740.5/10–2452: Telegram
No. 549
The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State
priority
2556. Cotel. Mytel 2458.1 I would certainly have had more respect for Pinay’s presentation to me at lunch Tuesday, if it had been put on a broader basis and was not so narrowly directed to our level of defense aid. I have therefore given careful consideration to entire present situation before furnishing Dept with analysis and my considered recommendations.
In first place, Pinay make it look as if United States aid and hence size of military budget was principal impediment to ratification of EDC and that if $650 million figure is met, other parliamentary objections to treaty could be easily overcome. I believe this is exaggerated. Problem of Brit association with EDC and Franco-German agreement (or lack of it) on Saar, specific criticisms of Herriot, general fear of German rearmanent and of German’s breaking out of EDC, will remain important factors until debate ends. However, Pinay is right in that most powerful argument of EDC’s opponents is that France cannot match German’s defense contribution because of drain in Indochina. Furthermore, this is only argument of EDC opponents which United States can do very much to overcome.
Secondly, how to provide adequate defense contribution in Europe while continuing war in Indochina would be one of Pinay’s principal problems even if he were not faced with EDC ratification this year. It would also be one of principal Franco-American problems, EDC or no EDC. The imminence of EDC ratification date, however, makes both Pinay’s problem and our problem more acute.
The war in Indochina and consequent drain on French financial, material and manpower resources and public debate as to whether France would be continuing to fight this war at all, all combine to make size of military budget and level of United States aid to France liveliest and deadliest political subject with which govt has to deal. Blunt and distorted as Pinay’s presentation may have been, he was talking as political man dealing with a most dangerous issue, an issue, which, while essentially domestic-political one, directly involves a foreign govt. Schuman could not attend lunch because of OEEC and Pinay is no diplomat, but there was no mistaking deep conviction with which he spoke and fact that he was in [Page 1269] real trouble. Schuman later told me he agreed with Pinay’s conclusions.
Dangers in this situation from United States point of view (question of EDC ratification apart) are that French public opinion and hence principal political and parliamentary leaders, who are largely ignorant of magnitude of our end-item aid to Indochina, will associate what they call “reduction” in United States aid figure as directly applicable to French efforts in hot war in Indochina. As reported in Embtel 22882 intimations along this line, perhaps officially inspired, had already appeared in press where our immediate and sharp denial received little play. There is unfortunate tendency in France today to blame many of nation’s problems on United States and it is but one step further to associate possible reverses in Indochina with “reduction in United States aid”. Govt here in present political atmosphere could hardly be expected actively to discourage such formulation.
Labouisse and I have fully supported, for reasons well known to you, granting of full $650 million figure to Fr Govt. Distasteful as Pinay’s narrow approach is to us, we do not feel that it would alter recommendations which were in part based on probability of our being faced with just this situation. Consequently, I urge reconsideration of our position taking into account considerations set forth above.
It is becoming increasingly important that we end as soon as possible the present situation in which everyone, from Pinay and the govt to important leaders of opinion and opponents of the govt, is blaming the United States “reduction” of defense aid for all their ills, including their difficulties in Indochina.
We should, it seems to me, get this discussion on the volume of aid in relation to the French military budget in such a state that we can publicly relate our assistance directly to the heavy drain on French resources in connection with Indochina.
Accordingly, I recommend authorization to inform Pinay as soon as possible along the following lines:
How the French Govt develops its military budget is of course a matter for the French Govt to determine. We are anxious, however, to direct our assistance as much as possible to the support of Fr military operations in Indochina and it is hoped that substantial amounts of our budgetary support can be directed to that end. As to the amount of United States budgetary support for FY 53, we [Page 1270] shall make every effort to increase the amount of aid as much as possible, taking into account the whole picture as to American aid to the NATO countries. The final determination of the total budget supporting aid from reduced Congressional appropriations can thus only be determined in connection with the NATO annual review, but we are desirous of entering at once into technical conversations with the French on this subject.
In conveying a message along the above lines, it would be essential in my opinion that we be prepared, with respect to counterpart, to take a position in our further detailed discussions on aid along the lines of our recommendations contained in para 6 of Embtel 2213.3
Labouisse is adding further comments, particularly as regards the line to be taken in continuing talks with the French, in a separate message to MSA/Washington.
- Supra.↩
- This telegram reported on a lead story in Le Monde on Oct. 14 concerning the reduction of U.S. aid and how it would affect the war in Indochina. In response to press queries, the Embassy stated that U.S. aid to France had not been finally determined and that there was no attempt to specify the division of such aid between the defense effort in Indochina and the Metropole. (951.61/10–1452)↩
- Document 545.↩