Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

740.5/11–452: Telegram

No. 551
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

secret

Washington, November 4, 1952—7:26 p.m.

2609. For Dunn and SRE. This is State–DMS–Def–MSA message.

1. We are anxious to take all possible steps secure adequate appropriations for FY ’54. Anticipate strong pressures on part any new admin to reduce expenditures and taxes and expect careful look at aid programs which are always considered vulnerable category of expenditure. We believe aid given in ’53 and proposed in ’54 to some countries (particularly French) as given for purposes budget support rather than meeting dol deficits will have to be carefully justified. Congress has always been strongly skeptical of wisdom asking US taxpayers to cover expenditures which might be met by taxpayers other countries. We desire to do all possible to assure that “mutual aid” is not merely matter US footing everybody’s deficits but that some other countries are giving mutual aid in financial or goods terms.

2. After considerable discussion have concluded tentatively that extremely helpful Congressional reaction wld be forthcoming if such aid cld in some way help Fr, to whom we are being most generous, but that it unlikely other Eur powers can be persuaded help Fr directly for their NATO effort. Believe best prospect lies in suggesting that they assist in carrying on one of active wars being waged against Communists, namely Fr effort in Indochina. Wld have in mind some kind of arrangement by which money or goods help wld be given to effort of Associated States without passing formally thru Fr budget.

3. Our present thinking is that, while not excluding any NATO countries as possible candidates for at least token assistance to Fr effort in IC, initial efforts might best be made with Canadians and Belgians. This choice dictated primarily on grounds their ability to contribute money or goods. Also however feel important not to start with Colonial powers with interest in Far East like Dutch.

4. In thinking about possible Canadian contribution we recognize desirability of having any proposal take acct Canadian desire have any aid they may provide contribute to their industrial development. It shld be possible to match some portion of mil requirements for Indochina with Canadian mil-industrial program. Consideration of possible Canadian token contribution to Indochina effort shld not rule out idea that Canada might also provide assistance in some form to UK either as result of Commonwealth programs or further NATO approach, shld developments make this feasible.

5. Of course US cld not take any initiative in such matter but must act in support of Fr initiative. Recognize that present is inopportune time to explore this subj with Fr but wld like have views Emb Paris, SRE, Brussels and Ottawa so we can proceed promptly along most effective lines when Fr situation becomes clearer. In thinking about this problem wish to emphasize that what we have in mind is Fr request for such assistance as sovereign govts might choose to give and that US could not of course take position on amt or form of this assistance, altho we wld be willing support Fr request shld it be decided to proceed along these lines. Also bear in mind importance keeping it clear that IC war shld not be made UN operation.

6. This possible approach discussed fully Draper here and substance concurred in by him.

Bruce

1. Drafted by Martin and Moore; cleared with R. B. Knight, Raynor, Gibson, Battle, Halaby of Defense, Ohly of DMS, and Cleveland of MSA; and repeated to Brussels and Ottawa.