I am attaching a paper which states our position regarding security
against Germany. This subject is on the agenda for the three power
conversations on Germany to be held in London on February 19.
In view of the importance of this matter I believe that you may wish to
read the entire paper. In brief our position is that the four-power
disarmament and demilitarization treaty previously proposed by us is
unworkable in the absence of four-power agreement and does not provide a
basis for tri-partite discussion. Although we maintain an active
interest in this subject we do not contemplate further specific
proposals at this time.
[Annex]
Department of State Policy Paper2
top secret
[Washington, undated.]
Security Against Germany
Background:
On April 29, 1946 Mr. Byrnes submitted to the
CFM in Paris the draft of a
four-power treaty for the disarmament and demilitarization of
Germany.3 This
draft was again submitted to the CFM
in Moscow on April 14, 1947 at which time the British and French
Delegations expressed substantial approval.4 The Soviet Delegation proposed a redraft which
would have so broadened the scope of the treaty as to represent a
virtual rejection of the proposal in as much as their redraft
introduced a variety of other subjects on which there had been
continued disagreement and which were more fitting for incorporation
into the general terms of the peace settlement. In brief these were
a special regime for the Ruhr, denazification, democratization, land
reform, liquidation of industrial war potential, and fulfillment by
Germany of its obligations to the Allies. No discussion of the
proposed treaty or of the security question took place during the
last meeting of the CFM in
London.
On January 22, 1948 the British Foreign Secretary announced in the
House of Commons that the British Government was looking toward the
closer consolidation and economic development of Europe and of the
Western states in particular, in which Germany must have its
place.5 He indicated at that time that as a first step
toward the realization of this project Great Britain and France
should invite the Benelux countries to join with them in a pact
along the lines of the Treaty of Dunkirk, signed March 4, 1947,6 which provided
for defense against a revival of German aggression. Mr. Bevin further indicated that once
this important nucleus in Western Europe was established
consideration would have to be given to the question of associating
other European states including the “New Italy” in this
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conception. It is understood
that the Benelux countries are now considering the Anglo-French
offer made in pursuance of Mr. Bavin’s
announcement.
At the same time the British Government has made a secret approach to
us suggesting that the US might consider entering with Great Britain
into a general commitment to go to war with an aggressor, thereby
reinforcing the defense proposals envisaged for Western Europe.7
We have stated in reply that European initiative in this matter is of
the first importance and the injection of the US before agreement
under Mr. Bevin’s proposal has
been further developed would seem premature.
Discussion:
It is clear that the original US proposals for the disarmament and
demilitarization of Germany no longer correspond to the realities of
the present situation. This concept was based upon the assumption of
an agreement of the four powers occupying Germany and contains
restrictive proposals which must embrace the four zones of Germany.
There have been indications that the French are thinking of
redrafting the Byrnes proposals as a
three-power agreement, but, in our opinion, it would be futile to
accept these restrictions and bind only one part of Germany leaving
the Eastern zone free to develop its military establishment and war
potential without any restriction except those imposed unilaterally
by the Soviets as the occupying power. It is clear that other means
must be found to provide security against any possible revival of
German aggression. In seeking these the US should be prepared to
play its part and to accept the same general responsibility in this
respect in any new arrangement as it had previously agreed to in the
four-power proposal. At the same time if the peoples of Europe are
prepared to develop a concept of spiritual and material unity and to
make this work, there will be no real question as the long-term
relationship of the US to it and to any defense arrangements
included therein whether directed against aggression from Germany or
other sources. In the elaboration of this concept if it should be
felt in Western Europe that the direct participation of the US in a
defense arrangement established in full harmony with the Charter of
the United Nations would be necessary to its success this country
should be prepared very carefully and sympathetically to consider
this question, but the initiative must be taken by the European
countries. As this concept is developed and as there is evidence of
unity with a firm determination on the part of the European nations
to act in concert
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to defend
themselves, consideration of the role to be played by the U.S. will
be facilitated.
The Dunkirk model which might serve as the framework of a pact
against Germany is however illusory unless intended as a screen for
further defense measures. Any adequate regional defense system for
Western Europe should undoubtedly envisage defense measures to be
taken in the event of aggression or attack from any source. As Mr.
Bevin’s concept of a
Western Union eventually envisages the participation of Germany,
there is no doubt that general adoption of a mutual assistance pact
based solely on defense against that country would militate its
eventual entry into the concept.
Recommendation:
During any consideration in London of the question of providing
security against Germany the US Delegation should take the position
that the four-power disarmament and demilitarization treaty is
unworkable in the absence of four-power agreement and therefore does
not provide a real basis for tri-partite discussion. This does not
indicate however the US is receding from its agreement to take part
in defense measures against Germany but will continue its efforts to
seek, in association with the UK and the French Governments,
appropriate means to this end. No specific proposal however is being
made at this stage since further study and development of the
Western Union concept will be required in this connection.
