87. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 12, 19571
SUBJECT
- Gaza and Aqaba
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
- Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel
- G—Mr. Robert Murphy
- NE—Mr. Donald C. Bergus
The Israel Ambassador stated that he had transmitted the text of the aide-mémoire and had reported yesterday’s conversation with the Secretary to the Foreign Minister, who was now in New York. He did not wish to prejudge what must be a Cabinet decision, but he and the Foreign Minister felt this was a serious and constructive step on the part of the United States. The approach regarding Aqaba had been welcomed, and he thought his Government would respond to it affirmatively.
He noted that the United States position on Gaza was obscure and felt that the United States might want to elucidate it. The crux of the issue was who would be in charge of the civil administration upon the entry of the United Nations forces. There were three possible elements: United Nations, Israel and Egypt. There was perhaps a fourth element, local administration. Israel had the negative objective of preventing Egypt’s return. Mr. Eban felt that the United Nations would have a basis for excluding Egypt, in that Egypt continued in a state of belligerency towards Israel. Mr. Eban repeated the usual arguments for not sundering the links between Israel and Gaza and not returning a strip of territory so close to the center of Israel to a status of being at war with Israel. Mr. Eban recalled the Secretary’s speech of August 26, 1955,2 and said that Gaza, under Israel civil administration could be a “pilot project” for repatriation to such extent as may be feasible for resettlement. Mr. Shiloah expressed apprehension over the possibility of Gaza becoming a center of subversion if the UNEF tried to administer it.
Mr. Murphy inquired whether Israel had any ideas as to how the proposals which it suggested could be handled at the United Nations in New York. Mr. Eban felt that something could be worked out, keyed to the theme of Egypt’s belligerency and the undesirability of returning to Gaza. Mr. Murphy felt that the overriding authority of the United Nations had to be taken into account and noted that the November 2 resolution called for unqualified withdrawal behind the armistice lines. Mr. Eban ventured the thought that, given the establishment of a purely United Nations regime, the regime might wish to call [Page 146] upon Israel to provide certain essential services in the strip. Mr. Shiloah suggested that the United Nations might wish to appoint a Commission to look into the problem of Gaza.
Mr. Eban stated that he had urged his Government to make an early reply to the United States Aide-Mémoire. He felt that such a reply might be forthcoming by Thursday, February 14. He hoped that action in the General Assembly could be deferred meanwhile. Israel still adhered to its demand that Israel shipping should be able to use the Suez Canal. They assumed that United States support for Israel’s position on this point continued. Mr. Murphy confirmed that there had been no change in our position. Mr. Eban pointed out that despite some press reports to the contrary, Israel’s right of transit through the Suez Canal was not being made a condition of Israel withdrawal. Israel anticipated some type of litigation over Suez and felt that the onus should be on Egypt to prove, if it could, that Israel had no such right. Mr. Shiloah predicted that the Israel Foreign Minister and Ambassador Eban would shortly be summoned to fly back to Israel for discussion on these important matters. The Israel Government would probably feel that such discussions were essential, although Mr. Shiloah felt that a directive to the Embassy here to make a preliminary reply to the aide-mémoire would be forthcoming very shortly. Mr. Shiloah suggested that the Department appoint somebody to carry out discussions with the Israelis in Washington as to how Gaza might be handled.
Mr. Eban asked if we considered that further General Assembly action was required. Mr. Murphy expressed the preliminary and personal view that the General Assembly would have to act at an early date. We were open-minded as to the form such action would take. He wondered whether the problems of Gaza and Aqaba were interrelated and tentatively concluded that they were.
It was agreed that the press would be told that this had been a routine meeting in which a number of problems, including matters arising from the Secretary’s talk with Mr. Eban of the previous day had been discussed.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–1257. Confidential. Drafted on February 13 by Bergus.↩
- For documentation on the Secretary’s speech, see vol. XVI, pp. 378 ff. For text of the speech, see Department of State Bulletin, September 5, 1955, pp. 378–380.↩