Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

661.00/8–1054

No. 626
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] August 10, 1954.

In a recent letter² commenting on National Intelligence Estimate 11–5–54 (Soviet Capabilities and Main Lines of Policy Through Mid-1959),³ Ambassador Bohlen states he sincerely feels that it is quite impossible to forecast even the main lines of Soviet policy for five years in advance. He says: “Capabilities of an industrial or military nature are, of course, another matter and to some extent can be very roughly estimated for a considerable period in the future. In regard to policy, intentions, etc., however, I doubt very much if even the men in the Kremlin could give you a reasonable answer.”

With regard to the estimate in 11–5–54 that “the stability and authority of the Soviet regime will not be affected during the next five years by conflicts for power or differences respecting policy within the ruling group,” Ambassador Bohlen feels there is clearly some confusion of thought. If there is a serious conflict for power or if there are such deep policy differences with the ruling group as to result in a split with the elimination of one faction as against another, he feels that this could not happen without seriously affecting the Soviet regime. “The serious, if not catastrophic, consequences to the Soviet regime of a fight to the death for whatever reason within the ruling group is one of the reasons why Embassy Moscow has tended to be less sanguine about such a split occurring.” Ambassador Bohlen finds it difficult to believe that the men who run the Kremlin and who are aware of all its problems and difficulties would be unaware of the dangers.

He feels that present evidence does not justify any firm assumption concerning a struggle for power despite the undoubted existence of normal human rivalries and jealousies within the group. If, however, for a number of reasons such a struggle does break out, whether based on policy differences or individual rivalries, the entire Soviet regime will be affected.

Ambassador Bohlen has some reservation with regard to the NIE conclusion that “The Soviet rulers will almost certainly believe that, as Soviet nuclear capabilities increase, the aversion of the United States and its allies to general war will correspondingly increase, and that the Kremlin will therefore have greater freedom of action to pursue its objectives without running substantial risk of general war. Thus the Kremlin will be increasingly ready to apply heavy pressure on the non-Communist world.” He feels that in the field of nuclear diplomacy, “there is confusion between cause and effect. That increased Soviet nuclear capability will have an effect on the Western world and particularly our allies is already painfully evident. However, it is by no means certain or even probable that the Soviet Union will be prepared to take greater risks on that account. After all, despite their capability to control the public opinion, these men themselves cannot be unaffected by the consequences of an atomic war. . . .⁴ Malenkov’s election speech, which spoke about the dangers to world civilization of nuclear warfare, probably represented much more the true thinking than the subsequent backtracking to the more familiar line of destruction of capitalism.” Ambassador Bohlen feels, however, that Soviet activities in taking advantage of divisions in the Free World will be confined in large measures to the diplomatic and political as against the military field. He notes that although unfortunate signs of division have been rather prevalent in the Western camp recently, the Soviet Union has not seemed to be applying heavier pressure on that account.

Ambassador Bohlen is somewhat disturbed about renewed tendencies to explain Soviet developments in terms of a struggle for power among Soviet leaders. He feels that recognition of this policy is one thing but that its acceptance as a working hypothesis in the light of which all developments are interpreted is quite another. He points out that although the Embassy in Moscow has never dismissed the possibility that collective leadership at the top will break down, nevertheless, he does not feel the evidence tends to indicate that a serious fight is in progress.

In conclusion Ambassador Bohlen states that he feels any attempt to write a five-year paper is almost doomed in advance. “The longer I am here the more I believe the inductive as against the deductive method of analysis of this country is the sounder. By this I mean conclusions drawn from an analysis of what has happened rather than the interpretation of events in the light of previously arrived at conclusions” should be the rule.

1. Drafted by Robert O. Blake of the Office of Eastern European Affairs and approved by Barbour (EUR) and Thurston (EE). The source text bears a notation indicating that Secretary Dulles saw this paper.
2. Not further identified.
3. Document 624.
4. Ellipsis in the source text.