Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

740.5/10–2653: Telegram

No. 653
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

secret
priority

Washington, October 29, 1953—6:44 p.m.

1623. From Secretary for Dillon, Bruce. In connection with EDC, if we cannot get French ratification prior to French presidential elections, it is all the more imperative that period between now and presidential elections be used to work out basis for Franco-German Saar settlement (re Paris Embtel 1636²). If agreement on principles of Saar settlement are not reached prior to presidential elections, we anticipate it will be extremely difficult if not impossible to bring EDC to vote in French Assembly immediately after elections.

Paris and Bonn should use every influence at their disposal to urge French and Germans respectively to push forward with Saar settlement on basis of reasonableness. If French insist on bringing Saar Conventions before Assembly, reaction in Germany will I believe be violent. In particular I am apprehensive Germans will take position that at very moment they prepared to sit down to work out Saar settlement, France is taking final action on Saar settlement by ratification of Conventions. If French insist on ratifying Saar Conventions and there is violent German reaction and breakdown in Franco-German talks on Saar, impression may be created French have deliberately injected Saar Conventions to prevent Saar agreement and thus to sabotage early French action EDC.

Amb Dillon should therefore continue do everything possible persuade French not act on Saar Conventions at precise time when they are getting ready to talk with Adenauer. In particular Bidault should be left in no doubt as to catastrophic effect on France’s position if French take unreasonable action which makes agreement on Saar near future impossible. Bidault should also know that if French nevertheless proceed with ratification Franco-Saar Conventions, and as result are subsequently unable arrive at agreement on Saar with Federal Republic, US Govt will find it exceedingly difficult give support to French position with respect to future status Saar.

Amb Conant should continue urge Adenauer be as forthcoming with French as possible re Saar and in particular prevent public utterances in Germany which may be interpreted as threatening French since these serve as ammunition to French opponents EDC and are resented by French supporters of EDC.³ Amb Dillon should likewise urge French not make any public statements which might aggravate situation.

Dulles

1. Drafted by MacArthur and cleared in substance with Secretary Dulles and Bonbright. Repeated to Bonn for Conant.
2. Not printed. (740.5/10–2653)
3. On Nov. 4 Conant reported that he had urged restraint on Adenauer as instructed in this telegram and that the Chancellor had said he would do his best, but was upset by French utterances which he felt were unjustified and far from helpful. (Telegram 1575 from Bonn, 762.022/11–453)