396.1–PA/6–751: Telegram

The Minister in France (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State

secret
niact

7577. Personal for Matthews from Bohlen. Distribution only as indicated by Matthews. At [As] last night’s telecon1 revealed that we are miles apart in our thinking on present status of conf and moves for next phase I am again bothering you with personal plea. I do not wish to go into any post-mortem of how we arrived at present awkward situation since our recommendations and estimates of probable developments were fully set forth in messages immediately fol Gromyko’s move of May 10.2 The fact is we are in very awkward situation for two reasons: (1) necessity of postponing termination until after French elections and (2) difficulty of making argument genuinely convincing to public opinion re our refusal accept NAT as unagreed item. In circumstances we envisaged note presently under consideration as interim measure which wld not contain any hint of finality or rupture but wld be drafted for maximum propaganda effect here in France. It is not only maneuver to gain time but to gain time with definite purpose. It is for these reasons we consider draft outline in Dept’s 6570,3 predicated entirely on termination of conf, no longer adequate or desirable.

We must recognize that only question in public mind in Eur and particularly in France is who is to blame for failure of CFM to materialize and this centers naturally on respective positions re only outstanding question. We do not see therefore how we cld duck this question as completely as Dept desires in this interim note. Tri draft was worked out with these considerations in mind and reps probably best we can get on agreed basis. Telecon objections related less to substantive criticism of note than to its departure from line previously agreed by Secy (Deptel 6570) on totally different basis. If tripartite draft is disregarded completely it is virtually certain there will be three distinct positions in three capitals with little prospect of coordinating on text without considerable and extremely damaging delay. Contents of tri draft contains nothing that has not been said over and over again at conf in support of West position and therefore unless [Page 1154] there is some substantive element which is regarded as genuinely damaging to West position, I hope very much that you will be able to amend it rather than to return to outdated line 6570. It seems to me perfectly apparent that all arguments concerning Sov unreasonableness, inconsistency, etc., which is chief theme of note are useful and necessary for final note terminating Paris conf but are not very valid arguments for refusal of unagreed NAT item since they wld apply with equal force to entire question of CFM in view demonstrated Sov bad faith.

I think it is better to keep this alive consistently in any written communication to Sov Govt. Therefore hope you will have new look with above considerations in mind at tri draft, recognizing that to start now with what wld amount to three divergent new governmental positions wld make it unlikely that reply cld be sent before weekend.

[ Bohlen ]
  1. In the teletype conference on June 6, in which, inter alia, Jessup, Bohlen, and Smith participated in Paris and Matthews, Perkins, Bonbright, and Laukhuff participated in Washington, the U.S. Delegation had transmitted the text of a note drafted by the British Foreign Office which had been sent to Davies and the text of a tripartite note agreed by the three Delegations. The conferees in Washington told Jessup that it was “clearly impossible” for them “to agree at this stage with type of note exemplified by either UK or tripartite drafts particularly since they are so far removed from Secretary’s views which were expressed in our 6570.” (396.1–PA/6–651)
  2. See footnote 1, p. 1137.
  3. Dated June 4, p. 1150.