the intention of HMG to consult with the Greeks and Turks or at least to show them the constitution before its promulgation. Holmes suggested the possibility that prior consultation with the Greeks might win their support for the constitution, and through them it might even be possible to get Makarios’ approval and hence contribute to the cessation of terrorism and the acceptance of the constitution by the Cyprus population. Nutting replied that no decision had been made on the question of consultation but gave it as his personal opinion that it would probably be better to promulgate the constitution unilaterally, possibly with showing the text to the Greeks and the Turks an hour in advance.

It was clear that the British have decided not to attempt a negotiated solution at the present time but on the contrary intend to proceed unilaterally. Presumably they believe that by the publication of a liberal constitution their public position will be improved.

There followed some discussion about the inscription of the Greek and British items on the agenda of the UN, and in response to a direct question, Nutting replied that although the Greeks had been notified in advance of the British intention to inscribe, there had been no understanding with them to postpone both items to the end of the UN Agenda. He said that although HMG had not yet decided on the position it would take, he felt that it might prove to be advantageous to have the debate early in the General Assembly. To Holmes query as to whether or not this meant that the British had given up any hope of a negotiated settlement, Nutting replied that even if the debate occurred at the end of the session, the time available would be only 3 months and he doubted that there was any chance of getting a settlement in that period of time.

We believe that the attitude described above is a part of the current British mood of self-assertion in anything having to do with the Middle East. As has been shown in the Suez matter, they have taken the position of “thus far and no farther”. All arguments tending to show the advantages of an agreed settlement met with no success.

Nutting asked Holmes whether or not he intended to go to Ankara for talks with the Turks. Holmes replied that he was not inclined to discuss the Greek proposals with the Turks in the light of the flat British rejection of them. He felt that it might be worthwhile to make a general sounding of the Turkish position, that he would decide about this later and let Nutting know whether or not he intended to go to Ankara.

Holmes feels that it would nevertheless be desirable to discuss these developments generally with Turks. If any appreciable give in Turkish attitude should be forthcoming, we would be justified in going back at British in view of importance for British position they have represented as attaching to Turkish adamancy. Another reason for doing this is the fact that according to report from Embassy Ankara, Birgi has a good idea of Holmes omission and it not be in US interests to fail to consult with the third principal party to the Cyprus controversy. Unless instructed by the Department to the contrary, Holmes will proceed to Ankara on Sunday.³

We feel that some statements should be made immediately to the Greeks with regard to the reception of their proposal in London, and suggest that if Department agrees instruction be sent to Allen to tell the Greek Government that the British have not found the Greek position acceptable, that one of the important considerations in reaching this attitude was British conviction that the Turks would find them wholly unacceptable, and that Holmes is going to Ankara to have a general discussion of the problem with the Turkish Government.⁴

Aldrich

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–2556. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia.
2. Telegram 2281, October 25, transmitted the text of the British rejection of the Greek proposals, which noted that the proposals did not “form a realistic basis for a settlement.”(Ibid.)
3. October 28.

4. On October 26, the Department informed the Embassies at London and Athens as follows:

   “To London: Approve suggestion penultimate paragraph Section 2 reftel. Department envisages Holmes returning to London for further attempt persuade HMG reconsider. May wish stop Athens en route Ankara to London for exploration with GOG British objections re time period and Turk interests.

   “To Athens: Approve suggestion last paragraph Section 2 reftel.” (Telegram 1498 to Athens, October 26; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–2556)

   Subsequently the Embassy at Athens informed the Department that Karamanlis and Averoff were both in Salonkia until October 30 and suggested that Holmes proceed to Ankara. In telegram 939 from Ankara, October 30, Warren informed the Department that Menderes would not be able to meet with Holmes before November 1. (Ibid., 747C.00/10–3056)