Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Control (Germany)/2–1348

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Achilles)

secret

[Washington,] February 13, 1948.

Participants:	M. Bérard, Minister, French Embassy
	Mr. Achilles, WE
	Mr. Wallner, WE

M. Bérard called at his request. He stated that he had been previously advised by Mr. Reber that we no longer considered the Byrnes draft four-power treaty on German demilitarization applicable.¹ This had caused his Government some concern and the Embassy had been instructed to obtain a further indication of our views prior to the London talks.

He was advised that the draft was obviously no longer applicable and that we were accordingly reviewing our whole thinking on the subject, that we had not progressed very far, and that we did not expect to produce any startling proposals on this subject at the London talks. He was also advised that we were waiting to see what developed in the current conversations between the British, French and Benelux countries, and that, incidentally, we did not think a treaty directed like the Dunkirk treaty exclusively against Germany was the; best approach.

Bérard mentioned several provisions of the draft treaty such as the prohibition upon any German armed forces or para-military forces or a general staff or the manufacture or importation into Germany of arms and munitions, etc. He wondered whether we would be prepared to enter a three-power treaty containing such stipulations. He was advised that the policy in Germany of the three occupying powers on these matters had not changed but that we regarded the draft as a dead duck.²

He indicated that his Government attached considerable importance to the imposition of such restrictions on Germany. The French Government regarded the establishment of a trizonia, which would be a logical and desirable outcome of the London talks, as dependent-upon preliminary agreement on the Ruhr and security. He indicated that if no satisfactory agreement were reached on military security, his Government would attach correspondingly more importance to the economic security guarantees inherent in an agreement on the Ruhr.

He was advised that since we considered the draft a dead issue we had not recently given any particular thought to the question he raised but that we felt the whole question of Western European security should be dealt with primarily by European initiative and that our representatives at the London talks would be open-minded.

In connection with a treaty directed exclusively against Germany, he was asked if his Government excluded any possibility of the eventual participation of Western Germany in security measures. He replied that such participation would imply reestablishment of the German army, which his Government would definitely not favor. However, if the British were full participants in such an arrangement the reestablishment of some German armed forces would be a less serious problem since the combined British, French and Benelux, forces would presumably outnumber them.

[

Theodore C. Achilles

]

1. The reference here is to a conversation on February 12 between Bérard and Jacob Beam, Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs. According to Beam’s memorandum, not printed, the conversation also touched on the Ruhr question in the following terms:

   “Mr. Bérard stated his view that trizonal fusion would depend upon satisfaction of French wishes regarding the Ruhr. He referred to the discussions of last October between the Secretary, Mr. Bonnet, Mr. Thorp, and members of the French Delegation. He asserted that the memorandum [see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. ii, p. 684] given us following these talks outlined in effect points of agreement between the U.S. and France respecting Ruhr control. I pointed out that the French memorandum went rather far, particularly in the proposal for internationalization of Ruhr properties and of management of the Ruhr industries, and I referred to the Secretary’s Chicago speech of November 18. Mr. Bérard maintained that these requirements were still an essential part of French policy. I pointed out that it could be maintained that the two questions of the Ruhr and trizonia were on a different footing in point of time, since trizonal cooperation was a question for the near future, whereas a Ruhr settlement pertained to the period after the withdrawal of occupation forces.” (740.00119 Control (Germany)/2–1248)

2. In connection with this conversation, telegram 850, February 16, from Ambassador Caffery in Paris, reported as follows:

   “Bidault told me this morning that his Embassy at Washington had been informed by the Department that the Department does not consider discussions of the Byrnes draft disarmament treaty practical at this time. Bidault said: ‘very well, I understand that, but I hope that we will be able to talk at London about something that will take its place.’ When I asked ‘what’, it was clear that he had no concrete ideas on the subject yet formulated.” (740.00119 Council/2–1648)