Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

41. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, May 29, 1955—noon.

1864. Re Department’s telegram 2050.² Mirza last night told me he had been surprised and concerned at nature of Ayub’s memorandum to Cabinet. He felt Ayub was bargaining too often and too hard. Said Cabinet hesitancy largely due to fear Turk-Iraq pact without US would likely be British-dominated. (Comment: I am sure Mirza feels strongly on this himself.) Mirza anxious for us to join pact, but willing for Pakistan to take step now, leaving it to US to make up its mind in due course. He expressed hope that I would receive instructions before Wednesday meeting of Cabinet which would enable me inform Prime Minister that US hoped Pakistan would join and encourage them to take step.

Reftel (with which Embassy concurs) provides adequate guidance, and I will pass on to Prime Minister position as outlined.³ I am concerned that Pakistanis will interpret any encouragement as implied commitment to give them support required to make effective their contribution to Middle East Defense. Embassy suspects that Ayub’s basic purpose is not so much to secure US participation in defense organization as to get commitment to raise additional army corps. Having failed to win latter objective in direct negotiation, he may now be approaching it by indirect route. As Embassy understands situation, some further expansion of Pakistan forces will probably be required if northern tier arrangement to assume area military significance. Pakistan participation in such arrangement not likely to be militarily meaningful unless such further expansion ultimately undertaken, since agreed that forces being raised under presently approved forces goal will be required home defense and internal security even assuming friendly India. If this understanding correct, Pakistan participation in defense arrangement under present circumstances considered desirable for political rather than military purposes. If this understanding not correct, please advise.⁴

Hildreth

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/5–2955. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Tehran, Cairo, and London.
2. Document 39.
3. Hildreth subsequently handed to Prime Minister Mirza an aide-mémoire that summarized the contents of telegram 2050. A copy of the aide-mémoire was transmitted to the Department of State in despatch 782 from Karachi, June 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6–355)
4. On June 22, Ayub arrived in Ankara for high-level talks with Turkish and Iraqi officials. On June 28, the Embassy in Ankara reported that Ayub had instructed that a cable be sent to Karachi recommending prompt Pakistani adherence to the Turco-Iraqi Pact. Ayub’s decision reportedly was made following two sessions with Turkish and Iraqi leaders, including President Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes, King Faisal, and Nuri Said. (Telegram 1629 from Ankara; Ibid., 682.87/6–2855) On June 30, the Embassy in Karachi reported that the Pakistani Cabinet had agreed to adhere to the Turkish-Iraqi Pact. (Telegram 2081 from Karachi; Ibid., 780.5/6–3055)