Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 304

CFM files, lot M–88, box 158

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

secret
WFM T–6d

Washington, September 12, 1951.

Revision of the Italian Peace Treaty

1. the problem

To reach agreement with the British and French on revision of the Italian Peace Treaty.

2. u.s. objectives²

To obtain a revision of the Italian Treaty which will:

A. Remove at the earliest practicable date the military restrictions now imposed on Italy, bearing in mind the importance of this action to the security interests of the United States;

B. Remove the psychological limitations on Italy’s full participation in the common defense effort within NATO;

C. Have the widest possible political support among the signatories of the Treaty and the free nations.

3. british and french positions

A. French Position

The French consider that action by the three Governments should consist of a declaration that their relations with Italy will henceforth be governed by the spirit of the North Atlantic Treaty rather than by that of the Peace Treaty, and that they recognize in principle Italy’s inherent right of self-defense. This declaration would be submitted to the United Nations for approval or “consecration”. Individual communications would be sent to Italy by the three Western Powers and by treaty signatories who are willing to join in, confirming or approving the declaration and informing Italy what practical conclusions (renunciations) are deemed to flow from it. These communications would merely indicate that as far as their senders are concerned, Italy would be free to ignore the treaty provisions in question.

B. British Position

The British recognize the need for substantive revision of the Peace Treaty but maintain that it should not be completed for about six weeks or two months to permit pressure on the Italians and Yugoslavs to settle the Trieste issue. Therefore, while in general accord with our procedure, they propose that we go ahead now with a declaration and include in that declaration a commitment to act on a future Italian request for revision. The British would hope by this method to insure that de facto revision will be postponed until there has been a Yugoslav-Italian agreement on Trieste.

C. Both British and French stress the importance of avoiding any action which would meet opposition from Yugoslavia. They are also concerned over the effect of removal of the military limitations on our case against violations of the military clauses of the satellite peace treaties.

4. italian position

Places principal emphasis on removal of the moral stigma of the Treaty and considers that action covering simply the military clauses, while necessary, would not be sufficient but they have not proffered nor been asked for their views.

5. position to be presented to the british and french

A. On substance, the US, UK and France should agree to support Italian action with a view to achieving de facto revision by entering into new understandings which will have the effect of revising:

1. spirit of the Treaty;³

2. military clauses (Articles 46–70) which limit Italy’s ability to defend itself and to produce munitions for other NATO countries;⁴

3. Trieste provisions, in agreement with Yugoslavia, accompanied by mutual Italian-Yugoslav assurances that with a settlement there would be no outstanding territorial questions between them;

4. general political clauses (Articles 15–18) and the spirit of the Preamble which are no longer needed since the democracy they were designed to assure is no longer in question.

B. We should not agree to:

1. any tripartite declaration which (a) does not include specific assurances that de facto revision will follow at an early date; (b) which is not preceded by tripartite agreement on a procedure by which de facto revision can be achieved;

2. denunciation of the Treaty;

3. revision of the territorial clauses other than those relating to Trieste;

4. general revision of the economic clauses;

5. revision of those clauses covering Italy’s international commitments and commitments to specific countries (Articles 24 through 44);

6. abrogation of provision for settlement of disputes (Article 87), as we cannot abrogate the rights of the USSR to participate therein and should not abandon the veto over Soviet actions provided in Article 87.

C. On procedure, we should, if our position on substance is accepted, support the British proposals with modifications and specifically agree with the British and French on:

1. the language of a declaration for which we propose a redraft (WFM T–6/4⁵) of the British declaration to include reference to the Italian request; and to our continued support of Italy’s application for admission to membership in the UN;

2. prior consultation with the Italians before discussion with other NATO signatories;

3. discussion with the Italians regarding the text of their Note which might be sent in response to the declaration;

4. issuance of the declaration following the discussions with the Italians at the Ottawa meetings.⁶

D. On timing, we should agree that formal replies constituting de facto revision by a new understanding should be made to the Italian request before the General Assembly convenes in Paris on November 6 even though a Trieste settlement may have not been reached. Since UN endorsement of de facto revision may be desirable, a statement of agreement by the friendly signatories including the settlement, if one is reached, of the Trieste question may, if advisable, be brought before the General Assembly under Article 14 of the Charter for UN endorsement. We should not, however, seek an Assembly “recommendation” or “authorization” but merely a note of satisfaction.⁷

E. By stressing that the external threat to Yugoslavia is the same as that facing Italy, and in light of Tito’s statement he will not object to revision of the military clauses if the two countries have reached previous bilateral agreement on Trieste and on settlement of reparations accounts, we believe Yugoslav support can be obtained.

