Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

INR–NIE files

No. 627
National Intelligence Estimate¹

top secret
NIE 11–4–54

[Washington,] September 14, 1954.

Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through Mid-1959

the problem

To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable courses of action through mid-1959.

conclusions

General

1. We believe that the stability and authority of the Soviet regime will not be significantly affected during the period of this estimate by conflicts for power or differences respecting policy within the ruling group. Any internal conflicts arising out of such developments would probably be resolved within the confines of the ruling group and the higher echelons of the Communist Party and would not lead to civil wars or disturbances of major proportions.

2. The appearance of new leadership in Moscow has had no apparent effect on the character of relations between the USSR and its Satellite states in Eastern Europe. We believe that Soviet authority over the Satellite regimes will remain intact during the period of this estimate.

3. Communist China is more an ally than a Satellite of the USSR. It possesses some capability for independent action, possibly even for action which the USSR might disapprove but which it would find difficult to repudiate. We believe that despite potential sources of friction between the two powers arising from occasional conflicts of national interests, the cohesive forces in the relationship will be far greater than the divisive forces throughout the period of this estimate.

Economic

4. The rate of growth of the Soviet economy has declined in the past five years from the very high rate of the immediate postwar period. We estimate that during the next two years Soviet gross national product (GNP) will increase by about 6 or 7 percent, and in 1956–1959 by about 5 or 6 percent, per year. If US GNP should increase during the period of this estimate at its long-range annual average of 3 percent, Soviet GNP would at the end of the period be about two-fifths of US, as compared with about one-third in 1953.

5. The pattern of resource allocation in the Soviet economy in 1953 showed about 14 percent devoted to defense, 28 percent to investment, and 56 percent to consumption. Current economic programs indicate that for at least the next two years the amount of expenditure on defense, instead of continuing the rapid increase that prevailed in 1950–1952, will remain about the same, while expenditure on investment and consumption will increase. We believe the chances are better than even that the Kremlin will continue its policies along these lines throughout the period of this estimate. The chief emphasis will almost certainly continue to be on further development of heavy industry.

6. The chief weakness of the Soviet economy as a whole has been in agricultural production, which has remained since 1950 at approximately the prewar level, though the population is now about 10 percent greater than in 1940. Soviet leaders appear to have recognized that continuation of the serious lag in agriculture would ultimately make it difficult to meet the food requirements of the growing urban population, the raw material requirements of the expanding industrial economy, and the export requirements of Soviet foreign trade, in which agriculture plays a major role. To remedy the situation the regime has embarked on a vigorous program, with the aim of achieving by 1956 a 50-percent increase in agricultural production over 1950. We believe that this goal will not be met, and that even in 1959 agricultural production will be no more than 15 to 20 percent higher than in 1950. Even this increase, however, would be sufficient to achieve a moderate increase in the per capita availability of foodstuffs and textiles.

Military

7. We believe that, generally speaking, the size of Soviet forces-in-being will remain approximately constant during the period of this estimate. However, the over-all effectiveness of these forces will increase, mainly because of the following factors:

a. A great increase in numbers of nuclear weapons, and in the range of yields derived from these weapons;

b. An increase in the number of all-weather fighters and jet medium bombers, and the introduction of jet heavy bombers in 1957;

c. A great increase in the number of long-range submarines;

d. An increase in combat effectiveness of Soviet ground forces, primarily due to improved weapons, equipment and organization, and to changes in doctrine and tactics designed to increase their capabilities for nuclear warfare.

8. The principal limitations of Bloc armed forces during the period of this estimate will be: deficiencies in experience, training, and equipment for long-range air operations and air defense; lack of capability to conduct long-range amphibious and naval operations; and the logistic problems, especially for operations in the Far East, arising from the size of Bloc territory and the relatively inadequate road and rail network and merchant fleet. The questionable political reliability of the Satellite armies places a significant limitation upon their military usefulness.

Probable Courses of Action

9. We believe that during the period of this estimate the Kremlin will try to avoid courses of action, and to deter Communist China from courses of action, which in its judgment would clearly involve substantial risk of general war.² However, the USSR or one of the Bloc countries might take action creating a situation in which the US or its allies, rather than yield an important position, would decide to take counteraction involving substantial risk of general war with the USSR. We believe, moreover, that the Kremlin would not be deterred by the risk of general war from taking counteraction against a Western action which it considered an imminent threat to Soviet security. Thus general war might occur during the period of this estimate as the climax of a series of actions and counteractions, initiated by either side, which neither side originally intended to lead to general war.

