Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

No. 624
National Intelligence Estimate¹

top secret
NIE 11–5–54

[Washington,] June 7, 1954.

Soviet Capabilities and Main Lines of Policy Through Mid-1959

the problem

To estimate Soviet capabilities and the main lines of Soviet strategic policy through mid-1959.²

conclusions

1. We believe that the stability and authority of the Soviet regime will not be affected during the period of this estimate by conflicts for power or differences respecting policy within the ruling group. Soviet authority over the Satellites will almost certainly remain intact. There are potential conflicts of interest between the USSR and Communist China but we believe that during the period of this estimate the cohesive forces in the relationship will be far greater than the divisive forces.

2. The economic policy of the USSR will probably continue to place primary emphasis on the rapid development of heavy industry and war potential, though with more attention than in the past to development of agricultural and consumer goods production. The high rates of economic growth achieved in the immediate postwar years have been declining. We believe that the annual rate for the next two years will be about 6 or 6.5 percent and in 1956–1959 about 5 or 6 percent.

3. We believe that if current economic programs are carried on as planned Soviet defense expenditures will have to remain approximately constant in terms of purchasing power, at least through 1955. However, military procurement, even if it does not rise above the high level reached in 1952 and maintained in 1953, will be sufficient for continuous qualitative improvement of the armed forces in weapons, equipment, and training. Apart from this general qualitative improvement, the most significant changes in Soviet military strength during the period of this estimate are likely to be as follows:

a. Increase in the nuclear weapons stockpile;

b. Increase in the capability to deliver these weapons by various methods;

c. Improvement in weapons systems for air defense;

d. Increase in the long-range submarine force.

4. We believe that the Kremlin probably will continue, at least for a year or two, to avoid courses of action which in its judgment would clearly involve substantial risk of general war. Bloc leaders will try to foster and exploit political weaknesses and, as opportunity offers, armed insurrections within the non-Communist world. Soviet leaders probably believe that, by alternately easing the tension and applying the political warfare pressure dexteriously, they can increase the chances that in time there will arise new opportunities for Communist strategic advances with substantial risk of general war.

5. While the Kremlin may continue to follow generally its present lines of policy throughout the period of this estimate, it should be borne in mind that the progress being made by the USSR in the development of nuclear weapons, and the increasing Soviet capability to deliver these weapons, are changing the world power situation in important respects. Under these conditions Soviet rulers will almost certainly believe that, as Soviet nuclear capabilities increase, the aversion of the US and its allies to general war will correspondingly increase, and that the Kremlin will therefore have greater freedom of action to pursue its objectives without running substantial risk of general war. Thus the Kremlin will be increasingly ready to apply heavy pressure on the non-Communist world upon any signs of major dissension or weakness among the US and its allies. We believe, however, that the Kremlin will continue to be extremely reluctant to precipitate a contest in which the USSR would be subjected to nuclear attack. At the same time, we believe that the Kremlin would not be deterred by the risk of general war from taking counteraction against an action by the US or its allies which the Kremlin considered an imminent threat to Soviet security. We believe that the extent to which the Kremlin uses the increased freedom of action which its increased nuclear capabilities appear to give it, and the success which it achieves, will depend primarily upon the determination, strength, and cohesiveness of the non-Communist world.

6. We believe the Chinese Communist leaders in general share these Soviet views about the world situation and about opportunities and methods of advancing Communist interests. During the period of this estimate, Communist China will probably be reluctant to undertake courses of action which it considers might involve substantial risk of provoking unlimited war with a major power. The major deterrents will be: (a) China needs time to consolidate the Communist state as well as to modernize her economy; (b) China’s strong ground forces are limited in service and support units, China’s expanding air force has certain limitations, and China’s navy has extremely limited capabilities, and China will remain militarily dependent upon the USSR for logistical, air, and naval support; (c) China’s industrial centers will be vulnerable; and (d) the margin of available resources over minimum domestic requirements will be narrow. However, China will probably counter with military force, to the full extent of its capability, any action which it considers to be a military threat to its borders or to constitute an imminent threat to its vital interests, accepting the risks of war inherent in such action.

7. Both Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders probably feel that Southeast Asia offers particularly favorable opportunities for Communist expansion, not only because of the vulnerability of the states in the area, but because of the possibility of exploiting disagreements between the US and its allies. Continued Communist successes in Indochina, or the consolidation of present Communist gains in Indochina, would probably lead the Chinese Communists to expand their efforts to subvert neighboring countries by political infiltration and covert support of local insurrections, though probably not by the commitment of identifiable combat units of Chinese Communist armed forces. The aggressiveness with which such a policy would be pursued would depend on the vigor and effectiveness of non-Communist reaction.

[Here follows the “Discussion” portion of this estimate, comprising 12 of 16 pages.]

1. Regarding National Intelligence Estimates, see footnote 2, Document 491.

   According to a note on the cover sheet of this NIE, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate. The IAC concurred in the estimate on June 1.

2. Although this paper is concerned primarily with the USSR, strengths and capabilities of the other members of the Soviet Bloc (Communist China, Eastern European Satellites, East Germany, and North Korea) are referred to where these add significantly to Soviet power. Consideration is also given to possible Chinese Communist courses of action which may have a direct bearing on the main lines of Soviet policy. [Footnote in the source text.]