Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922, Volume I

Disarmament Conference File No. 250/11

Memorandum by the Secretary to the British Empire Delegation of a Meeting of Heads of Delegations Held at the Pan American Union, January 11, 1922, 3:30 p.m.⁶

Secret

• Present:—
  • united states of America
    • Mr. Hughes
    • Colonel Roosevelt
    • Mr. J. R. Clark
  • the british empire
    • Mr. Balfour
    • Admiral Sir Ernie Chat-field
    • Sir Maurice Hankey
  • france
    • M. Sarraut
    • Captain Frochot
    • M. Camerlynck (Interpreter)
  • italy
    • Senator Schanzer
    • Captain Ruspoli
  • japan
    • Baron Kato
    • Captain Uyeda
    • Mr. Ichihashi (Interpreter)

The Heads of Delegations continued the discussion of the Naval Treaty at 3.30 p.m.

article xxiii.

Referring to Mr. Hughes’ draft, which had been accepted in principle at the morning meeting, Mr. Balfour said his experts had confirmed his provisional approval and had made a suggestion that towards the end of the second paragraph, the following words should be inserted after the word “suspend”—“for the period of hostilities”.

This was adopted. The Article as finally approved is attached in Appendix I.⁷

annex a.

Mr. Balfour recalled that at the end of the previous meeting, Mr. Hughes had proposed to omit the four paragraphs which appeared immediately after the respective tables of ships. He was told that in the first and second of these paragraphs there occurred phrases which did not appear elsewhere in the Treaty, namely, in the first case, the following:—

“The total tonnage to be retained by the United States Government will be 525,850 tons standard measurement.”

and, in the second case:—

“The total tonnage to be retained by His Britannic Majesty’s Government will be 562,950 tons standard measurement.”

Mr. Hughes said that in these circumstances it would be better to retain these paragraphs.

It was agreed:—To retain the whole of Annex A.

annex b.

Paragraph 1 was adopted.

Paragraph 2 (a) and (b) were adopted.

Mr. Hughes said, in regard to paragraph 2 (d), that it was of vital importance that nothing should be done which would tend to impair the moral value of the whole Treaty. No petty economies or fancied saving would compensate the destruction of the moral value. The whole matter of scrapping would be tested by the smallest details thing that was done in that direction. The whole of the sinking and scrapping and breaking up of ships would be ignored if anything were done provided for which could be taken pointed to as emasculating the Treaty if it were carried out. He then read paragraph 2 (d) as follows:—

“Converting the vessels to harbour use exclusively, or to naval auxiliary use. In such case the rules in paragraph 4 of this Annex must be previously complied with, except that not more than four guns of a calibre not in excess of 6-inches, and not more than four anti-aircraft guns, may be retained.”

It is true that the rules of paragraph (4) do provide for dismantling; but inspection would be necessary to determine fact of compliance with the paragraph, and no machinery was provided for ascertaining this fact. The public would submit this clause to close inspection to see if it fully carried out the broad intentions of the Treaty. The effect of this Article enabled all ships to be converted to harbour use or auxiliary use—uses which require the closest inspection. The United States Delegation were certain that if this clause were adopted, you might as well tear up the Treaty. The United States were scrapping 330 million dollars’ worth of property. Sincerity of purpose is the thing the Treaty will be judged by. The saving involved in this paragraph was so insignificant that in his view it was not worthy of consideration. Public opinion looked for further reductions in 15 years’ time. If any reasonable grounds were left for an attack on the sincerity of the Treaty, the value of the whole thing would be destroyed. The United States Delegation were convinced of this. The world looked for something comparable to the destruction of the German fleet at Scapa Flow and would brook nothing which enabled these ships to be kept alive. There was nothing in the mere economy of the situation that can justify this before the public. He hoped that all idea of The American delegation wished to eliminate the keeping of these ships as harbour vessels or auxiliaries would be eliminated (After the foregoing was translated, Mr. Hughes continued) There were always vessels available which could be used as mere harbour vessels and which were not touched by this Treaty. There were vessels growing old in the auxiliary classes. Some countries had already cut up ships in order to obtain the steel and sell it. The margin of saving involved in this clause was not very great and the United States Delegation had the greatest moral objection to it as affecting the moral situation. They were convinced that if this provision were retained the average man of the street would say that it the Treaty was a shame.

