Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

No. 625
Memorandum of Discussion at the 206th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 15, 1954¹

top secret
eyes only

Washington, July 15, 1954

Present at the 206th Meeting of the Council were The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State (for Item 2 only); the Under Secretary of State (Items 1 and 3–7); Robert B. Anderson, for the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (Item 1); the Acting Secretary of Interior (Item 4); the Secretary of Commerce (Item 1); Under Secretary of Commerce Worthy (Item 1); Assistant Secretary of Commerce Anderson (Item 3); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (Item 1); the Administrator, Federal Facilities Corporation (Item 3); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the NSC Representative on Internal Security (Item 1); the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

1. Restricting Diplomatic and Official Representatives of Soviet Bloc Countries in the United States in Connection With Strategic Intelligence (Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 8,² July 9³ and 14,⁴ 1954; NSC Action No. 1117⁵)

Mr. Lay opened the meeting by advising that the President would be delayed for a few moments. He suggested to the Vice President that the Council begin with consideration of the captioned item.

Mr. Lay outlined the following background information with respect to the subject. The Council’s Internal Security Committees (IIC and ICIS) were requested to make a joint study of the subject and to report thereon to the Council; on June 8, 1954, the resulting study was circulated to the Council.

Mr. Lay advised that coincident with the above circulation, and in accordance with the IIC–ICIS recommendations, CIA was requested to furnish an intelligence estimate in conjunction with IAC. . . .⁶

Mr. Lay also advised that IIC had also submitted its comments on SNIE 10–5–54 and its estimate of the effect of implementing the restrictions recommended in the IIC–ICIS report; that the Justice representative on the ICIS had also submitted his comments on SNIE 10–5–54.⁷

Mr. Lay next made reference to the Planning Board recommendations and to those contained in the IIC–ICIS report. He noted that all members of the Planning Board concurred fully in Recommendations 2, 4 and 5 of the IIC–ICIS report; that Recommendation 2 would require that all missions, establishments, etc., of Soviet bloc countries in the U.S. be plainly marked and that their representatives be required to appropriately identify themselves while functioning in the U.S.; that Recommendation 4 would provide for the establishment of programs, under the aegis of the Department of Commerce, relating to the release of governmental and non-governmental data of an unclassified strategic intelligence character; and that Recommendation 5 would provide that the military agencies and the AEC would circularize companies and facilities engaging in manufacturing or research for those agencies, advising of the practices of Soviet bloc representatives in attempting to obtain unclassified technical and strategic intelligence and suggesting that Soviet bloc officials requesting such information be referred to the appropriate Government agency.

Mr. Lay then referred to the three recommendations in the ICIS report on which there was not full agreement by all agencies concerned—namely, Recommendations 1, 3 and 6. Mr. Lay pointed out, as to Recommendation 1, that the IIC–ICIS proposed in essence that Soviet bloc missions be notified that all of their personnel in the U.S. (including those attached to international organizations) should be prohibited in the future from obtaining certain types of unclassified strategic information, and that deletions from the list of such prohibited items would be considered by the U.S. when and if comparable materials are made available to U.S. representatives in the bloc countries.

As to Recommendation 3, Mr. Lay pointed out that, with the exception of the Department of State, the Planning Board agreed with IIC and ICIS that travel restrictions on Soviet bloc representatives in the U.S. should be on a strict reciprocal basis and enforced on a basis at least comparable to the restrictions on U.S. representatives in Soviet bloc countries.

As to Recommendation 6, Mr. Lay noted that the Planning Board recommendation was a modification of that proposed in the IIC–ICIS report; that whereas the latter report recommended that when Soviet bloc representatives desire unclassified Government documents, they be requested to apply for same at a central office, the Planning Board recommended channeling of such requests through a central point, but on the basis of reciprocity, depending on the practices employed in each of the bloc countries with respect to requests made for comparable data by U.S. representatives in those countries. Mr. Lay noted that, pending the development of more detailed information regarding such practices, the Planning Board recommended approval in principle of its modified recommendation.

Mr. Lay then called upon the Attorney General, who asked the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for his comments.

