Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762.022/10–2053: Telegram

No. 651
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

secret

Washington, October 21, 1953—7:10 p.m.

1528. Paris pass Bruce. As Secretary informed Bidault at London² we are immensely concerned lest next few months opportunity slip by without French and Germans achieving essential progress European integration. Since every French utterance on EDC has been to effect Saar settlement is prerequisite ratification it appears imperative French and Germans try achieve forthwith outline mutually satisfactory Saar arrangement. Heretofore various pretexts have cropped up for delaying Franco-German negotiations. Latest has been necessity wait for Adenauer form cabinet. This has now been done. Further delays apparently will result in still additional problems arising such as French attempts ratify Franco-Saar Conventions for purpose improving French bargaining position before Bidault–Adenauer talks. We are gratified note from Paris telegram 1525³ Embassy already planning take negative line with French on this proposition, and agree conclusion Paris telegram 1554⁴ that high-level action this front required if French persist.

We are concerned apparent stiffening Bonn’s position (HICOG 1357⁵) and in this connection now need Bonn’s estimate on when Adenauer will be prepared begin talks. It would appear initiative lies with Germans since French letter September 25 conveying invitation open discussions is last written communication on subject.⁶ Opportunity raise this point would appear lie in Conant–Bruce talk with Adenauer envisaged HICOG 1321⁷ now that German cabinet formed. We also need Paris estimate Bidault readiness to begin talks at once.

We see from Secto 27 October 18⁸ Bidault has told Secretary he will not go to Hague meeting without some form preliminary approval EDC and EPC by Assembly. It is unclear exactly what he has in mind, particularly with reference EPC. Presumably however it is something sufficiently concrete as far as EDC approval is concerned to require previous Saar settlement. This makes progress this front even more important if all phases European integration not to be slowed down.

Paris and Bonn are instructed discuss Department’s views on urgency Saar question at high level. Reference could be made Secretary’s views as expressed Bidault London regarding catastrophic effects further long delays on European integration, which appear to us, at least from French side, blocked by absence progress on Saar. While we have never admitted Saar solution was legitimate prerequisite French EDC ratification fact is some progress must take place before anything else will happen. Therefore this subject seems to take number one priority now.

We would hope French would be satisfied settlement going into detail as little as possible in order speed up EDC ratification, and that broad general outlines economic and political settlements would suffice. Laniel investiture statement “…⁹ certainty should be obtained concerning a Saar settlement” appears leave way open for only generalized settlement prior to ratification. We would suspect Germans would also prefer this, and we trust Embassy Paris will express conviction French will not want to hold up EDC until every “i” is dotted and “t” crossed on this very old, delicate and complex problem. On contrary we have always felt satisfactory detailed solution could occur only as European integration generally progressed to point where Saar Europeanization could be workable reality and not merely catchy phrase. We remain convinced ultimately settlement must result from increasing effectiveness and number European organizations which can take over various phases Saar affairs and thus prevent Saar from becoming another small European state—solution which is unacceptable to Germans.

Dulles

1. Drafted by McBride, cleared by Morris and RA, and initialed for the Secretary of State by Bonbright. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London and Strasbourg.
2. For a record of Secretary Dulles’ conversation with Bidault on Oct. 16, see Secto 27, Document 302.
3. Not printed. (762.022/10–1953)
4. Not printed. (762.022/10–2053)
5. Telegram 1357 reported the views of various party leaders in the Federal Republic on the question of the Saar. (762.022/10–1053)
6. See telegrams 1044, 1027, and 954, Documents 643–645.
7. Supra.
8. Document 302.
9. Ellipsis in the source text.