M. Sarratjt said he had given the attention to the moral point urged by Mr. Hughes which it deserved and grasped fully the import of his remarks, but it seemed to him that the Chairman had answered his own argument by comparing the great sacrifices involved in the Treaty with the feeble economies which would result from the conservation of a certain number of ships for harbour use. It was quite true that statesmen had to be led to some extent by the opinion of the man in the street, but if the latter could not be made to understand the extent of the sacrifices that was involved in this plan, it was no good trying to do anything. He agreed it was necessary to listen to public opinion, but he did not think it would be taken as a sham if a few ships were diverted to harbour use. It was essential that the Treaty should be ratified not only by public opinion, but also by Parliaments. To speak frankly, he must admit that there were a good many people who were not particularly pleased with this Treaty and were inclined to carp and to nag. This was the case in his country and probably elsewhere. He was not absolutely certain, therefore, that the Treaty would be popular, and it would be better not to let people have the excuse to say: Why have you not kept this or that ship? What was important was to keep well to the front the immensity of the sacrifice of 300,000 tons. If the situation in France and Italy were considered, each country only keeping 5 capital ships, it would not seem excessive that in addition they should retain a few old capital ships as colliers or oilers.

If the attention of public opinion were fastened on to the main point of the sacrifice, it would be unnecessary to haggle about small details of no great value.

The Treaty as it was appeared to him quite sufficient, and the man in the street had sufficient good sense to see this. It had been said that “Mr. Everybody has more sense than M. Voltaire”. In short, the high purpose of the Treaty must be preserved, but it must be of such a character that it could be passed through Parliaments.

Mr. Hughes said it was true that the Treaty would be judged as a whole and mainly by the sacrifices that had been made. But under the Article now under consideration, no ship need be scrapped. Every ship indeed could be retained. In fact, all the ships could be kept when they were supposed to be scrapped, and the Treaty would be judged by this one fact alone.

Mr. Hughes then pointed out that the question would not arise for France or Italy for nine years. The question related rather to Japan, the United States and Great Britain who were faced with immediate scrapping.

He agreed that the man in the street was an intelligent fellow, but he would resent it if it were made possible to keep ships under the Treaty as harbour ships which were supposed to be scrapped, the man in the street He would say that none would be scrapped and that in this manner they were really being in reality being saved to be made available immediately in case of war.

Senator Schanzer said he understood the force of Mr. Hughes’ argument, and so far as Italy was concerned he would not oppose the suppression of these provisions. He would, however, ask to keep the ships for gunnery purposes under (f). He wished to have that kept in view.

Mr. Hughes said that when the Committee came to discuss (f) he would say that it did not express the intention which he understands it was meant to express. This appeared to relate to something that was to be done by a future conference. If some thing were really to be done at a future conference, why should anything be said here? But it further appeared that this was not quite the situation, which this provision was designed to cover and which did not relate at all to scrapping. As regards (d), however, the proposal related to scrapping, and yet made it possible to avoid scrapping any ships, and in his opinion if (d) were passed retained, so permitting ships to be thus saved under the Treaty provision no ship in fact would be scrapped.

M. Sarraut said that if Mr. Hughes’ argument were envisaged in its absolute form, no doubt he was right. It was true that under various pretexts it would be permissible to keep all the capital ships. If Mr. Hughes really thought that this he himself was willing to withdraw his opposition to the deletion of the Articles. His desire was that the Treaty should be plain and concise. If these Articles would enable ships to be kept fraudulently, and if Mr. Hughes had no doubts in regard to that felt that the capital ships would likely be retained, he himself would withdraw his objection.

Mr. Hughes said he had never meant to suggest that any nation signing this Treaty would be guilty of fraud, but the ships could, in fact, be kept without any fraud if this Article was retained.

Baron Kato said he had no objection to the deletion of Article (d).

Mr. Balfour said that all present must sympathise with the object Mr. Hughes had in view. If there was any possibility of keeping all ships now in existence or any possibility of re-converting them into ships of war, he agreed that this would lead to a great deal of misunderstanding. He himself would speak in regard to the special problem of the country he represented and which was the one most concerned. Since the Armistice Great Britain had scrapped no less than 1,400,000 tons of war ships. Some of the British harbours were still full of anti-torpedo craft, launches and so on, which could not be disposed of. The Government wished to get rid of them but was unable to do so. In addition to the 1,400,000 tons already scrapped Britain was now asked to scrap 16 Dreadnoughts. No other Power had the same problem. It was true that the United States had to scrap a number of unfinished ships.

