Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762.022/5–1453: Telegram

No. 637
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

secret

Paris, May 14, 1953—7 p.m.

5950. At Mayer’s request Burin des Roziers called on me today to give me full report re conversation with Adenauer on Saar. Talk took place Tuesday night² at Hotel Matignon and lasted two to three hours. Present were Mayer, Bidault, Burin des Roziers for French; Adenauer, Hallstein, Blankenhorn for Germans. Adenauer opened by outlining his position as follows:

1. As legal point any settlement of final German frontiers must await definitive peace treaty. Therefore Saar frontiers can only be finally settled by peace treaty.

2. He was willing to grant political autonomy to Saar with Saar Government to have own Parliament. But in some respects (not detailed by Adenauer) Saar must be subject to a European authority. He suggested coal and steel authority for this purpose.

3. He had heard that monetary problem was considered important to French. To him it seemed not so important. He looked forward to general convertibility of European currencies in next few years and this should automatically take care of problem.

4. On economic side Germany had special interests in trade with Saar. Also German business interests must have right to invest in Saar industries.

5. Any Franco-German agreement must be subject to ratification by a newly elected Saar Parliament. Elections for this Parliament must be completely free with all parties allowed to take part in election.

6. Due to proximity of German elections this not the time to make any agreement. He was confident that he would be successful in elections and at that time, after elections, but not sooner a Franco-German agreement could be reached.

7. He said that he realized that for economic reasons and in particular because of the burden of refugees from the east, the population of the Saar did not now and for foreseeable future would not want to return to Germany.

Mayer for French then answered Adenauer’s points in order:

1. Settlement of Saar problem necessary now before ratification of contractual agreements. Problem must be settled if progress toward European unity to continue. French recognized problem of Germans re necessity postpone definitive boundary settlement to peace treaty. Saw no reason why language satisfactory to Adenauer on this point could not be worked out.

2. Welcomed Adenauer’s comments on this point but said it not clear exactly what powers should be reserved to European authority. Suggested that council of Europe might well be preferable to coal and steel authority as over-all authority.

3. Continuation of Monetary and Customs Union vital to France. Convertibility of currencies had nothing to do with problem which is simply that French economy requires that Saar trade with French for monetary purposes. Pointed out that French had stated this clearly last fall and after objection by Adenauer had asked him to submit his counterproposal. No German counterproposal received as yet. Mayer inquired if Adenauer now prepared to make a German proposal. Adenauer replied in evasive terms and question was dropped.

4. France had no intention of interrupting normal Saar trade with Germany. France agrees Germany has an economic interest in Saar. Question of German ownership of Saar industries not insurmountable. French understand Germans completed a detailed study of German-Saar economic relationships some three or four months ago. French had requested copy of this study some months ago but had not received it. It would be useful to negotiations if French could have a copy of this study. Adenauer made no reply to this request.

5. French could not agree to submitting accord to a newly elected Saar Parliament. This would not be a clear test as any election would be affected by other partisan political questions. Also any vote in Saar Parliament would also be subject to other partisan intrigues. French proposed as alternative a referendum to approve or disapprove the Franco-German agreement. If agreement approved there could then be new and completely free elections in Saar. Adenauer had no very good answer to French arguments and French had definite impression that Adenauer would in the end accept their position on this question.

6. French regretted Adenauer’s decision to postpone decision till after his elections but expressed understanding of his political problem. French suggested that interim conversations continue to prepare way for prompt agreement after German elections. Adenauer said he felt such talks would not be productive and suggested it would be better to put whole subject aside until fall. End detailed summary of talks.

French feel talks have been useful as they narrowed real area of disagreement to question of Monetary and Customs Union. Here no progress was made as Adenauer obviously not ready to show his hand until serious negotiations start in fall.

French also felt that Adenauer’s personal suspicion of Bidault had been removed and path for future negotiations had been greatly smoothed.³

Dillon

1. Repeated to London and Bonn.
2. May 12.
3. Other reports on the Adenauer–Mayer meeting, essentially along these same lines, were transmitted in Coled 75, Polto 2245, and telegram 5973 from Paris, May 15 and 16 (740.00/5–1553 and 740.5/5–1653); telegram 6146 from London, May 18 (651.62A/5–1853); and telegram 4999 from Bonn, May 20 (762.022/5–2053).