Mr. Hoover pointed out at the outset that there are 309 diplomatic representatives of Soviet bloc countries in the U.S., 15 of whom are from the USSR; whereas the U.S. has only 83 of its representatives in the Soviet Union. . . .

. . . . . . .

Mr. Hoover went on to say that he believed the subject had been thoroughly considered by IIC, ICIS and the Planning Board, and that he felt that the recommendations made in the IIC–ICIS report were quite restrained. He observed that the recommendations in no instance were more than reciprocal. He expressed the opinion that it would be necessary to place the blockades between the Soviet bloc representatives in question and the information they were desirous of obtaining. It was Mr. Hoover’s personal belief that if the recommendations made by the Internal Security Committees are adopted and implemented, additional restrictions would not be placed against our people by the Soviet bloc countries.

. . . . . . .

At this point, Mr. Hoover adverted to his earlier reference concerning the interpretation given by the employee of the Department of Commerce regarding the regulation which precludes the furnishing of certain information in the Geodetic Survey Office to Communists, and he stated that he could hardly conceive that the Secretary of Commerce would interpret that such Soviet representatives were not Communists. He attributed this interpretation to some subordinate down the line in the Department and not to the Secretary of Commerce.

Mr. Lay then called upon Secretary Smith to comment. Secretary Smith advised that the State Department’s position was an extremely detached and completely objective one. He said the job of the Department of State was to collect political information, and that such collection could be done without much travel in the Soviet Union. He added, however, … that in considering these necessary services, his job was to point out as dispassionately as possible which of the recommendations in the IIC–ICIS report would aid the several interested agencies of the Government and which of the recommendations would impede U.S. interests.

Secretary Smith referred to the reference in the IIC–ICIS report which reflected that the Soviets relaxed their travel restrictions after the U.S. imposed additional travel restrictions on Soviet personnel here. Secretary Smith indicated that this relaxation had nothing to do with the restrictions imposed by the U.S.; rather, the modified restrictions of the USSR resulted from various changes in the Soviet Union following Stalin’s death.

Secretary Smith expressed the view that the blocking off of large areas of the U.S. is infeasible, and stated that he was afraid that if the U.S. were to do that, there would be considerable adverse reaction in this country, in that people in areas where access was not denied would want such areas denied to Soviet personnel.

At this point, Secretary Smith called attention to a map which was in exhibition before the Council and which reflected the additional areas in the Soviet Union which have recently been opened to our personnel there. Secretary Smith advised that in recent months U.S. representatives have traveled 205,000 man miles in the USSR.

Secretary Smith advised that the Department of State is of the view that Recommendations 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the Planning Board should be approved, with the caveat that the Department of State determine the exact method of implementation, in consultation with other appropriate agencies, and that they should be applied quietly and by degrees. He proposed that Planning Board Recommendations 1–a and 1–b be referred back for more realistic study. He stated that the Department of State is opposed to Planning Board Recommendation 3. It was Secretary Smith’s view that if the Council were to go beyond the proposals of the Department of State which he had just outlined, the U.S. would rapidly reach a point of diminishing returns.

. . . Mr. [Allen] Dulles observed that if we endeavored to restrict Soviet bloc personnel only in the acquisition of this unclassified data, they would be able to get it through other means and through various European countries.

Mr. Lay then called upon Secretary Weeks for his comments. Secretary Weeks advised that the Department of Commerce is unable fully to evaluate all of the recommendations in the report, since many of them do not relate to that Department. He stated, however, that Commerce concurs in those recommendations of the report which apply to that Department.

Secretary Weeks made reference to Mr. Hoover’s comments regarding the interpretation of the Commerce regulation which precludes furnishing certain types of information to Communists. He stated that this matter had been called to his attention by Mr. Cutler; that he had had the matter investigated; and that investigation had disclosed that an innocent mistake had been made by the employee involved.

Secretary Weeks then referred to the nautical and related types of maps which Soviet bloc representatives were obtaining from the Coast and Geodetic Office, and stated that it is possible to walk into any store in the country and buy such maps and charts. He added that he had in fact bought them himself. He stated that since this was the case, he did not know why the Soviet bloc representatives came to the Department of Commerce to obtain these maps, rather than purchase them at various stores where they are available throughout the country. Secretary Weeks added that the foregoing was not intended to modify his Department’s views on the recommendations. He again stated that the Department of Commerce favors the recommendations which relate to it.