Mr. Hughes interpolated that America had to scrap 14 pre Dreadnoughts.

Mr. Balfour, continuing, said Great Britain had to scrap 16 Dreadnoughts. The result was great difficulty and loss. Mr. Hughes had truly said that there was a great difference between the petty economies involved in converting ships to harbour use and the great moral results of the Treaty, and it was clear if there were any conflict the former must be scrapped and the Treaty preserved. He believed, however, that Article (d) had originally been proposed by the United States Delegation.

Mr. Roosevelt said there was some great mistake here as the original proposal was not American.

Mr. Hughes said that if this were the case he would have even less feeling in scrapping it.

Admiral Chatfield read the original proposal of the American Delegation to show that it was the foundation of the present Article (d).

Mr. Hughes said that whatever the original situation was and no matter who made the proposal now the truth was the United States Delegation did not want to keep this Article.

Mr. Balfour said that it had only been a parenthetical remark. He pointed out that in Para, (c) it was proposed to convert war ships into merchant ships. If this were done the ships would actually be on service and could be re-constructed and put back into military service in time of war. He observed that Para. IV which was referred to in Article (c) laid down rules for removing the military value of ships converted into merchant ships, but, nevertheless, would leave the hull and engines intact. So long as these were left the ships could be re-converted into men of war.

Also he would observe that all the arguments in favour of converting the Lexingtons into aircraft carriers were relevant to the present case. So far as aircraft carriers were concerned, the original British proposal had been for a limit of 25,000 tons. The American Delegation amended this by raising it to 27,000 tons. Then they discovered—and he would be the last person to criticise this—that the Lexingtons might be used for conversion into aircraft carriers by cutting them down to 33,000 tons. Thus on grounds of economy they had raised the limit of aircraft carriers to first 27,000 and then to 33,000 tons. In these cases—and he was not so unreasonable to suppose that because economy was inapplicable in one case it was also inapplicable in other cases—In these cases, however, the United States Experts concerned had endeavoured to carry out the great programme before the Conference with a maximum of economy. Eeferring to Para. IV (b), Mr. Balfour pointed out that a vessel would lose its value as a ship of war when certain provisions had been complied with. He would have thought that much more complete destruction could have been provided for and that a ship might be made more unfit for war by, for example, destroying the engines. It might be possible to have an International Commission which would inspect the Dreadnoughts of the United States of America, Great Britain and Japan and report whether they had been rendered useless as ships of war. He agreed, however, that if Article (d) left it even theoretically possible to retain all capital ships under disguise as harbour vessels, it must be drastically modified. He would only ask that before compelling the three Governments, and more especially the British Government, to give up economy, an endeavour should be made to discover whether some plan could not be evolved to get rid of these ships as capital ships without immediately throwing them on a market that was already gorged. He thought that if the Experts were to set to work with a genuine desire to destroy the value of these ships as men of war—and he agreed that this was asking a good deal of the Experts—they could do so. He must add this, that Admiral Chatfield told him that before the Conference two old British Dreadnoughts had been converted into Boys’ Training Ships, but he does not know the significance of this fact.

