Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

740.5/10–2453: Telegram

No. 652
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

secret

Paris, October 24, 1953—7 p.m.

1619. From MacArthur.² Following is summary my meeting with Hallstein and Blankenhorn at Bonn today which lasted about hour and half:

I opened saying as old friends I would talk with complete frankness and expected them do same. Before going to some of problems I wished discuss with them I assured them tripartite meeting Paris was in first instance for full exchange views and would not make any final decisions.³ Final decisions by three governments would only be made after adequate consultation with Germans. I said it would be most helpful for Paris tripartite if German views re elections and status all-German government could be received by October 28. Hallstein expressed appreciation for assurances but said German position re elections and all-German government could only be forthcoming after German Cabinet consideration. Since first Cabinet meeting scheduled only for October 27, he doubted whether German views available before November 1.

I then gave our view that as result developments last several months and particularly Federal Republic elections we had entered new period which had great possibilities if they were developed but this period would only last several months. We believe future of Europe is hanging in balance and decisions taken in next 3 or 4 months will determine whether Europe moves forward to real strength and unity or whether it will passively let march of events recreate same old fire trap which led to conflagrations of past. If EDC fails or is put off we will be faced with new and disturbing alternatives not of our own making. I did not believe US Congress or public would pour further resources and treasure into a Europe which seemed incapable of unity which essential to any real strength.

In particular I wished talk about Saar which we strongly felt was greatest remaining single obstacle to EDC. Although we did not recognize legal Saar-EDC link, as practical matter they linked by French. French look on Saar settlement acceptable to France as acid test of Germany’s true intentions and good will toward France. We deeply disturbed by reports that elements in Federal Republic were adopting regressive position and wished Adenauer to backtrack on position he had taken with Bidault.⁴ We felt it essential Adenauer go to extreme limit to meet French and we firmly believe Germans in better position politically to give more than France. We also believe this not time for public statements by German leaders which French can construe as threats. These simply give ammunition enemies of EDC in France and are resented by French elements supporting EDC. It urgent that French and Germans work out their problems privately and not in public declarations which would lead to further recriminations. I then said there strong pressures in France to bring Franco-Saar Conventions before Assembly in next couple weeks. We did not believe this would be helpful and would try to discourage it but if it did occur we were counting on Chancellor to do everything possible to keep German reaction to minimum.

Hallstein (who did most talking) took very grave view re Franco-Saar Conventions, about which he had heard saying with best will in world Adenauer could not restrain violent German reaction. At present SPD had nothing else to exploit but Saar issue and there would also be violent reaction on part of government coalition, particularly free democrats. He urged we use all possible persuasion with French.

He then outlined at length difficulties within Cabinet re Saar and his estimate of German public opinion along lines Bonn has reported saying while Chancellor intends be as forthcoming as ever with French and will not backtrack on stand he took with Bidault he has real problem with coalition although he will retain solid CDU support on any “reasonable” Saar agreement. One great difficulty is that Adenauer–Bidault talks dealt in broad generalities. What needed are criteria or principles governing Saar settlement and these Germans would try work out with Poncet. Adenauer wanted a real European solution which would advance and perhaps even serve as “pilot model” for further European integration. French on other hand wanted status quo maintained and simply given a European label.

This would never be accepted by Federal Republic or German public. There must be some new and truly “European elements” on solution, although these might be minimum. Main difficulty with Van Der Goes report⁵ was that “it accepts present French economic control of Saar and only expresses pious hope that eventually a European solution will be found”. Adenauer was not nationalistic about Saar and on contrary viewed it as only one element in broader context of European unity but there were limits—economic rather than political—within which Adenauer must remain. Solution must be economically “European” as well as politically.

Hallstein then said time might come when French and Germans would be deadlocked on Saar and if this happened it might be helpful both to French and German governments to have some kind of “informal mediation” by US and UK and possibly other European countries. He had no clear ideas about this but hoped we would keep in mind. In meantime he hoped we would urge French be reasonable just as we were urging Germans.

Concluding, Hallstein said another consideration re Saar agreement was fact that if Germans made great concessions and reached agreement with French, present French government might fall and be succeeded by one which might reject EDC or at least not push it or pose new conditions. Net result would be that Germany would have made great concessions on Saar to get EDC and EDC would be killed by France. He added he had no knowledge Laniel government would fall but reports from Paris were not encouraging re its longevity.

I concluded by urging again that Federal Republic give till it hurts in reaching settlement and reiterated view that public statements at this time very damaging.

Dillon

1. Repeated to London and Bonn.
2. On Oct. 22, MacArthur, who was in Paris for the meetings of the Tripartite Working Group (see footnote 3 below), reported that Blankenhorn had asked him to visit Bonn for informal talks with him and Hallstein. After consulting with Conant, Dillon, and Bruce, MacArthur agreed to make the trip primarily to stress the necessity for the Germans to be as forthcoming as possible on the Saar. (Macto 7 from Paris, 762.022/10–2253)
3. For documentation on the work of the Tripartite Working Group which met at Paris, Oct. 21–Nov. 2 and Dec. 16–21, see Documents 312 ff.
4. Regarding Adenauer’s conversation with Mayer and Bidault on May 12, see telegram 5950, Document 637.
5. See Document 640.