85. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1
Delga 706. Re: Palestine/SYG’s Report Israeli withdrawal.2 Lodge informed SYG of substance Dulles–Eban conversation as conveyed to Lodge by Secretary this morning. SYG said it was interesting and hopeful, and Israelis “now have something to point to if they wish to get out”.
He was pleased that our policy was based on full withdrawal of Israel. When Lodge informed SYG Israelis expressed concern to Secretary that Hammarskjold would not in fact move UNEF into Sharm el-Sheikh if Israelis withdrew, SYG said Israelis should look at his report. He once again stressed, as he did on Sunday,3 that if Israelis got out of both Gaza and Sharm el-Sheikh Egyptians would not interfere with rights of passage; if Israelis got out of only Sharm el-Sheikh and not Gaza, state of belligerency would be continued by them and would justify continuance of Egyptian action to obstruct passage into Aqaba. See Part I, paragraph 9 of SYG’s report (copies pouched Dept tonight).
SYG noted that Annex IV his report was letter received from Eban at 12:15 a.m. today. He regarded contents as … adding nothing to previous statements. It tried, he said, to convey impression that Israel’s non-withdrawal was due solely to SYG’s failure to move on Israel’s requests—a point which he has sought to knock down in Part I his report. SYG also noted that Israel made mention for first time in his last minute letter of “timetable of withdrawal”.
In conclusion SYG said if US démarche started ball rolling, and if Eban’s reference to “timetable” had any meaning, so much the better. However, he was still doubtful they would budge.
Late this evening Fawzi and Loutfi (Egypt) called on Lodge at their request to obtain reaction to draft res on sanctions (text contained Delga 707)4 which they plan give to Afro-Asian group meeting this evening “as a draft”. They asked if we could have answer on this text [Page 142] by tomorrow. Lodge told them we would need instructions which we would request at once, but since it would require consideration on highest levels, we might not be able give them answer on Tuesday.
After brief discussion regarding Algeria (being reported separately), Fawzi referred to important aspect of timing. He noted he had agreed postpone plenary consideration Mid-East situation until Wednesday. There was, he said, another kind of timetable involving forthcoming consultations among Arab leaders, especially in Cairo. He said King Saud would be stopping there to compare notes. From all points of view—especially political, psychological—Fawzi said, it was “difficult exaggerate importance of King Saud being able to say to other Arab leaders that good intentions in Eisenhower Doctrine and elsewhere in US policy were matched to reasonable extent by actions”. Fawzi went on to say it would be extremely hard for Saud to obtain any reasonable reaction to US policy if Israel were still on Egyptian territory. Likewise, US policy on Algeria would have important bearing on reception by Arab leaders of Saud’s presentation.
Fawzi concluded by saying he did not belittle America’s difficulties in present circumstances, either technically or politically.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–1157. Confidential; Priority. Received at 11:43 p.m.↩
- On February 11, Hammarskjöld released the “Report of the Secretary-General in pursuance of the resolution of the General Assembly of 2 February 1957”. (U.N. doc. A/ 3527)↩
- February 10.↩
- The operative paragraphs of the Egyptian draft resolution (1) condemned Israel for its non-compliance with previous resolutions, (2) called upon all states to deny all military, economic and financial assistance and facilities to Israel, (3) requested all states to provide the Secretary-General with information on their implementations of the resolution, and (4) requested the Secretary-General to report again on the implementation of previous General Assembly resolutions. (Delga 707 from USUN, February 11; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–1157)↩