Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, July 8, 1955—7:12 p.m.

48. New Delhi 30 repeated London 3 Phnom Penh 4 Ottawa 3;² Phnom Penh 19 repeated London 3 Ottawa 2 New Delhi 3 Paris 4.³ We concur general thinking helpful New Delhi 30.

Agree Nehru not likely be impressed by U.S. legal interpretations even if his opposition to agreement based only language. Brief statement intent, based primarily political arguments rather than strictly legal rebuttal, already given Indian Embassy for Krishna Menon. It explained 1) pact does not call for military bases and we do not intend establish such bases; 2) does not involve Cambodian participation SEACDT; 3) agreement supplement to 1950 and 1951 mutual defense pacts undertaken at Cambodian request to underline new direct relationship two countries; 4) transit provision does not commit Cambodia permit transit equipment destined other countries but merely to grant tax exemption if such transit permitted; 5) contribution defensive strength free world conformed principles UN Charter and does not involve military alliance. Copies memo being pouched.⁴

We are rather hopeful Eden–Macmillan talks with Nehru, covering points listed Deptel 38 to London repeated Phom Penh 10 Ottawa 6 New Delhi 12 Paris 31,⁵ will do much bring Nehru to recognition U.S. intent in MDA Agreement does not violate Geneva. If British do not turn trick, we agree it would be helpful you see Nehru, using arguments paragraph 6 New Delhi 30⁶ if objections based language only or of paragraph 9⁷ if opposition is to fundamental U.S. concept collective security.

Suggest, however, you not approach Nehru until specific instruction received. We wish wait before taking direct action until 1) receipt London’s reports British conversations with Nehru, and 2) initial ICC reaction prospective Cambodian reply to ICC letter requesting confirmation Cambodian position (Phnom Penh 19). We assume Cambodian reply will not end matter, but that problem will be referred with ICC Chairman recommendation to Nehru.

With respect U.S. explanation of intent to ICC, we fully agree with Embassy Phnom Penh that ICC entirely out of bounds in believing it can hold us directly accountable or in expecting direct communication from us. Phnom Penh reports indicate Indians tacitly accept contention only spokesman for MDA Agreement is Cambodia.

U.S. note to Cambodia for incorporation letter to ICC if Cambodia desires is of course entirely proper. We are sending to Phnom Penh detailed Legal Adviser statement⁸ our interpretation language to which ICC objects for possible Cambodian use. We shall prepare separate statement of intent addressed Cambodian Government for similar use if proves advisable.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5–MSP/7–655. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Byrne; cleared with PSA, SOA, and L/MSA (in draft); and approved by Robertson. Repeated to Phnom Penh, Ottawa, Paris, and London.
2. In telegram 30, July 6, the Embassy in New Delhi reported that India was likely to support an ICC decision that the language of the U.S.-Cambodian military assistance agreement of May 16 could be interpreted as in contravention of the Geneva agreement on Cambodia. The Embassy’s opinion was that Nehru was not likely to be impressed with U.S. legal explanations to the contrary. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 19, July 6, contained the text of a letter from ICC Chairman Parthasarathi, not dated but presumed to be July 5, to the Cambodian Foreign Minister. The letter was a summation of the charges before the ICC and the defense offered by the Cambodian Government. (Ibid.)
4. Not found in Department of State files.
5. Document 210.
6. Paragraph 6 of telegram 30 from New Delhi reads in part as follows: “If purposes of US are thoroughly explained to Nehru, it will give GOI opportunity to say to ICC, ‘the wording is capable of different interpretations, but the US and Cambodia have explained their purposes clearly. How can their statement be refused?’ Nehru has been accepting ‘declarations of intent’ of Soviets, Chinese Communists, etc. in order to ‘reduce tensions’, to ‘morally contain’, and it would be difficult to do less with US.”
7. Paragraph 9 argued for a frank exposition to Nehru of U.S. policy, especially toward collective security.
8. According to telegram 50 to Phnom Penh, the Department decided that the Legal Adviser’s statement could not be validly summarized and was too lengthy to submit by telegram except in an emergency. (Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5–MSP/7–1555)