Mr. Hughes said that in view of Mr. Balfour’s conclusion, with which he felt much sympathy, it was unnecessary for him to go much into detail. He did not think there was any great divergence of view between them. He understood and appreciated the extent of the British scrapping. He gathered, however, that Great Britain was not in lack of auxiliary craft. She had at the present time many craft which it was difficult to dispose of and which were available as harbour craft. He supposed also that in so large a navy other craft were growing old which would be available. He also agreed that the provision for converting ships to commercial use would be better if omitted., because all these provisions, however, would have had a cumulative effect. Hence, even if (c) were retained it would be still more important to omit (d). But certain facts required careful consideration. If a ship were converted to commercial uses it would have to be entirely reconstructed and would become valuable for peace but not for war. It would be quite different from a ship which had been designed for war purposes, and which were retained in harbors and kept armed. If he could be allowed to explain the extreme of his thoughts, it would be to take out the clause relating to conversion into merchant ships. If the, for if that clause were retained and also the clause in regard to the retention of ships for harbour and military duties, the idea would get about that there was no real intention to scrap them any ship. People would say this was a great stage play, but that when the schedules were examined it was found the that all ships were retained and none scrapped. Referring to Mr. Balfour’s remarks on the conversion of the Lexington’s [sic] into aircraft-carriers, he thought there must be some mistake in regard to the maximum tonnage of aircraft carriers. Colonel Roosevelt told him that the change from 25,000 to 27,000 maximum had been in order to provide for the conversion of British measurement into American measurement. He did not care much about this, however. What he regarded as the really important point related to the retention of two ships of 33,000 tons. In regard to that, he reminded Mr. Balfour that the United States was entitled to two aircraft-carriers. By the proposed change they would only get two ships of increased tonnage, instead of two other ships. Moreover, they were to be limited as regards their armament in comparison with other aircraft carriers allowed by the Treaty. If that were the point on which Mr. Balfour’s objections to getting rid of paragraph (d) turned, he would be prepared to discuss it the matter with the American Delegation, with a view to eliminating these Lexingtons. His Delegation were most anxious not to agree to anything which would appear to emasculate the Treaty. He did not think, however, that the retention of the Lexington’s affected the scrapping policy or the Treaty as a whole. If he understood aright, Great Britain desired to retain two ships. To this he had no objection, but he did not want the retention to apply to all the ships. If there were any way in which these ships could be kept without giving them the appearance of being retained as a reserve of capital ships, he would be glad to consider it. But as the matter stood, the Treaty provision really provided for reconstructing a ship of war, and leaving it a ship of war for war use.

Mr. Balfour said he was rather inclined to suggest that a clean sweep should be made of every ship which was not to be used as a capital ship. Let them all be destroyed. As Mr. Hughes pointed out, each new clause providing for retention made matters worse, though it was true that to abolish one Article or another did not make matters equal between the Powers. For example, the American Delegation would like to turn warships into merchant ships. Great Britain had none suitable for this purpose. Here, therefore, America would obtain a pecuniary advantage which would not be applicable to Great Britain. The clause which enabled Great Britain to sell ships as old iron did not compensate for this, as there was no market. He would like Admiral Chatfield to say something on this subject.

Admiral Chatfield said that since the armistice Great Britain had scrapped over 3,000 ships. Lately they had decided to get rid of six Colossus Class battleships, but the only ones they had been able to get rid of were two or three that had been sold to Germany under a contract.

Mr. Hughes asked if Germany was not in the market for more? This was the purport of his advices.

Admiral Chatfield thought not.

Mr. Hughes said his information was the other way, and that contracts were being proceeded with.

Admiral Chatfield said that advice given to the British Empire Delegation by the Admiralty was that the ships now to be scrapped could not be sold as scrap for five years. The Delegation had agreed to their retention for four years, with a possibility of an extension of one year, on the ground that there was no harm in keeping old hulks that had been rendered useless for any war purpose.

Mr. Hughes said he was informed that the American Delegation did not specially desire the conversion of warships for commercial purposes. The suggestion had been made, and they had proposed to retain the right. That was all. He was not conscious of any advantage that would be gained thereby. He himself, therefore, would be willing to see paragraphs (c) and (d) disappear. What they had wished to retain was the airplane-carriers, but (c) was of no account as they thought some money might be saved by this.

Mr. Balfour said that he understood, therefore, that the American Delegation attached no value to the conversion of their Dreadnoughts into commercial vessels. Neither did the British. He asked whether the Japanese attached any importance to this?

Baron Kato nodded that he did not.

Mr. Balfour asked if it were not rather difficult to defend conversion of the Lexington’s into aircraft-carriers when the British Government were not allowed to convert their old ships for harbour service?

Mr. Hughes said he did not see the comparison. Conversion for to target purposes was different, but he did not see how airplane-carriers could be objected to. The American navy would only get what it was entitled to, and would obtain no advantage except the difference in tonnage. Moreover, the converted ships were to be limited in armament, the same as even to a greater extent than the 27,000-ton ships.

