793.94/6955
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 20.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s telegram No. 82 of March 19, 7 p.m., 1935, with regard to reporting on current developments in the rumored Sino-Japanese negotiations for a rapprochement, and to assure the Department that the Legation will do everything which it can to assist the Department in studying and evaluating available evidence on this subject.
I should like, however, to suggest that, the situation which has developed here since 1931 being primarily in the hands of the Japanese military and more specifically in the hands of responsible leaders of the Kwantung Army, the Legation lacks means of maintaining proper [Page 92] contacts for purposes of accurate and reliable information. Japanese military officers generally maintain an attitude of complete aloofness from all foreign contacts. In such associations as we have been able to make and maintain with Japanese civilians, official and unofficial, we have been led to the conviction that either they are not privy to the plans and intentions of their military colleagues or are afraid, in view of the attitude of the military, to say anything of significance.
Furthermore, the Chinese with whom men like General Suzuki, Major General Doihara, and the Assistant Military Attaché at Peiping, Major Takahashi, make what we believe to be responsible approaches are equally afraid to talk, and the Legation and other officers have been attempting to exercise particular care not to give the appearance of overt interest or anxiety in conversations with either Japanese or Chinese. It is believed that conversations with regard to the most important phases of Sino-Japanese “cooperation” are confined on the Chinese side to a very limited number of persons whose identity is not known with exactitude, although it is presumed that General Chiang Kai-shek is one of them. To obtain information from the principals concerned, who are the only persons who know what is actually going on, is impossible. It may also be mentioned that some of the Chinese with whom the Japanese deal have so little apparent connection with the usual organs of diplomatic intercourse and are so insulated against the usual contacts that for members of the Legation to approach them would arouse immediate suspicion.
We are definitely aware of a difference of opinion among Japanese as to method of approach in dealing with China, points of view being as wide apart as the known Kwantung Army policy of dealing with Chinese officials singly and locally for the purpose of profiting by a divided China, and the Foreign Office policy of dealing with a single Chinese Government held responsible for the whole of China. Between these two points of view it is impossible for the Legation at any given moment to foretell with any assurance of accuracy the direction which Japanese policy will take. For the moment it would appear that an attempt is being made by the Kwantung Army (together with those military in Japan with similar views), which appears to be guiding Japan’s policy in its relation to China, to follow the Foreign Office policy, but at any moment this may change.
The Chinese, unable to meet Japanese force with force and faced with a financial crisis, are apparently at their wits’ end to know what to do. They can be expected to comply as far as possible with Japanese desires, as they see no help either at home or abroad in their predicament. It must not be forgotten that the British within recent [Page 93] days have informed the Chinese that they can expect no assistance from Great Britain unless Sino-Japanese relations improve.
Respectfully yours,