Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

201. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/4¹

Washington, December 14, 1954.

PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4,² paragraph 2, the following list of priority national intelligence objectives is established as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and production in response to requirements relating to the formulation and execution of national security policy.

2. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be critical national intelligence factors requiring priority attention and effort. Distinction is made, however, between three levels of priority within the general priority category. Order of listing within these three groups is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within the group.

[Omitted here is a graphic depicting priority levels.]

3. In order to afford a stable basis for intelligence planning, this directive is designed to remain valid over an extended period. It will be reviewed semiannually, or on the request of any member of the IAC. It is recognized that urgent interim requirements may arise requiring ad hoc treatment, and that the criteria on which the following priorities are established shall remain under continuing review.

4. DCID 4/2 is hereby rescinded.³

I. Highest Priority Objectives:⁴ Those of such critical importance as to require a maximum intelligence effort.

a. Soviet over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and plans, particularly Soviet intentions and plans to initiate hostilities using Soviet or Satellite armed forces.

b. Chinese Communist over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and plans, particularly Chinese Communist intentions and plans to initiate hostilities using Chinese Communist armed forces.

c. Soviet development, production, disposition, and employment of weapons and other components of weapons systems requisite for nuclear attack on the United States and/or key US overseas installations or for defense of the Soviet Bloc against air attack. Particular reference is made to the development, production, and employment of: (1) nuclear weapons; (2) delivery systems, including aircraft, guided missiles, and related base facilities; and (3) the components of the Soviet air defense systems.

d. Soviet capabilities, plans, and intentions for the clandestine delivery of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

II. High Priority Objectives:⁵ Those of such high importance as to warrant an intensive intelligence effort.

The USSR and European Satellites

a. The Soviet estimate of US and allied capabilities and intentions, of US and allied economic and political stability, and of the strength, cohesion, and probable development of the NATO Bloc.

b. Major Soviet international political objectives and courses of action, including economic policies and actions, with particular reference to courses designed to weaken and disrupt the NATO alliance or to foment antagonism between Western and Asian powers.

c. Soviet political strengths and weaknesses: the actual locus of political power in the USSR; actual or potential personal or policy conflicts within the ruling group; Soviet-Satellite relations, with particular reference to the character and degree of Soviet control; the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet and Satellite apparatus of police control; the extent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in the Soviet and Satellite populations.

d. The character of the Soviet (including Satellite) economy, with particular reference to its ability to support a major war; the motivation, character, and magnitude of current economic development programs, their implementation, and their effect upon the economic, political, and military strength of the Soviet Bloc.

e. Soviet and Satellite scientific and technical strengths and weaknesses affecting Soviet economic and military capabilities.

f. The strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses of the Soviet and Satellite armed forces, including their strategic and tactical doctrine, their political reliability, their logistical support, and military production and stockpiling.

[29 paragraphs (86½ lines) not declassified]

Allen W. Dulles

⁶
Director of Central Intelligence

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Box 2517, NSC Intelligence Directives. Secret. DCID 4/3 and DCID 4/4 were attached to a single cover page; see footnote 1, Document 200.
2. Text in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 422.
3. DCID 4/2, “Priority List of Critical National Intelligence Objectives,” was issued 28 September 1950 and revised 12 June 1952 and 4 August 1953. [Footnote in the original DCID 4/2 is Document 25]
4. Note: Order of listing within Category I is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within that category. [Footnote in the original.]
5. [2½ lines not declassified.] [Footnote in the original.]
6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.