Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

203. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, October 8, 1956—9 p.m.

1918. Principal officers only. Paris for Dillon and Perkins. Barbour and Holmes with Nutting and Kirkpatrick this afternoon. Holmes gave an account of his impression of the Greek attitude with regard to the Cyprus question with special emphasis on the vulnerability of Karamanlis vis-à-vis opposition and public opinion, concluding with the statement that he was convinced that Greeks are genuinely anxious for settlement.

Holmes handed Nutting copy of Greek position which had been authorized by Karamanlis.² He then added the points which the Greeks had authorized him to convey orally (Athens nos. 1181³ and 1182 to Department⁴).

There followed a general discussion consisting principally of comments that the three-year period was too short a time for self-government to begin to function properly, and paragraph 7 of the Greek paper which was considered as giving Makarios veto power over any Anglo-Greek agreement which might be reached. Holmes said that he thought it might be possible to obtain a longer period than three years from the Greeks if a counter proposal did not depart too radically from the basic formula on self-determination. He went on to say that he had told Averoff that he doubted that the British would accept the proposal concerning consultation with Makarios as set forth in paragraph 7. A discussion then followed as to the advisability of insisting with the Greeks that if an agreement is reached with them it Will be applicable regardless of the final attitude of the Archbishop.

Holmes then told the British that he had been authorized by Averoff to say that Greeks felt it imperative to go ahead with the inscription of their item on the GA agenda, that Averoff had stated he thought they would be successful in obtaining inscription but that he would make a formal commitment that the Greeks would immediately move to place the item at the end of the agenda. Averoff pointed out that this would give 2 or 3 months during which a negotiated solution might be reached. Nutting said that the British had definitely decided that they had no alternative but to inscribe their complaints against the Greeks. Holmes suggested for British consideration that they inform the Greek Minister advance of their intention to inscribe, saying that they understood the Greeks would move to have their item placed at the end of the agenda and that if this were confirmed British would do likewise. Nutting appeared to be impressed by this suggestion.

There were several remarks made about the difficulty of the position which the Turks would likely take particularly on the formula on self-determination but nothing new emerged in this part of the discussion.

The general reception of the Greek terms was non-committal but was not negative. Nutting said that the matter would be considered by HMG and he would communicate with Embassy as soon as possible.⁵ Department may care pass UN portion this message to New York.

Aldrich

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1540/10–856. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Paris, Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia.
2. The text of the Greek position was transmitted in telegram 1182 from Athens, October 7. Among the points enumerated in the Greek position were direct and unreserved recognition of the principle of self-determination, application of self-determination to be made by a three-fifths vote in the NAC or by the British Government and the elected government of Cyprus, and the granting of a liberal constitution. (Ibid., 747C.00/10–756)
3. Supra.
4. See footnote 2 above.
5. See infra.