239. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense1
COMMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HOOVER COMMISSION TASK FORCE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT
The following comments are addressed to the Recommendations of the Task Force which are applicable to the Department of Defense. [Page 730] Recommendations (a) and (b) of the Commission itself, and Recommendations Nos. 1, 2, and 7 of the Task Force, are considered not to be sufficiently applicable to the Department of Defense to justify comment by it.
Recommendation No. 3
“That the chiefs of the various intelligence units of the military services be elevated in the organizational structure to the level of Deputy Chiefs of Staff in the Army and the Air Force, and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy.”
Non-concur
Comment
The Department of Defense agrees that it is essential that intelligence be given adequate weight and representation in the staff organization of the military services if it is to function with optimum efficiency,—but it considers that this can be assured without the recommended organizational changes at this time.
Implementation: None at this time.
Recommendation No. 4
“That the Department of Defense make extensive use of Schedule A of the Civil Service Regulations (non-competitive appointments) in the employment by the military services of civilian intelligence analysts and other specialists in order to provide the necessary flexibility in the recruitment of qualified civilian personnel (to include retired citizens with wide previous business experience in the foreign field) and to facilitate the interchange of such personnel between zone of interior competitive service and the overseas excepted service.”
Concur
Comment
Each of the three Services has taken or is developing measures to apply Schedule A to elements of its civilian intelligence staff. In addition, the Department of Defense is studying the matter with a view to finding an optimum balance between desirable flexibility in hiring and rotation of skilled career personnel on the one hand and providing the fullest practicable job security and incentive (as a vital morale factor) on the other.
Implementation: Take action in accordance with the results of such study.
Recommendation No. 5
“That measures be instituted in all agencies for rechecking the security status of all personnel engaged in intelligence activities at periodic intervals not to exceed 5 years in any individual case.”
Concur in principle
Comment
It is considered that the current security practices and the procedures for acting on adverse information essentially fulfill the objectives of these recommendations. Within the objectives, however, it is desirable to leave to each individual service reasonable latitude in the method of implementation. For example, it may in some cases aid the investigation not to alert the individual involved by suspending him. Measures are taken, of course, in such cases to insure that classified information is adequately safeguarded. This general subject is being reviewed in order to insure that the underlying objectives of these recommendations are adequately served.
Implementation: Additional precautions indicated by such review.
Recommendation No. 6
“That the responsibility for procurement of foreign publications and for collection of scientific intelligence be removed from the State Department and placed in the hands of CIA, with authority to appoint such scientific attachés as may be necessary to carry on this work abroad.”
Concur in part
Comment
The collection of scientific intelligence is one of the most important intelligence activities of the Government. It is of vital concern to the Department of Defense. The CIA should have coordinating responsibility but it would be unwise and inefficient to give it or any other agency a monopoly in this field, nor does any one agency now have such a monopoly. The Department of Defense considers it inappropriate for the Central Intelligence Agency to have overt attachés stationed abroad.
Implementation: None by Department of Defense.
Recommendation No. 8
“That steps be taken to introduce highly selective methods of choosing members of the coordinating committee on atomic energy intelligence, not only to get the benefit of service by the most competent individuals, but also to assure long tenure in this important assignment.”
Concur
Comment
The salaries the Department of Defense can pay for top-flight talent in this field compare unfavorably with those offered outside the Government, and this makes it difficult to insure long-term continuity.
[Page 732]Implementation: The Department of Defense will use its best efforts to carry out this Recommendation.
Recommendation No. 9
“That a comprehensive, coordinated program be developed to expand linguistic training among American citizens serving the Intelligence effort; and
“That the Department of Defense expand and promote language training by offering credit toward reserve commissions to ROTC students and drill credit to Reserve personnel for completion of selected language courses.”
Concur in principle
Comment
The Department of Defense endorses the importance of a comprehensive program of foreign language and area specialist training for persons serving the national intelligence effort and allied activities. It and its elements have taken various measures during the past years to further such a program. But in the case of ROTC and reserves, the Department of Defense is reluctant to provide for additional language training if such training must be at the expense of training in primary military subjects. Specifically, the Task Force’s recommendation would make for wider participation but would, not by itself, produce well-trained linguists.
Implementation: The various existing programs are being studied in the light of this recommendation with a view to achieving an optimum balance between qualitative and quantitative standards.
- Source: Defense Intelligence Agency Files. No classification marking. The paper was enclosed in a November 10 letter from Secretary of Defense Wilson to President Eisenhower, and both were under cover of a November 10 letter from Wilson to Rowland R. Hughes. Attached to the paper, but not printed, is Tab A, a draft of Department of Defense comments on all nine recommendations. Both of Wilson’s letters indicate that the responses were to the unclassified Hoover Commission Report on Intelligence Activities. For extracts from this unclassified report, see Document 221.↩