Office of the Historian

211. Letter From the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Ambassador in Cambodia (McClintock)1

Washington, July 5, 1955.

Dear Rob: We have certainly had a go-around over your MAAG agreement during the past ten months. I recall that when you left [Page 465] Washington last September, one of your last words was to get the MAAG agreement pouched out to Cambodia in a hurry so that we could get it negotiated and signed by the King. When we were in Phnom Penh in March, we assumed somewhat lightly that we might be through with the negotiations and have a MAAG established there by early April. And it is still with us.

I have been frankly surprised at the suddenness and bitterness of the Indian reaction, since I have tried to keep the Indian Embassy here informed and since you have been doing the same thing in Phnom Penh. My conclusion is that Nehru and Menon either were not informed or have ignored the information coming to them through these channels. It seems to me three things have set off the Indians:

(a)
The idea of an Indian training mission has been toyed with in various quarters—the Secretary, Eden, Nehru and U Nu. At Bandung, Nehru, U Nu, Prince Sihanouk and Chou En-lai discussed the possibility of an Indian training mission. Apparently an understanding was reached that an Indian training group would be more satisfactory in terms of Cambodian “neutrality” than an American training mission. Sihanouk apparently agreed or did not object so Nehru and U Nu, and presumably Chou En-lai were surprised when they learned in the press three weeks later of the signing of the MAAG agreement. They assume that the agreement precludes an Indian training mission and that we deliberately concluded the agreement for that purpose. I have been getting intimations from the British that the Indians think we rushed the timing of the signature in Phnom Penh for that reason. Of course at that time we hadn’t a clue about the Bandung talks. The Prince returned to Cambodia, considered the agreement, and endorsed it. As far as I know he never mentioned the Bandung talks to you. The problem now is to explain to the Indians that there is no theoretical conflict between the agreement and the Indian assistance for Cambodia in any form.
(b)
The Chinese Communists have probably put a great deal of pressure on Nehru either bluntly or subtly to oppose the MAAG agreement and US assistance to Cambodia. At Geneva, Chou En-lai tried to close us out of Cambodia without success. Now he is back at it again. An Indian definition of “making and reducing tension” is that when the Chinese Communists object to something that we do, then we must undo whatever that is to reduce their tensions.
(c)
The Indians and the Burmese, and perhaps others, have assumed that the MAAG agreement automatically means US money, equipment and instructors in toto to the exclusion of the Indians or anyone else. This is not necessarily so. Whether or not this can be cleared up, it is certainly our intention to try and I believe the Secretary will go [has gone?] into the situation with U Nu.2 The latter may raise it himself.

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In any event I hope that the MAAG fellows will comport themselves with full discretion and common sense in Cambodia. I told Colonel Moore that an unobtrusive mission would be far more effective both with the Cambodians as well as with others there. I suggested that Col. Moore and his people make contact with the Indian and Canadian military insofar as you thought it was advisable. I am somewhat disturbed that CINCPAC has given MAAG Cambodia a 12 July deadline for submitting a report. If they need more time to do a better job, I hope you will see to it that they get it.

I am enclosing some recent briefing papers on the MAAG problem that we have prepared for the Secretary.3 Also I am enclosing an informal paper we have given to U Nu.4

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Kenneth T. Young, Jr.5
  1. Source: Department of State, PSA Files: Lot 58 D 207, SEA, Cambodian Correspondence, Nov. 1954–Dec. 1955. Secret; Official-–Informal.↩
  2. Apparent reference to discussions with U Nu in Washington; for reports, see Documents 208 and 209.↩
  3. Apparent reference to UNU D/5, June 27, “U.S. Military Aid Agreement with Cambodia”, not printed. (Department of State, FE Files: Lot 56 D 679, Briefing Papers—U Nu Meeting)↩
  4. A copy is attached to a letter from Young to Arthur R. Ringwalt, First Secretary of the Embassy in London, July 6, not printed. (Ibid., PSA Files: Lot 58 D 207, London Correspondence, 1949–1955)↩
  5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