The Vice President inquired if strict reciprocity is now in effect between the U.S. and the USSR. Secretary Smith advised that the answer is no, and went on to state that when he left Moscow, USSR regulations precluded our personnel from traveling beyond a 40-kilometer distance from Moscow. He said that at that time our personnel were permitted to go to two or three other places, but only with special permission. Secretary Smith stated that now, however, much more extensive travel is allowed. He added that he did not believe that a great deal is actually gained from this added travel, and again emphasized that if the Council were to go beyond the proposals made by the Department of State, he felt that the U.S. would be taken past the point of diminishing returns.

. . . . . . .

At this point the President and the Secretary of State joined the meeting, and Mr. Lay briefly summarized what had transpired up to that time. Secretary Smith briefly summarized what he had said previously.

The President said he would like to ask Mr. Hoover how much we can really deny to these people. He stated that when he had seen the Smyth report in 1945,⁸ he had given up on trying to keep anything secret.

Mr. Hoover stated that one of the recommendations in the IIC–ICIS report provided that any requests made by Soviet bloc personnel be channeled through a central source. He said that this does not mean that denial of all such information could necessarily be assured by the adoption of that recommendation, but that it would certainly slow them down in the efforts to acquire it. . . .

The President asked Secretary Smith for his views on the matter, and Secretary Smith thereupon read from a brief memorandum which he had read earlier to the Council. Secretary Smith then stated that the Department of State agreed with Planning Board Recommendations 2, 4, 5 and 6; that it recommends their approval with the caveat that State should determine, in consultation with other agencies, the exact method of accomplishing them, and that they be done quietly and on a progressive basis. He said State recommended against the adoption of Planning Board Recommendation 3, and that it proposed the referral of Planning Board Recommendations 1–a and 1–b back to the Planning Board for further consideration, while observing the effect of implementing the other recommendations proposed for approval.

The President said that in a situation of this kind we at the Council table have to shoot from the hip; we do not have detailed background data on the matter; that if we could successfully put all of these recommendations in effect he would favor doing so, but he thought the best way to handle the situation was by continuing close liaison and close working relations between State, CIA, FBI, etc., meeting these problems and resolving them as they arose.

Mr. Allen Dulles stated that he had been keeping a clipping file on classified security data which had been appearing in the press, and he felt that it was this situation which we should be studying and trying to resolve. Mr. Dulles referred, by of example, to the recent article written by Retired Admiral Morreel relative to the destruction of the steel-producing capabilities of the U.S. by Soviet H-bombs.

The Vice President though that apart from the question of acquisition of intelligence, another factor which should be considered was the advisability of adopting absolute, rigid, strict reciprocity with respect to Soviet bloc diplomats. He stated that there has been a feeling in the past in the Department of State that if we were nice to the Soviet bloc diplomats they would be nice to us. Secretary Dulles and Secretary Smith observed that this feeling did not obtain at the present time in the Department of State.

Secretary Smith stated that State favors identical, rather than comparable, restrictions with respect to the bloc personnel. The Attorney General said that the Department of Justice could go for that type of arrangement.

Mr. Lay suggested, in conjunction with the foregoing, that a technical group composed of appropriate agencies should be established for the purpose of accomplishing this objective.

The President expressed the view that constant study of this problem by competent personnel in the agencies concerned was more important than trying to lay down precise and detailed regulations.

Secretary Weeks said, with respect to Planning Board Recommendation 4, that he thought the Department of Commerce, in consultation with industry, could help slow down considerably the efforts of Soviet bloc representatives to acquire unclassified strategic data from industrial sources in this country. Mr. Lay pointed out that one of the recommendations in paragraph 4 dealt specifically with this point, and with the taking of affirmative steps by the Department of Commerce to solicit the voluntary cooperation of business and industry with respect to the publication of such data.

