Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

205. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, November 3, 1956—8 p.m.

1002. Principal officers only; Paris for Dillon and Perkins. Holmes and I had an hour’s conversation alone with Prime Minister evening of second.

Holmes explained mission and Menderes response was immediate and cordial, saying that it was understandable that the “head of the family should take the initiative in settling a family row”. He went on to say that Turkey was anxious to bring the Cyprus dispute to a successful conclusion and, although Turkey’s interests in the problem were vital and that the issue had become one of first importance in terms of internal politics, Turkey, nevertheless, was prepared to do everything possible to contribute to a solution. Menderes confirmed reports from Athens that Hacopulos, a Greek member of the Turkish Parliament, was acting as go-between in an endeavor to get Prime Ministers of Turkey and Greece together in hopes of making progress on Cyprus and improving relations in general. He said that Hacopulos was in Ankara and was to depart November 3 for Athens to transmit agreement for meeting. Prime Minister said that it would not be possible for him and Karamanlis to meet without publicity but that arrangements would probably be made for Etem Menderes, Acting Foreign Minister, to meet Averoff, possibly some place in Europe on latter’s return from UNGA. He went on to say that it might later be decided for Etem Menderes to attend GA, in which case he and Averoff would have ample opportunity for discussion in New York. Prime Minister intimated that this exchange with Greeks was on Turkish initiative and pointed to this fact as evidence Turkish desires to improve situation.

Holmes outlined his personal opinion as to present Greek and British attitudes, saying that he was convinced that Greeks were very anxious to dispose of Cyprus matter and prepared to accept any reasonable formula which Karamanlis could justify with Greek public opinion. He pointed out that the British were proceeding with Radcliffe constitution and that in his view UK would inevitably be obliged institute self-government Cyprus as soon as local conditions would permit. He offered purely personal suggestion that delay in coming to grips with the problem would benefit no one and that it might be advantageous to assist the present British Government in setting a pattern of self-government, particularly in the light of the public commitment of the British Labor Party to self-determination and the possibility, at least, that should Labor come to power a solution favorable to Turkey might be more difficult of attainment than with the present Conservative government. Menderes attitude was extremely friendly, including repeated assurances of the importance to Turkey of the NATO alliance and particularly the relationship with the US. He said he would discuss our conversation with the President and his colleagues, and see us again November 3.

Holmes and I were called to the Foreign Office at noon today and had an hour and a half with Acting Foreign Minister Etem Menderes and Birgi. Much of the conversation of the evening before was repeated with Birgi acting as interpreter. Holmes went a little further in offering as his own purely exploratory idea of a possible formula which would consist of the UK consulting both Greece and Turkey with regard to the Radcliffe constitution and giving both these governments an opportunity to comment. The purpose of this consultation would be to permit Turkey and Greece to approve the constitution. This would perhaps enable the Greek Government, having once agreed, to persuade Makarios to support the self-government plan and to call on the Greek Cypriots for a cessation of violence. The British Government would make a public statement reaffirming the applicability of self-determination to Cyprus but saying that circumstances do not permit its application now; that the problem must be approached in a gradual and orderly manner and the first step would be self-government; that after self-government had proved a success and when political and strategic conditions in eastern Mediterranean permitted, HMG would address itself to the problem of self-determination. This formula would have the virtue of postponing the question of self-determination to the indefinite future but would set the pattern for a period during which self-government could be developed, peace would reign on the island, and an opportunity would be had for a reestablishment of friendly relations between Greece and Turkey and between the UK and Greece.

Preceded by a long explanation of the background of Greek behavior and the deterioration of Greco-Turkish relations, wherein all the blame attached to Greece, Etem Menderes said that in his view such a formula would not be accepted by Turkish public opinion as it would be construed only as a corridor leading to Enosis.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

After more general discussion, Holmes asked Menderes whether or not he agreed that the Cyprus problems should not be allowed to run on and that steps should be taken forthwith to finding a settlement. To this he agreed, which is at least a step away from rigid position of no change in the status quo which the Turks have taken up to now. The Prime Minister’s attitude was more conciliatory and forthcoming than the Foreign Minister’s position today. Whether this balance was introduced by design, it is difficult to say. It may be significant that Birgi was not present at the conversation with Prime Minister but was present with the Foreign Minister. It should be noted that in this last discussion, Birgi acted as interpreter and made little or no contribution of his own to the discussion.

The interview ended with an invitation from the Foreign Minister for Holmes and me to dine with him and Birgi privately evening of November 4. He expressed hope that the Prime Minister could join us. I shall do what I can to encourage the Prime Minister’s attendance as we believe the meeting will be more productive if he is there.²

Warren

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–356. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Ankara, and Nicosia.

2. In telegram 1015 from Ankara, November 5, Warren reported the substance of a November 4 meeting among Holmes, Acting Foreign Minister Etem Menderes, and Birgi. At the meeting the Turks expressed a willingness to arrange a meeting between Averoff and Etem Menderes in Europe after the Greek Foreign Minister’s return from the General Assembly. Warren noted: “Our assessment of the Turkish attitude as presented last night is that there is definite move away from the rigidity heretofore expressed. We believe that direct US interest in this matter has influenced them to be somewhat more forthcoming in working toward settlement.” (Ibid.,747C.00/11–556)

   In telegram 1027, November 6, the Embassy at Ankara reported that Holmes left for Athens that morning. (Ibid., 120.1540/11–656) That evening Holmes met with Averoff to convey his impressions of his talks with the Turks. According to Ambassador Allen, Holmes informed the Greek Foreign Minister of the genuine Turkish desire to effect a settlement of the Cyprus problem. Averoff reportedly agreed and added that arrangements had been made for him to meet with Etem Menderes in Paris. (Telegram 1632, from Athens, November 7; ibid., 120.1540/11–756)