611.51/11–852: Telegram
No. 554
The Secretary of
State to the Embassy in
France1
6. For Dunn from the Secretary, I have read with much interest and profit your 2729.2 I agree with you on the substance of your telegram and within the realm of the possibility we are trying to act along the lines which you propose. I had hoped that you would be returning to Washington so that we could have a thorough discussion of the problems which confront you in Paris and us back here. As this is postponed for the time being, I would like to try to think out loud with you.
Be it North Africa, Indochina or aid, our difficulties with our French friends appear to stem from the fact that while we are able to support them and agree with them up to 90 percent of their [Page 1277] views and wishes, we just cannot do so 100 percent, and this for many reasons.
That France is a cornerstone in the edifice which we would be happy to see constructed in Europe should be apparent. For more than two years we have been seeking every possible way to ease the problem of German participation in the defense of the West. First the French sought to get out of this quandary through Moch’s proposal and then through its heir the Pleven Plan, the latter of which we have consistently supported. At no time have we hinted at what the French themselves fear in the back of their minds nor sought by any means whatever to foster a German military effort without an equivalent French effort, in order to achieve our security goal. This patience does not result only from the sentimental and human values which we place on France—rather it reflects our mature judgment that European security and thereby our own rests on France and Germany and not on France or Germany. As you know we have not prodded France re EDC ratification for all the complex reasons which you and I appreciate and know would be counter-productive; neither do we intend to do so at this time, preferring to seek prior action by the other five EDC countries which should bring our French friends to face up to their decision and in a way which should lead them to make the decision which we sincerely believe to be in their own best interests.
With reference to the aid figures, I do not see how outside of the AR, we can give them the satisfaction which they ask and commit ourselves to $650 million worth of budget supporting aid. The French themselves have periodically requested a collective approach to the NATO task and we just cannot prejudice the entire AR by agreeing to this figure bilaterally. The amount at stake of $125 million is not only a very small percentage of the total French military budget, but is a relatively small percentage of our total aid to France. Parenthetically in this regard, I am not happy about the manner in which our end-item assistance both for France and IC seems to be largely disregarded in France.
With regard to North Africa we intend to support France in the UN if the French give us the minimum means of doing so by at least stating their case in positive terms. We will do so because we think this serves our own best interests and because we think it is right. This is not to say that this course of action will be popular, for it will not. As an example of the type of assistance which we are prepared to give, I refer to Deptel 26623 stating that we have [Page 1278] taken a position that we will oppose any oral hearing of Tunisian and Moroccan representatives in the General Assembly. We are aware of the thorny problem of competence and regret that we simply cannot take any other position thereon but to admit competence. As you know our legal experts are unanimous on this point. However, in general, we are determined to be of help on the substantive issue and resolutely to oppose any action in any way condemnatory of France.
I agree with you fully that our relations with France have never been more complicated and tense since we had to deal with De-Gaulle. I realize full well the complexes and attitudes which render your task so difficult and with which we must successfully deal if a sensible solution is to be found both in terms of our interest and those of France. I assure you that the French attitude is both well known and understood in the Department. We will do our utmost to take it into account in our actions. I am not entirely sure that the French Government is equally conscious of the situation and state of mind which face us at home and of the limitations imposed by our general responsibilities which prevent us at times from entirely complying with French desires. We must, of course, at all costs avoid a situation that will enflame public opinion here into demanding a retraction from the European continent in the face of what this opinion might consider an unreasonable and uncooperative attitude on the part of those who must remain our French friends and close allies in Europe, Africa and the Far East.
I fully realize that you are doing everything within your power to present the American problem to the French in Paris, and I assure you that I shall do everything possible along the same lines during my meetings with Schuman over the next few days.
- Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 375, which is the source text. Acheson was in New York to attend several meetings of the Seventh Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly and to hold discussions with various Foreign Ministers. For information concerning his meetings in New York with representatives of the French Government, see the editorial note, supra.↩
- Document 550.↩
- Telegram 2662 discussed the U.S. position concerning the Tunisian and Moroccan items on the agenda of the General Assembly. (320/11–652)↩