793.94/6924: Telegram
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 23—10 a.m.]
126. Although the Legation is unable to obtain any other authentic information with regard to the substance of the alleged conversations between certain Chinese and Japanese looking toward improved relations, the Legation is of the opinion that these conversations are primarily for the purpose of an improvement of a general character in Sino-Japanese relations and that such improvement will be accompanied gradually by concrete evidence that such improvement is being effected. Among those indications may be anticipated the raising of the two legations to embassies, changes in the Chinese tariff favorable to the Japanese, increased Sino-Japanese trade, industrial understandings. The Legation doubts that these conversations will result in any detailed agreement of wide scope but anticipates that rather they will prepare the way for a series of understandings or provisional developments, some of which will be arrived at by government officials, some by the military, and some by industrialists and other businessmen.
The foregoing is presumed to be the so-called Hirota policy, the immediate purpose of which is supposedly the development of China as a market for Japanese produce and as a source of raw materials for Japanese factories. It is too soon to hazard what the political implications of this policy may be.
It is believed, however, that at least an important part of the military is not satisfied with Hirota’s policy. They are skeptical of its success, due to their belief that “friendliness” shown by the Chinese will not be “sincere.” They are at heart afraid of a strong Chinese [nation?] [Page 91] developing to a degree inimical to Japanese expansion. And they are interested in obtaining in China certain noneconomic objectives, such as strategic advantages in preparation for a future war with Russia and other advantages which will make it impossible for China’s military to become a threat to Japan.
How long the Japanese military may permit the Hirota policy to be tried out is not known. Reports from Manchuria indicate that the Kwantung Army is at present more intent on consolidating its position in Manchuria and in improving “Manchukuo” than in adventuring outside its borders in other than political adventure. Report of Major General Doihara to his colleagues in the Kwantung Army on his tour of China will have an important bearing on the attitude of the Kwantung Army; but Doihara’s ideas are not known to the Legation. The Legation does not expect any important military move on the part of the Japanese Army in the near future. This does not preclude, however, the possibility of factional activities with that section of the Japanese military which believes in the desirability of dealing with certain of lower-acting Chinese leaders and in weakening General Chiang Kai-shek. This lack of unity of policy on the part of the Japanese makes it impossible to be more definite in a forecast of future events than that the Japanese military instruments prevent China from becoming either a barrier or a menace to Japanese expansion.
As to the Chinese, there is no reason to believe that they will do other than reluctantly comply with Japanese desires, in view of the improbability of help being obtained from other quarters and in view of the serious internal problems which confront General Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanking Government.