F. We do not agree that consideration of the satellite treaties should delay action on the Italian Treaty. Violation of the satellite treaties should be used in any way that will best support action on the Italian Treaty.⁸

1. The original draft of this position paper was prepared by a Steering Committee in the Department of State in anticipation of the Foreign Ministers meeting and was circulated as WFM T–6 of August 15 once it had been cleared with EUR, UNP, and L/EUR. Minor changes were made in the paper as a result of a Steering Group meeting of August 21, and the revised text was circulated as WFM T–6a of August 22. The first major alterations in the paper were recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum attached to a letter from the Acting Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, September 1. (665.001/9–151) As a result of these recommendations, the paper went through two further revisions which were circulated as WFM T–6b of September 7 and WFM T–6c of September 10. The final approved version, printed here, contained some additional changes resulting from a meeting between Acheson and Schuman on September 11. The major changes in the text are noted in the footnotes below.

2. The wording for subparagraphs A and B was provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum of September 1. They also proposed that the following subparagraph be included:

   “Recognize that the obtaining of a satisfactory revision of the Italian Peace Treaty must not be subordinated to a resolution between Italy and Yugoslavia of the Trieste and reparations problems.”

   This recommendation was not included in the final approved version.

3. The following phrase, which appeared in all the previous revisions, was removed from the final approved version after Acheson’s meeting with Schuman on September 11: “by a statement of readiness to negotiate bilateral agreement which will base relations with Italy on the spirit of the NAT rather than that of the Peace Treaty.”
4. The addition of the phrase “and to produce munitions for other NATO countries” was made at the request of the Acting Secretary of Defense in his letter of September 1 and was included in the subsequent revisions of this paper beginning with WFM T–6b of September 7.
5. Regarding WFM T–6/4, see the editorial note, supra.

6. Paragraph C was entirely rewritten after Acheson’s meeting with Schuman on September 11. In the previous revision, WFM T–6c of September 10, paragraph C reads as follows:

   “Formal initiative should come from Italy; the US, Britain and France should avoid the commitments inherent in public declarations of intention until the Italians have publicly taken previously agreed action.”

7. The sentence “Action should be completed before the German settlement is signed,” which appeared in all previous revisions, was omitted from paragraph D in the final approved revision.

8. Paragraph G, which only appeared in WFM T–6c of September 10, was omitted in its entirety from the final approved revision. It concerned tactics and reads as follows:

   “If we find that British and French will not agree to our procedure for revision and insist on agreement only to a declaration, we should take advantage of the British halfway position and suggest agreement on a declaration, providing the British and French will agree to our procedure for de facto revision and to an early date at which it should be initiated. If we could obtain such a compromise, there are alternative declarations which we might suggest. (WFM T–6/4) We should stipulate as essential that no declaration should be made public until after De Gasperi has had an opportunity to see it, and present his views. If the French state that the Italian Prime Minister has already approved their draft we should take exception in that he has communicated other views to us. It might help in answering the French doubts concerning our procedure to point out that ours is not ‘revision by agreement’ but involves unilateral renunciation with the advantage of having responsibility for the initiative come from Italy. While we shall welcome the use of the word ‘revision’ in publicity about our action, the French should realize that our procedure is in the sense of revision no different from theirs.

   “We should maintain that any declaration which is not accompanied by acceptance of a procedure for de facto revision is worse than no action at all. Such a declaration would be popular for a brief period and would be followed by an adverse reaction as soon as it had become evident that it had not, in fact, assured de facto revision. Therefore, it would not satisfy our own public opinion nor would it benefit the Italian Government.”