115. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 9, 1956, 10 a.m.1
SUBJECT
- Middle East
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Mr. MacArthur
- Admiral Radford
The Secretary said he had noted that the JCS had recommended that the US join the Baghdad Pact. He said we had given serious thought to this matter but that there were considerations which made it inadvisable at this juncture for us to join, or indicate that we would join, the Pact.
As part of his consideration of this matter, the Secretary had spoken privately both to Senator George and Senator Mansfield. Both felt that the injection into the Congress of the question of joining the Baghdad Pact would create a major explosion, and the judgment of the two Senators was that the Senate would not agree. Therefore, to propose joining the Pact and then to have it rejected by the Senate would be a death-blow to the Pact and would have much more serious and detrimental effect on the Pact at the present time than our not joining.
Another reason the Secretary felt it was unwise to join the Pact was that while the original Northern Tier concept had been a regional grouping to resist Soviet penetration and aggression, it had become really a forum for Arab politics and intrigue. The UK saw in the Baghdad Pact a means of preserving its position in Iraq and also viewed it as an instrument of supporting Nuri in his rivalry with Nasser and King Saud, as well as to support Iraq as against Syria and Jordan. In other words, the Baghdad Pact was dealing about 90% with Arab politics.
Even if we should join the Pact, the Secretary felt that the effect on Iraq would be extremely bad. The other Arab States would take the position that Iraq had sold out its solidarity with them against Israel for US membership in the Pact, and this might well result in toppling the Nuri Government.
Still another consideration was that if the US joined the Pact there would be almost irresistible pressures to give Israel a security guarantee, which would permanently alienate the Arab States and cause them to join solidly with the Soviet Union.
[Page 276]The Secretary concluded by saying that we fully agreed that the Baghdad Pact was in a precarious position and we were doing everything we properly could to show our support for it, short of joining.
Admiral Radford inquired what would happen if the Baghdad Pact fell apart. The Secretary said this would be a very serious situation, since the Soviets were avowed to destroy the Pact, and if it fell apart it would be viewed in the area as a Soviet victory and a major defeat for the West.
The Secretary then said we should give thought to what might be done if the Baghdad Pact started falling apart, and in this connection mentioned that it was conceivable that a situation might arise where Iraq withdrew from the Pact. In such event, one possibility was that the US might join in place of Iraq. Since we were already allied with the UK, Turkey, and Pakistan, it would not necessarily create a problem if we joined the Pact and allied ourselves with Iran. In such event, at least the Pact could be devoted to the purposes for which the Secretary had originally conceived it, namely, resistance to Soviet penetration and would not be mixed up in Arab politics.
The Secretary said the ideas he had just expressed were simply thinking out loud, as it were, but did seem worth examining on a contingency basis.
Admiral Radford mentioned a letter he had received from the Iraqi Chief of Staff indicating that to engage in the proper advance planning and utilization of resources, it would be helpful if the Iraqis could know about three years in advance what American equipment deliveries would be. This was a difficult question to answer in writing, and Admiral Radford was considering having an answer conveyed verbally to the Iraqis, which while not committing us to anything would at least not discourage them.
The Secretary mentioned that Senator Mansfield was following matters in the Middle East quite carefully, and it might be useful for Admiral Radford to see him. Admiral Radford concurred and said he would get in touch with the Senator.
[Here follows discussion of a proposal by Dulles for a pool of aircraft in the Middle East, and the Hammarskjöld mission. For text, see volume XV, page 496.]
- Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #1. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted by MacArthur.↩