Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

396.1–PA/6–1151: Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State ¹

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Paris, June 11, 1951—4 p. m.

7671. From Jessup. Follows summary of personal letter just received from Parodi:

Parodi brings to Davies’ and my attention his serious concern about future tactics here. He points out that last Friday’s quadripartite session makes it possible for us to handle quadripartite session today and possibly tomorrow² without great difficulty but he foresees that Wed or Thurs we will find ourselves in a very embarrassing position. He points out that we must always keep in mind possibility of Sov maneuver which will upset Fr public opinion on eve of elections. He urges that three of us agree now on how we wld handle any Sov maneuver.

Parodi points out that he had presented last week three possible solutions. First, to accept NAT as unagreed but offset it with item concerning Sov policies. After saying that US had opposed this suggestion he adds it is too late to make such proposal now. Second, an annex or letter covering NAT item, was also opposed by US and Parodi says it now does not have same advantages as when he first suggested it. Only remaining formula wld be to offer Gromyko meeting without an agenda. Parodi points out that no agenda is little different from alternative C which we included in our May 31 note.³ Formulation of item in C is so broad that it cld lead to all kinds of discussion and he does not believe Mins wld have greater difficulties if they meet without any agenda than if they meet on one like C.

It seems to Parodi very unlikely that Sov wld accept offer of meeting without an agenda and he foresees that if we propose it Gromyko wld say we are trying to avoid discussing concrete questions and attempting to prevent FonMin meeting.

Parodi, however, points out that proposing meeting without an agenda wld place us in excellent public position since it wld be irrefutable proof that we have neglected no opportunity to bring about meeting of Mins.

Parodi says that in presenting no agenda offer we cld say that Mins wld be guided by amount of agreement reached by deps here and in recent exchange of notes. Such a presentation wld change in no way discussion by Mins of their agenda since Sov FonMin will raise NAT under any circumstances. Parodi says that if we cld make this suggestion Friday we wld influence public opinion in simplest and most effective manner and at same time prepare ground for ending talks here next week in case Sov response is negative.

Parodi points out that any compromise which Gromyko wld propose such as an annex or even a conference with no agenda wld endanger our position if we rejected it flatly. If Gromyko proposes an annex of NAT and bases item, he believes we must accept it. He says he understands that my instructions do not permit acceptance and he asks that Wash re-examine this question. At very least he believes we wld have to reply with counter proposition such as no agenda offer. He adds that he does not think we cld refuse if Gromyko, as is highly unlikely, proposes meeting without agenda. However, in either case, he feels it is essential for us to reply at same meeting at which Gromyko makes any proposal and turn Sov maneuver against them.

Parodi then asks me to ask my govt to consider no agenda proposition again. He recalls that all suggestions put forward by Fr del in last few weeks have been turned down, either by US or UK and that present we are in an immobile situation which prevents any maneuver.

End summary⁴

We think there is something in Parodi’s arguments expressing similarity between alternative C and his proposal for no agenda. It might be possible to work out some text in note which wld suggest not that Sovs wld accept alternative C as such but that Mins cld take into account alternative C as indicating general range of subjects which they wld consider. They wld also have in mind discussions here and exchange of notes and with these as a guide they wld be able to organize their work.

At lunch today Davies told me they were working on somewhat similar idea before they receive Parodi’s note. Their idea is very similar to what we argued in our tel 7587⁵ namely that Mins meet and take into consideration alternative B and notes as representing nature of agreement and disagreement which had resulted from Paris meetings.

[ Jessup ]

1. Repeated to London, Moscow, and Frankfurt.
2. On June 11 and 12 the U.S. Delegation reported on the 67th and 68th meetings of the Representatives. At the former Gromyko insisted that there was no basis for a session of the Council of Foreign Ministers if the Soviet proposal on NATO and American bases was not accepted, while Jessup emphasized the inconsistency of the Soviet position on NATO and stressed Soviet utilization of a series of pretexts to obstruct the convening of a Foreign Ministers meeting. At the latter Davies made a strong statement emphasizing Western refusal to allow NATO on the agenda, Soviet noncooperation since the war, and obstruction of a Foreign Ministers meeting to which Gromyko responded with a 2-hour propaganda harangue. (Telegrams 7691 and 7718 from Paris, 396.1–PA/6–1151 and 6–1251)
3. Ante, p. 1148.
4. On June 12 Ambassador Bonnet discussed the sessions in Paris with Secretary Acheson stressing the importance of some affirmative action by the Western Representatives and pressing Acheson to accept one of the three points raised by Parodi. Secretary Acheson expressed sympathy for the problem facing the French, but stated that Parodi’s proposed solutions were unacceptable. (Telegram 6769, to Paris, 396.1–PA/6–1151)
5. Not printed.