Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

396.1–PA/6–851: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup), at Paris¹

secret
niact
priority

Washington, June 8, 1951—3 a. m.

6655. For Jessup. Had long discussion with Secy tonight in which he went over various proposed drafts and the different points of view that have been expressed. The following represents his considered views:

1. We are convinced that tri-draft note is bad for all of us. We do not think the material in the note is convincing and we would anticipate a Soviet reply which would place us in worse position than we are in right now, since we do not see what answer we could give in the light of our position as stated in para 2 below. In fact, we would expect that Sov reply would merely result in enormously increased pressure from French to urge upon us one of the Parodi proposals² as the only means of extricating French Govt from a difficult situation in the elections.

2. We want to be as helpful as possible to French in their present situation and we want them to understand our concern. We think that for their part they should recognize that we have our own problems with American public opinion which is of vital importance to the west. We are therefore not willing to pay the price of helping French if this leads us into a situation where we must accept either a meeting “without an agenda” or any variation Parodi formula or outright acceptance of Soviet proposal.

3. Consequently, as we see it there are only two alternatives to continued postponements of Deps meeting which we would consider.

4. The first is to proceed now on basis of tactics we described in telecon June 6 and two draft notes sent to you June 7, involving withholding renewal of invitation until end of next week.³

5. The second, much as we dislike it, is to resume quadripartite discussion temporarily while seeking tripartite agreement on note to be sent sometime next week on which we would stand until French elections.

6. If second alternative is followed, you should speak along following lines, with addition of material from our June 8 draft note, at next quadripartite meeting:

We understand that Soviets are unwilling to accept our invitation to meeting in Washington on any one of three agenda proposed our note May 31 and we regret that is case. (This statement could be followed by propaganda speech emphasizing broad and generous avenue opened by our proposals.) We want Soviets to understand we are aware that their purpose is either to block a meeting of the four Ministers by injecting an issue which they know we would not accept or to create the false impression that we had in some way agreed to the inclusion of a NAT item when in fact we had not agreed.

This is our attitude and we want the Soviets to be under no misapprehension about it.

Apparently Soviets think further discussions among the Deputies in Paris would be helpful. We have always kept the door open for discussions and still do. We hope the Soviets may have something to say which will remove the obstacles which they have been placing in the way of a meeting of the four Ministers. We are certainly ready to listen to anything Soviets wish to say.

7. It is our view that statement along this line, with addition of material from our June 8 draft⁷ at next quadripartite meeting would be used to provide opportunity to keep Deputies meetings going long enough to permit tripartite agreement on note which would be fired at Soviets sometime next week and on which we would stand until elections. We again want to emphasize that in such note we are neither prepared to accept any of the Parodi proposals nor any Russian proposals re NAT base item.⁵

Acheson

1. This telegram was drafted by Bonbright and repeated to Moscow, London, and Frankfurt.
2. Presumably this is a reference to Parodi’s suggestion that NATO and American bases be included as unagreed items in the agenda by means of an annex or covering letter or that the Foreign Ministers meet without an agenda.
3. Transcripts of the telecons on June 6 and 7, neither printed, are in files 396.1-PA/6–651 and 6–751.
7. Under reference here is a draft entitled “Suggested United States Draft of Tripartite Note for Delivery to Mr. Gromyko June 8,” not printed. A copy of this draft is attached to the transcript of the June 7 telecon referred to in footnote 3, above.
5. At the 66th session on June 8 each of the Western Representatives spoke from the text of the draft reply which reflected the “particular points of view important from angle of public opinion of each country.” Jessup reported that the meeting went off very satisfactorily and that the session would continue into the following week. (Telegram 7635 from Paris, June 8, 396.1–PA/6–851)