Mr. Balfour thought that there was some misconception. Mr. Hughes’ point was that Great Britain, by retaining ships as harbour vessels, would keep ships which might be available as men-of-war, but he Mr. Hughes maintained that the Lexington’s would obtain no advantage except that of an additional 5,000 tons. He would remark parenthetically that this in itself might be some advantage. The British Government, however, did not contemplate that these old vessels for harbour service could be used as men-of-war. They only wanted to keep them as old iron until old iron should again become saleable.

Mr. Hughes said his objection was that under the clause as drawn these old ships need never be disposed of. It was contended that ships could be scrapped in three ways:—(1) by sinking them, (2) by breaking them up, and (3) by keeping them. If they were kept, everybody would say that they were being kept as men-of-war, and the moral effect would be very great.

Mr. Balfour thought it was necessary to argue the question of the conversion of the Lexington’s rather further.

Mr. Hughes thought that Mr. Balfour was entitled to argue this if he wished, but he did not quite see the basis of his arguments. If Great Britain had some super-Hood’s which were 90 per cent complete and were asked to scrap four ships to compensate for them, and if they were then to ask that they might retain them as aircraft-carriers, confining their armament to that of ships of smaller tonnage, and if America were to say “No, you must scrap them and begin all over again”, then Great Britain would be in the same position as America was in now. He recalled that in view of the excessive tonnage of these ships it was proposed to limit the number of 8-inch guns to 8 instead of to 10, as in the other aircraft-carriers.

Mr. Balfour said he did not want to be drawn into what was essentially an expert question, but as he understood the matter the objection to the Lexington’s was not to the armament but to the armour.

Colonel Roosevelt said that he had been late for this meeting because he had been with the Chief Constructor of the American Navy, who had told him that in order to bring the Lexington’s down to 33,000 tons he could keep practically no armour except a small belt over the engines. These ships had originally been designed for 43,000 tons and then cut down to 35,000 33,000 tons. They would only have the speed of an aircraft-carrier of 27,000 tons.

Mr. Hughes said that, if Mr. Balfour wished, he was quite willing to raise the question of the Lexington’s with the American Delegation. The Delegation were strongly opposed to anything in the Treaty which appeared to say one thing and actually said another, or which allowed ships to be retained which appeared to be scrapped.

Mr. Balfour said he hoped that Mr. Hughes did not think he objected to getting rid of paragraph (d).

Mr. Hughes said that he had no particular desire to deprive Great Britain of harbour ships, but he wanted to avoid destroying the Treaty. The point was the American Delegation was opposed to having the treaty seem to say one thing when meaning mother. The sole consideration is to save the Treaty. So fair as he personally teas concerned, he would, if necessary, eliminate (c), (d), and the aircraft carriers to accomplish this. He therefore recommended suggested for consideration the deletion of paragraphs (c) and (d). If Mr. Balfour insisted as a condition that the Lexington’s should not be converted into aircraft-carriers, he would take the matter up with his Delegation; or, even if Mr. Balfour did not make it a condition of deleting (c) and (d) but nevertheless would like the matter considered, he would take up the case of the Lexington’s with the Delegation. He would not for the sake of ten or twenty millions of dollars, spoil this Treaty. He would like to have Baron Kato’s thoughts on the matter.

Baron Kato said that originally his idea had been that if clause (d) were retained he would convert some of the old battleships into training ships. He was now convinced, after hearing Mr. Hughes’ arguments, that (d) should be scrapped. As regards clause (c), namely, the conversion of warships for commercial purposes, he would have no objection to its exclusion, for as an expert he thought it would be very difficult to effect this conversion. As regards Japan’s problem of scrapping, he did not anticipate any particular difficulty, merely a question of time, though he realised the great difficulties of Great Britain.

Mr. Hughes asked how the question was left?

Senator Schanzer repeated that so far as Italy was concerned the arguments of the Chairman appeared so important from a moral point of view that he was willing to suppress paragraphs (c) and (d).

M. Sarraut said that the French Delegation was always affected by good arguments, and he was therefore ready to suppress the paragraphs in question. He thought, however, that paragraph (f) should be retained.

Mr. Balfour asked what the United States Navy would do about training-ships for boys? Great Britain had always used battleships as training-ships since the days of the old two-deckers.

