89. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
942. Reference Emtel 941.2 Ben Gurion’s oral comments to me in transmitting letter closely followed its pattern. In addition, he dwelt on what he said he considers enigma of highest world authority, supported by US as world’s leading state, discriminating against “tiny Israel” and demanding adherence by it to UN resolutions in favor of Egypt which for years had defied—not merely General Assembly which can only recommend, but Security Council itself.
Pursuing theme which is currently popular with Cabinet and Foreign Ministry, he said US probably owed to Sinai campaign some share of its present successes with Arab world. It was his view Saud never would have had courage to defy Nasser by visiting US if Nasser had not first been humiliated by IDF. Similarly, Lebanon is expressing views which it has entertained long time but had not courage to express openly until Nasser’s defeat Jordan was another. In October, Hussein had become party to alliance with Syria and Egypt with avowed purpose destroying Israel. Now he was emboldened to take more independent line. Saud’s visit and agreements reached with him were of importance to US which should not endanger these gains by giving Nasser victory in present UN test which would then enable him to reassert authority over Arab states.
I said that I was disturbed by unvarying insistence by press and Israel officials that so much responsibility rested with US and I pointed out that from beginning we had thought UN was most suitable authority to seek solution. It was unreasonable to charge US with responsibility for every knotty problem UN encountered. His rejoinder was that nevertheless, US position would determine final answer.
We discussed report carried in press late today that President has asked Nasser whether he is prepared to express intention of non-belligerence.
If President had delivered such message, he could anticipate Nasser’s reply. It would be, “not unless Israel withdrew from Sharm el Sheikh and Gaza in which case he would be willing to comply”. But with Israel out, old story of murder and blockage would begin again. Nasser’s word was not to be relied on; that was why Israel had to have more than Egypt’s guarantees on freedom of transit Tiran Straits.
[Page 149]Ben Gurion said Eban had Tuesday appointment with Secretary3 at which time he thought they might expect latter’s comments on reply to President.
He apologized and blamed his personal misunderstanding of customary procedures that virtually final text of letter had been given to Murphy by Eban Friday without advice to me. I do not know reason for this procedure but presume it may have been arranged by his aides at Eban’s request in order to enable him to get Department’s ear at what they regard as critical juncture.
Ben Gurion is still confined to bedroom but is receiving official visitors. In my opinion he looks no better than when I saw him last week. However, he and aide told me he continues to improve and only doctors are restraining him. I could elicit no comment on his condition from Mrs. Ben Gurion.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–1257. Confidential; Priority; Presidential Handling. Received at 6:52 p.m.↩
- Telegram 941 from Tel Aviv, February 10, contained the text of Ben Gurion’s message to Eisenhower, Document 68.↩
- Eban met instead with Murphy. See Document 87.↩