Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

611.51/11–353: Telegram

No. 550
The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State¹

secret
niact

Paris, November 3, 1952—1 p.m.

2729. Franco-American relations are cooler than at any time since Gen de Gaulle resigned in 1946. Dept knows causes, on one side as on other of Atlantic, and object of this message is neither to summarize nor to analyze them. France’s major internatl troubles, however, when placed in proper (not Auriolesque) perspective are of almost as much concern to us and to Atlantic Alliance as to Fr. They are intimately connected and cannot be considered in isolation from the other. Forthcoming weeks offer real, if limited, opportunities to palliate if not to solve some of these troubles, and as their psychological aspects are sometimes as important as their substantive ones, palliation at this particular time is not unimportant.

Principal issues are:

(1) US aid and Indochina,

(2) North Africa,

(3) Germany–EDC–Eur Union.

Reasons for this telescoping will appear as each item is analyzed.

(1) US aid—Indochina. For present fiscal year the maximum (in addition to end-item aid and normal OSP) that Fr have any reason to hope for is $650 mil. Rightly or wrongly, Fr public opinion has been conditioned to this figure as fair and equitable US contrib to Fr mil budget for Metropole and Indochina and as figure US had led Fr Govt to expect. Fr public opinion has also been informed that, with this assistance from US, Fr can develop mil program which will enable achievement of 1953 objectives in Fr NATO build-up and Indochina operations. Again rightly or wrongly, if $650 mil is not made available during course of annual review the “shortfall” in US aid will continue, in Fr public opinion, to be cause of any failure of Fr to meet not only mil targets but essential civilian requirements. By granting differential between 525 and 650 and accepting Fr link to Indochina we gain out of all proportion to sum involved. Concurrently, of course, we shld undertake continuous judicious release of pertinent statistics and related info to disabuse Fr Parl and public of widespread picture of Fr alone bearing full Indochina burden. Substance of long-term Indochina problem is too vast to be tackled now.

(2) North Africa is psychologically most important to Fr and our support of their presence there costs us nothing financially. Furthermore, national interests, political as much as strategic, are bound up with their staying there, at least during present imbalance between Soviet and free world. Lack of coherent and forward-looking Fr policies directed toward autonomy are a matter of real concern. On other hand, UN “interference” and impression we constantly give publicly that we are “against” them have strengthened hand of narrow-minded elements and weakened that of broad-minded elements. Tunisian and Moroccan nationalism of a narrow sort, when it receives or appears to receive outside (especially US) support, encourages same sort of narrow nationalism here. Future of Fr presence in N. Africa lies in peaceful co-existence of Fr and native communities, and final solution depends on way Fr deal with problems they face there. For immed future, however, our interests lie in keeping Fr there and our influence with Fr Govts re encouraging liberal policies will be greater by making our interests manifest rather than by voting against them in UN and giving their most vocal opponents radio time on VOA. This will not please certain Arab and Asian Govts and certain sections of US opinion. But we have made choice and must now avow it both in UN and elsewhere. Clearly and consistently stated policy of supporting (a) continued Fr presence in N. Africa and (b) progress toward autonomy through direct French-N. African negots wld be far preferable to recent sitn in which our policy has appeared to both Fr and Afro-Asians as confused and vacillating and which has gotten us worst of both worlds.²

(3) Ger–EDC–Eur Union. If Fr receive consideration on two points discussed above, there is little else we can or shld do of a positive nature during forthcoming weeks. Negatively, there is much we shld avoid doing—bustling the Fr on ratification of EDC (although quietly encouraging ratification of other five nations may prove to be in order), threatening dire consequences if they don’t hurry or worse if they don’t ratify at all; giving public evidence of favoring Ger policies (Saar) or Ger industrial expansion or premature Ger rearmament (OSP); reviving war memories by supporting early measures for clemency of war criminals, etc.

If question of Ger defense contribution comes up in Dec 15 NAC mtg,³ relation of EDC ratification to urgency of NATO build-up will become clear. This development without US having to take lead shld in itself put considerable pressure on Fr to understand and to face her responsibility, particularly if Ger Bundestag has ratified EDC treaty by that time. Our guess is that majority of Fr Parl and public know they probably must accept EDC for better or worse. Best proof is that most virulent opponents have not come up with viable alternative. But in absence of comprehensive understanding on N. Africa, US, Indochina, opponents may force indefinite delay in ratification of EDC.

All of us here consider these issues basic to Franco-American relations at present time. Lines of action suggested above appear to be within our means and to coincide with our interests, failure to follow substantially such course runs risk, in our opinion, not only of further serious (and unnecessary) deterioration in relations but also of jeopardizing attainment of major US objectives in NATO, SEA and with respect to Ger and EDC.⁴

Dunn

1. Repeated to Tangier, Rabat, and Tunis.
2. For documentation on French North Africa, see vol. xi, Part 1, pp. 127 ff.
3. For information on the North Atlantic Council meeting, Dec. 15–18, held in Paris, see the editorial note, vol. v, Part 1, p. 348.

4. In telegram 989 from Saigon, Nov. 13, the Embassy noted its concurrence with the recommendations contained in this telegram and added that a shortfall in U.S. aid might be seized by the French as an excuse to reduce their effort in Indochina. When compared with the fighting in Korea, where U.S. expenditures were much greater, the Embassy concluded that the war in Indochina was too important for the United States to quibble over the sum involved. (611.51/11–1352)

   For Acheson’s personal reply to this message, see Document 554.