Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

238. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/5¹

Washington, October 18, 1955.

PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4,² paragraph 2, the following list of priority national intelligence objectives is established as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and production in response to requirements relating to the formulation and execution of national security policy.

2. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be critical national intelligence factors requiring priority attention and effort. Distinction is made, however, between three levels of priority within the general priority category. Order of listing within these three groups is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within the group.

3. In order to afford a stable basis for intelligence planning, this directive is designed to remain valid over an extended period. It will be reviewed annually, or on the request of any member of the IAC. It is recognized that urgent interim requirements may arise requiring ad hoc treatment, and that the criteria on which the following priorities are established shall remain under continuing review. These criteria were issued in IAC–D–50/7, 16 August 1955,³ and define categories of priority as follows:

a. First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would occasion gravest consequences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion greatest benefit to the US.

b. Second Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would have serious consequences for the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion great benefit to the US.

c. Third Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would have harmful consequences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion substantial benefits to the US.

4. DCID 4/4 is hereby rescinded.⁴

I. First Priority Objectives⁵

a. Soviet over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and plans, particularly with respect to initiating hostilities using Soviet or Satellite armed forces, and to disarmament and arms inspection.

b. Chinese Communist over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and plans, particularly with respect to initiating hostilities using Chinese Communist armed forces.

c. Present and probable future Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack on the United States or key US overseas installations and for defense against air attack.

d. Soviet capabilities, plans, and intentions for the clandestine delivery of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons against the US or key US overseas installations.

II. Second Priority Objectives⁶

The USSR and European Satellites

a. The Soviet estimate of US and allied capabilities and intentions; of US and allied economic and political stability, and of the strength, cohesion, and probable development of the NATO Bloc.

b. Major Soviet international political objectives and courses of action, including economic policies and actions, with particular reference to courses designed to weaken and disrupt the NATO alliance or to foment antagonism between Western and Asian powers.

c. Soviet political strengths and weaknesses: the actual locus of political power in the USSR; actual or potential personal or policy conflicts within the ruling group; Soviet-Satellite relations, with particular reference to the character and degree of Soviet control; the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet and Satellite apparatus of police control; the extent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in the Soviet and Satellite populations.

d. The strength and weaknesses of the Soviet (including Satellite) economy, with particular reference to its ability to support a major war; the motivation, character, and magnitude of current economic development programs, their implementation, and their effect upon the economic, political, and military strength of the Soviet Bloc; the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Soviet and Satellite internal communications systems.

e. Soviet and Satellite scientific and technical strengths and weaknesses substantially affecting Soviet military, economic, and political capabilities.

f. The general capabilities of the Soviet and Satellite armed forces.

[9 headings and 31 paragraphs (96 lines) not declassified]

Allen W. Dulles

⁷
Director of Central Intelligence

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC Intelligence Directives. Secret. On December 7, the Department of State sent this directive to all diplomatic posts and Hong Kong and Singapore in Circular Airgram 4388, to aid the Department in improving the organization and coordination of intelligence reporting from the field. (Ibid., Central Files 1955–60, 101.21/12–755)
2. See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 422.
3. Documentation on IAC–D–50/7, “Criteria for Determining Priority National Intelligence Objectives,” August 16, is in National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, Box 27.
4. DCID 4/4, “Priority List of Critical National Intelligence Objectives,” was issued 14 December 1954. [Footnote in the original. For DCID 4/4, see Document 201.]
5. Note: Order of listing within Category I is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within that category. [Footnote in the original.]
6. Note: Order of listing within Category II is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within that category. [Footnote in the original.]
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.