114. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1
1557. London for CINCNELM. Paris for Wallner. Rome for Maffitt. I read from Deptel 1768, April 6,2 to Shah this morning. He listened most attentively, interrupting me at times to ask for repetition. When I concluded he stated that if he understood message correctly it meant that US Government was prepared to participate in pact as if member but without formal adherence.
He was delighted to know that US attributed such significance to forthcoming Council meeting that it was sending Deputy Under Secretary State, Admiral Cassady and an ICA regional director. He wondered whether we were deterred from actual adherence by fear of Nasser’s trouble-making potentialities.
We then discussed at considerable length general situation in ME and I again made point that now when there was evidence all not well in Soviet Union it was most important there should be no sign weakness or disagreement of part of West. He agreed emphatically and said he was much troubled over his forthcoming visit to Soviet Union now set for June 1. He did not want to go to Soviet Union but felt that he was so to speak “cornered”. He was certain that Soviets would put on very big show to impress him with their strength. He also expected that Soviets would make offers substantial economic and technical help and that offers would be presented in highly attractive form. He felt sure that word of these offers would be circulated effectively by Soviet propaganda machine and would promptly reach Iranian public. Voroshilov had spoken to Iranian Ambassador, Moscow, only two days ago to stress importance which Soviet Government placed on Shah’s visit. In this conversation, Voroshilov had admitted that Soviet policy had even up to recent past committed many errors with respect Turkey and Iran, but that Soviets were now sorry and wished sincerely to be friends and to be as helpful to both countries as they could. This same thought was stated by Mikoyan in personal conversation with Shah’s half brother in Karachi.
Shah was encouraged by message I had delivered. He hoped something tangible would be forthcoming as result Council meeting. It would be a benefit not only to stability this area, but directly to Iran. He said that unless something tangible emerged which could be [Page 274] shown to Iranian public, he would be in most embarrassing situation which would increase public difficulties of resisting blandishments he expected from Soviets during his visit Moscow.
I asked him if he could specify pact results that would meet his requirements. His reply not entirely specific, but as I understood it covered following points:
- (1)
- Firmer structure pact organization with full US support.
- (2)
- Possibility of regional economic development.
- (3)
- Substantial strengthening of pact military forces.
Re (1), he stated his belief that firm pact structure would give pause to such possible troublemakers as Afghanistan since that country, even if abetted by USSR, would not wish to take on whole Baghdad Pact membership, particularly if the US was in firm support even though not active member. He thought also that strong pact organization would be deterrent against Nasser’s schemes since although Nasser might create a great fuss he would not wish to challenge such stronger pact.
As regards (2), he thought that US might wish to consider development of now greatly increased oil reserves of Iran as offset to possible loss of production in an undependable and unfriendly country such as Saudi Arabia. This he gave as but one example economic development.
(3) It was essential for military security of whole ME that line of Iran defenses should now be Elburz, a defense concept in which he recalled Admiral Radford had concurred during his visit Tehran.
When I said that examples he had mentioned were primarily Iranian, he laughed and said that was true but that Turkey could give us an even longer bill of desiderata. He said that, as I knew, Menderes had threatened that if Turkey did not obtain certain objectives from the Council meeting, it would have to reconsider its entire foreign policy. Shah said Iran was not prepared to go that far.
He reiterated hope that assurances contained in telegram I had read to him were indication of some concrete contribution from the US.
After audience with Shah I saw Ala and read same message to him. He took notes on 8 points of US action in reference telegram. He was extremely pleased with message and reacted exactly as Shah had, equating US steps to decision to join pact in substance but not in form.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–956. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Karachi, Baghdad, London, Paris, and Rome.↩
- Printed as telegram 1665 to Ankara, Document 110.↩