Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI

794.00114/8–1145

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman ²³

Washington, August 10, 1945.

The State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee has agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it would be desirable for the attached draft warning to be issued to the Japanese Government and people over the signatures of the heads of the Allied states concerned (Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America). This matter is presented at this time with the thought that if the Japanese Government continues to wage war it may engage in acts of violence against Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in its hands. In that event it might be necessary for the protection of Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees to issue the attached draft warning at the earliest possible moment.

It is recommended that if the Japanese Government continues to wage war the attached draft warning be cleared with the interested Governments at the highest possible level. The State Department will obtain this clearance.

A similar warning was addressed to the German Government in April last by President Truman, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin.

James F. Byrnes

[Annex]

Redraft of the Draft Warning to All Japanese²⁴

This solemn warning is issued to the Government of Japan and to the Japanese people by the Allied Governments of Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

These Allied Governments declare the Government of Japan and the Japanese people must give full protection to Allied prisoners of war and civilians. Japan and the Japanese cannot escape this duty. Allied prisoners and civilians at all times must be properly fed and housed and treated with kindness. They must be guarded from harm. The Allied Governments intend to hold the Government of Japan and the Japanese people, individually and collectively, responsible for the safety and welfare of Allied prisoners of war and civilians. Each Japanese subject, who comes in contact with any Allied prisoners of war or civilians, shares this responsibility. Particularly, proper treatment of Allied nationals is demanded of members of the Japanese Army, Navy, and Air Forces; of commandants, officers, and guards at prisoner of war camps and of officers and members of the Japanese gendarmerie.

The Japanese Government by solemn public declaration has told the nations of the world that it gives good, humane treatment to prisoners of war and civilian internees. This declaration is in effect a pledge of Japan’s national honor. The declaration has been made on many occasions. At the end of hostilities the Allied Governments will each make careful investigation to find out the extent to which the Japanese authorities have treated properly the Allied nationals in their custody and the extent to which they have wilfully or unnecessarily exposed them to danger. In so far as the solemn declarations of the Japanese Government are then proved to be false, the Allied Governments will persistently pursue and punish each individual who has mistreated an Allied prisoner of war or civilian or who has consented to or permitted such mistreatment. This will be done regardless of the position or status of the offender. It will make no difference where the offenses took place, whether in the battle zone, in the lines of communication, in a camp, hospital, prison or elsewhere.

Equally, the Allied Governments will take into consideration in dealing with Japanese individuals any special acts of kindness which may be reported to them by Allied prisoners or civilian internees who come into Allied hands at the end of hostilities.

The Allied Governments regard this responsibility as binding at at all times on the Japanese Government and on each individual within Japanese territory. The responsibility cannot be avoided or transferred.

23. Approved by President Truman on August 11. In a memorandum of August 22, Carl M. Marcy of the Special War Problems Division stated: “In view of the fact that the Japanese Government indicated on August 14, 1945, that it was prepared to sign unconditional terms of surrender it was not necessary to proceed further with the underlying draft warning to be issued by the heads of Allied states to all Japanese.” (794.00114/8–245) For documentation on the Japanese surrender, see pp. 621 ff.
24. The original draft warning, prepared by the Acting Chairman of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee, was circulated as SWNCC 154 on June 21 for consideration by the Committee. The War Department member of SWNCC prepared a redraft on July 14 (SWNCC 154/2). Further changes recommended by the Acting Chairman of SWNCC (SWNCC 154/3) were approved on August 2 (SWNCC 154/4). In a memorandum of August 2 transmitting the draft to the Secretary of State, the Acting Chairman of SWNCC (Hickerson) stated: “The Joint Chiefs of Staff have advised that they consider it desirable from a military point of view that this draft warning be issued, and stated further, that it would be advisable to recommend to the heads of the states concerned that the warning be issued over their signatures and that the statement be distributed in the form of leaflets dropped over Japanese territory after the Japanese Government has received the warning.” (794.00114/8–245)