10. The progress being made by the USSR in the development of nuclear weapons, and the increasing Soviet capability to deliver these weapons, are changing the world power situation in important respects. Soviet leaders almost certainly believe that as Soviet nuclear capabilities increase, the unwillingness of the US, and particularly of its allies, to risk general war will correspondingly increase, and that the Kremlin will therefore have greater freedom of action to promote its objectives without running substantial risk of general war. In any case, the USSR will probably be increasingly ready to apply heavy pressure on the non-Communist world upon any signs of major dissension or weakness among the US and its allies. Nevertheless, we believe that the Kremlin will be extremely reluctant to precipitate a contest in which the USSR would expect to be subjected to nuclear attack. The extent to which the Kremlin uses its increasing freedom of action will depend primarily on the determination, strength, and cohesiveness of the non-Communist world.

11. We believe that the USSR will continue to pursue its expansionist objectives and to seek and exploit opportunities for enlarging the area of Communist control. It will be unswerving in its determination to retain the initiative in international affairs and to capitalize on successes in order to keep the Free World on the defensive. For the near term, however, the Kremlin will almost certainly continue to direct its external policies towards the immediate objectives of weakening and disrupting the mutual defense arrangements of non-Communist states, preventing or retarding the rearmament of Germany and Japan, undermining the economic and political stability of non-Communist states, and isolating the US from its allies and associates in Europe and Asia. At the same time it will continue to expand the industrial strength of the Bloc, and to maintain large modern forces-in-being as a guarantee of the integrity of the Bloc and as an instrument of intimidation in support of its policies abroad.

12. The Communists will vary the methods used to accomplish the foregoing aims and will time their actions so as to exploit situations that in their judgment offer the most favorable opportunities. For the time being, the Kremlin seems to feel that its foreign objectives will be best served by a generally conciliatory pose in foreign relations, by gestures of “peaceful co-existence” and proposals for mutual security pacts, by tempting proffers of trade, and by playing on the themes of peace and disarmament. The purpose of these tactics is to allay fear in some parts of the non-Communist world, to create the impression that there has been a basic change in Soviet policy, and thereby to destroy the incentive for Western defense and to undermine US policies. At the same time, however, the Communists continue to support and encourage nationalist and anticolonial movements, and to maintain their efforts to subvert governments outside the Bloc. We believe that the Kremlin will revert to more aggressive and threatening conduct whenever it feels that such conduct will bring increased returns. By such varieties and combinations of tactics the Soviet leaders almost certainly consider that they can improve the chances for further Communist strategic advances. We do not believe that such tactics indicate any change in basic Communist objectives, or that they will involve any substantial concessions on the part of the Kremlin.

13. We believe that Southeast Asia offers, in the Communist view, the most favorable opportunities for expansion in the near future. The Communists will attempt to extend their gains in Indochina, and will expand their efforts to intimidate and subvert neighboring countries by political infiltration and covert support of local insurrections. We do not believe that the Communists will attempt to secure their objectives in Southeast Asia by the commitment of identifiable combat units of Chinese Communists armed forces, at least during the early period of this estimate. However, we find the situation in this area so fluid that we are unable to estimate beyond this early period.

[Here follows the “Discussion” section, comprising 58 of the 62 pages (including 20 pages of appendices).]

1. Regarding National Intelligence Estimates, see footnote 2, Document 491.

   According to a note on the cover sheet of this NIE, the intelligence agencies of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this paper. The IAC concurred in this estimate on Sept. 14.

2. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, and the Director of Intelligence, USAF, believe that the following should be substituted for the first sentence of paragraph 9: “Although the Kremlin will probably try to avoid courses of action and to deter Communist China from courses of action that entail substantial risk of involving the USSR in general war, it may be more willing to support courses of action that would involve risk of a localized war between the US and Communist China. The support given such courses of action would depend largely on Soviet judgment as to the probable outcome of the war. If the Soviet leaders believed that it would result in a severe defeat to Communism, or the fullscale participation of the USSR in general war, they would probably exert pressure on the Chinese to avoid courses of action which would precipitate hostilities. On the other hand, if they estimated that the conflict could be limited to war localized in the Far East, and that it would result in greater relative damage to US strengths than to Communist strengths, they probably would support more adventurous courses of action on the part of the Chinese Communists.” [Footnote in the source text.]