Secretary Dulles observed that there were psychological aspects to this problem, and that he believed that it was a domestic political relations problem primarily. He observed that it would be well for us to be in a position to say that we were reciprocating in kind vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc. He observed that a far greater problem existed with respect to the safeguarding of classified security information, as contrasted to the safeguarding of unclassified data. Mr Hoover pointed out in this regard that the particular study under consideration by the Council was limited to the problem of restricting access to unclassified, as distinguished from classified, materials. Secretary Dulles stated that he did not believe that the fate of the world would depend on how we solved this particular problem.

The President again stated that he had doubts as to the advisability of trying to lay down regulations on the subject, other than in the broadest terms.

Secretary Humphrey thought that the Council’s guide should be that we do to them precisely what they do to us. The President stated that his only objection to that point was the problem of trying to enforce any detailed regulations that were drawn. He said he disliked issuing an order unless it could be enforced fully.

Dr. Flemming asked if the Council could not accomplish what it wished to do in this situation by referring the matter to the Operations Coordinating Board. Mr. Lay pointed out that the OCB is not in the internal security field, and that this problem was primarily one of an internal security nature. The President said that the problem should be resolved by making our arrangements vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc strictly reciprocal all around.

Secretary Smith observed that it was not realistic to close out areas in the U.S. comparable to those which we are denied in the Soviet bloc countries.

The Attorney General suggested that an attempt be made to agree on areas along the lines of strict reciprocity and that if agreement could not be reached, then the problem could be brought back to the Council. Secretary Smith stated that wherever we can do it, he was in favor of restricting the activities of Soviet bloc representatives in the United States.

Secretary Weeks referred to the Planning Board recommendations which were to be implemented by the Department of Commerce, stating that he assumed that from a monetary standpoint his Department would receive a helping hand from the Bureau of the Budget when it came to implementing such recommendations.

Mr. Lay advised that a record of action on this subject would be prepared for circulation to the Council, along the lines indicated by the President.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the recommendations of the NSC Planning Board transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 9, in the light of the report by the IIC–ICIS on the subject transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 8, the report of the Director of Central Intelligence contained in SNIE 10–5–54, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 14.

b. Adopted Recommendations 2, 4, 5 and 6 by the Planning Board, with the understanding that they be instituted quietly and by degrees, and that the exact method of implementing Recommendations 2 and 6 will be determined by the Department of State in consultation with other interested agencies in order to minimize the risk of Soviet bloc retaliation.

c. In lieu of Recommendations 1 and 3 by the NSC Planning Board, adopted the following:

Restrictions be placed upon diplomatic and official representatives of the Soviet bloc countries in the United States on the basis of strict reciprocity for restrictions placed upon U.S. representatives in each Soviet bloc country; as determined to be feasible by a group composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and of ODM and CIA.

Note: The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the appropriate agencies for implementation, and circulated to the Council for information.⁹

[Here follows discussion of the remaining agenda items dealing with the European Defense Community and other matters.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Drafted on July 16 by Gleason.
2. This memorandum circulated to the NSC a letter of June 4 to Lay from J. Edgar Hoover as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and Thomas J. Donegan as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, transmitting a joint report of the two committees to the National Security Council on “Restricting diplomatic and official representatives of Soviet bloc countries in the United States in connection with strategic intelligence,” dated June 1. Neither the memorandum nor the report is printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5427)
3. This memorandum transmitted to the NSC the NSC Planning Board draft recommendations on the joint IIC–ICIS report. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5427)
4. This memorandum circulated to the NSC a letter from the Joint Chief of Staff supporting the draft recommendations enclosed with Lay’s memorandum of July 9. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5427)
5. Not printed.
6. SNIE 10–5–54, not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5427)
7. Neither printed; enclosed with Lay’s memorandum of July 9.
8. Henry D. Smyth, “A General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic Energy for Military Purposes,” the official report on the development of the atomic bomb in the United States, 1940–1945, prepared by the Chairman of the Department of Physics of Princeton University; released by the War Department on Aug. 12, 1945, and published as “Atomic Energy for Military Purposes” (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1945).
9. The recommendations adopted by the Council at this meeting were subsequently circulated as NSC 5427.