86. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State in Washington and the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) in New York, February 12, 1957, 2:22 p.m.1
TELEPHONE CALL TO AMBASSADOR LODGE
The Sec mentioned the long meeting this morning2 in which we came up with nothing better than to gain some time to give the Israelis time to reply. The Sec. mentioned the opposition here of new sanctions in Congress as being overwhelming. Probably would be unanimous vote for resolution against it in both Houses. The Secretary mentioned the letter just in from Lyndon Johnson re sanctions3 and read certain portions of it later in the conversation. Sec. said we were going to be in very serious trouble and indeed may lose our authority [Page 143] to impose sanctions. Sec. thought we had to stall on the thing. We did not want the Israelis to know we were weak on this thing at all. He said he thought it would be a great mistake if we gave the Egyptians reason to believe we were going to proceed. Sec. mentioned our resolution which was introduced in the Security Council calling for the member states as such not to give economic, financial and military aid.4 That did not call upon us to stop new aid. It was deliberately drawn up in that way. The resolution the Egyptians suggest5 says we should deny all aid, stopping all private dealings between this country and Israel.
Lodge asked if we weren’t giving aid now. The Secretary replied in the negative, saying we had stopped economic, financial and military assistance to Israel. The Sec. said we are also doing much the same thing to Egypt. We started doing that earlier with them because of the seizure of the Suez Canal Company.
The Secretary mentioned the interpretation in the papers of the Hammarskjold report. Sec. said that killed sanctions certainly as far as the GA was concerned and he wondered if Hammarskjold intended that. Lodge said H’s idea was to count to ten before doing it. It was serious. In many cases where it had been done it hadn’t been very successful. Lodge mentioned differences between Bunche and Hammarskjöld. . . . Sec. mentioned the news report from Jerusalem about the Gulf of Aqaba. Lodge said H wanted Lucius Clay as consultant, setting up administration of Gaza and to get Gen. Tomaya (?)6 who was in Korea to run it. Lodge mentioned writing a letter to Clay but the Secretary said the next time he spoke to the President he would mention to the President the suggestion about Clay. H. wants Clay as consultant in New York and setting up a staff there, according to Lodge. Sec. said he thought there would be no problem about that.
Lodge said he had had a long talk with Pearson this morning, who was thinking of putting in some kind of resolution of his own so that we won’t be faced with this Arab Resolution—yes or no. It would be coming up tomorrow and Lodge would try to stall as long as he could.
Lodge asked if the Sec. did not like the idea of the matter going into the SC. Sec. said it had some advantages over the GA. He imagined it would have quite a bit of debate in the SC. Lodge said you would have to work it out ahead of time. Sec. said if our resolution only talks about government-to-government operation it wasn’t going to have any practical effect at all. If it should go into private business, [Page 144] Sec. said he [we?] would be in really desperate position. If you could enforce it, it would be fatal for Israel. It would not have any influence at all on Egypt as a threat as something that might be put into operation. It was slap on wrist as far as Egypt was concerned and a death sentence as far as Israel was concerned. Israel can’t survive without proceeds of bonds. Israel’s life was at stake. Lodge said that the advantage of the Security Council was you could get much more explicit directive than from the GA. It might save everyone’s face to get it through the SC. The Egyptians were willing to do the right thing but they won’t admit it. Sec. asked if it would come up in plenary tomorrow and Lodge said yes. Lodge said Algiers would be completed this p.m. Sec. mentioned exposing our hand. Lodge said at least we were going to make it plain we were not going to sponsor.
Lodge asked when we expected to hear from Israelis. Sec. said by Thurs.—that Eban was seeing Murphy off the record at 6 today,7 which might throw some further light on the situation. If it did not, Sec. would be in touch with Lodge right away.8Lodge said he would be at a banquet tonight and unavailable between 6-10. Barco would be available and could get message to Lodge at Waldorf where banquet is to be held. Lodge thinks SC is worthy of thought. May be just the thing that will break the deadlock and all sides may be willing to do it. The Sec. mentioned the terrific control the Jews had over the news media and the barrage which the Jews have built up on Congressmen. Lodge said a lot could be done with Congress with a well-reasoned statement. The Secretary suggested Lodge saying something to the effect that we were trying very hard to find a solution there which would be acceptable to both sides. We believe that what we are discussing here would serve that purpose. Until we know their position we are not in a position to disclose our position much less to sponsor any resolution.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Asbjornson.↩
- According to Dulles’ Appointment Book, the Israeli situation was discussed at a meeting among Herter, Murphy, Rountree, Wilcox, Phleger, George, Richards, De Palma, and Secretary Dulles which began at 11:02 a.m. on February 12.↩
- Document 83.↩
- Reference is to the draft resolution introduced by the United States in the U.N. Security Council on October 30, 1956. See the editorial note, vol. XVI, p. 881.↩
- See footnote 4, supra.↩
- Lieutenant General K.S. Thimayya of the Indian Army served as Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea, June 1953–January 1954.↩
- See the memorandum of conversation, infra.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 88.↩