208. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 29, 19551
SUBJECT
- MDAP Agreement with Cambodia
PARTICIPANTS
- U Nu, Prime Minister of Burma2
- U Thant, Secretary to U Nu
- James Barrington, Ambassador of Burma
- The Secretary
- FE—Walter S. Robertson
- FE—William J. Sebald
The Secretary said that he was somewhat concerned at the apparent misunderstandings which had arisen by reason of our negotiation and signature of the MDAP agreement with Cambodia. He understood that India had felt that the conclusion of the agreement was contrary to the remarks which he, the Secretary, had made to U Nu during his visit in Rangoon3 and which U Nu had passed on to Nehru.4 He felt that the agreement was in no way inconsistent with his suggestion that U Nu examine into the possibility of India sending a training mission to Cambodia, and still considers it desirable that India undertake some responsibility for Cambodia and Laos.
The Secretary said that the chief purpose of the agreement entered into was to ensure compliance with our statutes and regulations and to enable us to take advantage of the presence in Viet-Nam of large stocks of military equipment which we felt should be delivered [Page 461] to the Cambodians without delay. The question of who should train the Cambodians or how this should be done is not a part of the agreement. If the Cambodians are supplied with equipment, it would seem logical that the agreement would have made it easier for the Indians to undertake the training. It was his understanding that the Indians had made it clear that they do not have the financial resources to furnish military “hardware” or other equipment to Cambodia but that they would be able to send a training mission of approximately 200 officers and men. As the situation now stands, no agreement has been reached as to who should do the training of the Cambodian army. The Secretary mentioned the inability of the French to agree with our proposal that we undertake this training, feeling that the United States is thereby attempting to displace French influence and culture in Cambodia. Ambassador Barrington asked whether the Indians, if they were to send a mission, would have the same problem. The Secretary thought they would, as the French are rather persistent in holding on to the training program.
Mr. Sebald said that we understood from Mr. Menon that the Indians were under the impression that the United States had proceeded with the negotiation and conclusion of the agreement “behind the backs” of all concerned. This was not true, as the Indian Minister of the Indian Embassy in Washington had been kept informed on a periodic basis both during the time of negotiation and when the agreement was ready for signature. Mr. Robertson pointed out that the Embassy at Phnom Penh had also kept the Indian Ambassador to Cambodia and the Chairman of the ICC informed in like manner. It was therefore contrary to fact to say that the Indians had not been kept informed—we did not, of course, know whether the Indian officials concerned had reported back to their Government, but we could, of course, only work through the Indian Government’s representatives. The Secretary said Mr. Menon had not raised this matter with him, but had mentioned it to Mr. Young along the lines indicated.
U Nu said that he had no direct interest in this affair. His only connection with the problem arose out of the Secretary’s request made in Rangoon that he sound out Nehru on the question of an Indian training mission to Cambodia. He said that in consequence of the Secretary’s request, he had discussed the problem at length with Nehru and Chou En-lai in New Delhi. The letter which he had sent to the Secretary from Rangoon was the result of the joint drafting efforts of Nehru, Chou En-lai and himself. He pointed out that Chou had no objection to the Indians taking over training in Cambodia, on the premise that the Chinese Government can trust the Indians and know that they would not be operating against the CPR. On the other hand, U Nu was convinced that if the Americans undertook [Page 462] the training program it would be considered a threat to the CPR. In consequence the Chinese Communists would undoubtedly send in agents to cause difficulties in Cambodia. He felt therefore, in the interests of lessening tension in the area, that it would be preferable for the Indians to undertake the training. It was his understanding that Eden would discuss this problem with Nehru when the latter visits London next month.
Ambassador Barrington raised the question whether it would be necessary for the United States to have a military mission in Cambodia to carry on end-use checks (as suggested by Mr. Sebald). He felt that if the Indians should send a training mission, the presence of two missions would cause difficulties. The Secretary said he was not sure whether we could delegate end-use checks to someone else, but said we would look into the matter with our legal advisers.
It was agreed that this problem would be further discussed during the meeting to be held on Friday afternoon.5
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5–MSP/6–2955. Secret. Drafted by Sebald and approved by Robertson and Dulles.↩
- U Nu visited Washington, June 29–July 3. For documentation on the visit, see vol. XXII, pp. 13 ff.↩
- Dulles was in Rangoon, February 26–27. No mention of discussion on Cambodia is contained in Dulte 16, February 27, Dulles’ report to the President, printed ibid., p. 3. Neither is there any report on such discussions in another summary of the Dulles–U Nu meeting, Secto 41, February 27, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/2–2755)↩
- U Nu reported on his discussions with Nehru on this question in a letter to Dulles, May 3, not printed. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Dulles–U Nu Correspondence)↩
- See the memorandum of conversation infra.↩