Colonel Roosevelt said that the American Navy had training camps and used old cruisers. They considered a 10,000-ton cruiser just as good as a battleship for this purpose.

Mr. Balfour said he was prepared to agree that it should be made impossible, and obviously impossible, to use ships which were designated for scrapping, for any warlike purpose whatsoever. Beyond that he could not go without reference home. He thought it was only fair to consult the Admiralty, as they had two Dreadnought’s employed as training-ships. He agreed that these ships must not be available, even colourably, as warships in reserve. He would like, however, to have the right to retain as boys’ training-ships the two vessels which had been devoted to that purpose before the Conference. He had to admit that the proposal to convert the Lexington’s into aircraft-carriers was disliked by the Admiralty and would not be favourably received by public opinion in Great Britain. The effect was that it gave to America two ships with which Great Britain had nothing to compare in the way of speed, which under the Treaty they never could equal, and which could be equipped with very considerable armaments. So far as (c) was concerned he could not foresee any situation in which Great Britain would desire to convert warships into merchant ships, but so far as (d) was concerned he would like to have the right to retain the two training-ships.

Mr. Hughes pointed out that paragraph (d) said nothing about training-ships or about limiting the number to two. It might be possible to scrap clause (d), but to give Great Britain the right to retain the two training-ships. As regards the Lexington’s, Great Britain might convert some of her ships.

Admiral Chatfield said that the difficulty was that it was impossible to convert them at once. Great Britain had to scrape ships immediately, but would require a year to prepare for the conversion of two ships. They could not, for example, convert the super-Hood’s at once. If Great Britain could build two ships with equal limitations to the Lexington’s the position would be satisfactory.

Mr. Hughes said he would be glad to take up the question of the Lexington’s with his own Delegation. Their conversion into aircraft-carriers had not been his proposal. Nevertheless, he did not want to see money wasted. He did not want to be “penny wise and pound foolish”. If Great Britain objected to the Lexington’s, however, he would take the matter up with his Delegation. He did not want to throw money away when reasonable economy might be effected.

Mr. Balfour then handed to Mr. Hughes the following draft in regard to aircraft-carriers:—

“Any of the Contracting Powers may without increasing its total tonnage of aircraft carriers build not more than two such aircraft carriers each of a tonnage of not more than 33,000 tons, and for this purpose may convert any of their unfinished ships which would otherwise be scrapped.”

Mr. Hughes said he would take this question up with his Delegation. He himself felt very strongly about anything that would tend to disappoint world opinion; in fact, he would say that rather than disappoint world opinion it would be better that the attempt had never been made to reach this agreement. He would rather his Government spent a hundred million dollars than that the world should be disappointed.

Mr. Balfour agreed. He understood that what was desired was to cut out clauses (c) and (d). He thought it would be better to cut these out. He was entirely agreed that with the possible exception of the retention of two training-ships there should be no pretext for retaining ships which were supposed to be scrapped. He would like, however, to communicate with the Admiralty about the training-ships.

Mr. Hughes said that he himself would like to have a repetition of the Scapa Flow sinking. He himself was perfectly willing to adopt this course, and he believed in the end all the nations concerned would save money thereby in relieving themselves of the upkeep of these ships.

Mr. Balfour said that he would agree. He would like to take the whole of the ships out into the Atlantic and sink them.

paragraph (e).

Mr. Hughes apologized for talking so long and repeating so much, but it was a matter about which he himself, and the American Delegation felt very deeply. Continuing he said he did not like the use of the word “permanent” in paragraph (e), and suggested the adoption of the word “exclusive”.

This was accepted.

paragraph (f).

There was a short discussion on paragraph (f), in the course of which Mr. Hughes again expressed his opinion that the paragraph failed to express just what was intended, and again stated his apprehension that the public would fear that under it no ships would be scrapped, but all kept till the next Conference. … After which the Conference adjourned until 11 a.m. on the following morning, Thursday, January 12, 1922.

Washington , January 11, 1922.

6. No agreed official minutes of this meeting were made. The American delegation used the memorandum prepared by Sir Maurice Hankey.

   The file copy of this memorandum bears corrections by Mr. Clark. Words which he crossed out are indicated by canceled type; words which he inserted are printed in italics.

7. Not found in Department files.