Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922, Volume I

Disarmament Conference File No. 250/10

Memorandum by the Secretary to the British Empire Delegation of a Meeting of Heads of Delegations Held at the Pan American Union, January 11, 1922, 11 a.m.¹

Secret

• Present:—
  • united states of america
    • Mr. Hughes
    • Mr. J. R. Clark
  • the british empire
    • Mr. Balfour
    • Sir Maurice Hankey
  • france
    • M. Sarraut
    • Captain Frochot
    • M. Camerlynck (Interpreter)
  • japan
    • Baron Kato
    • Captain Uyeda
    • Mr. Ichihashi (Interpreter)
  • italy
    • Senator Schanzer
    • M. Pagliano

naval treaty.

Mr. Hughes thought the best plan would be to start from the beginning of the Draft Treaty² and ascertain the present position.

articles i-ix.

Article I, he said, had been passed, but as regards Article II, he withdrew the reservation he had made on the previous day. Articles III-IX had been passed.

article x.

Mr. Hughes said he accepted the amendment proposed by Mr. Balfour on the previous day.³

Senator Schanzer said that in a spirit of conciliation, the Italian Delegation would accept the English proposal. The Italian experts, however, desired to add in the last line, after the words “antiaircraft guns”, the following words—“and guns not exceeding 4.6″.”

Mr. Hughes, after retiring to consult his experts, said that the American Delegation accepted.

M. Sarraut said he would like to consult with his experts. Personally, he was inclined to conciliation, but he must examine the practical consequences. Regarding anti-aircraft guns, for example, expert opinion differed. Some thought small guns were best and others thought large guns would be required. It would be difficult for him to express an opinion. He himself [must], therefore, examine the question before giving a final acceptance.

Mr. Balfour said the British experts would approve [prefer] not to include Senator Schanzer’s addition, but in order to settle the question, he would not decline it.

The Article as finally reserved, at M. Sarraut’s instance, for further consideration, is as follows:—

“No aircraft carrier of any of the Contracting Powers shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches (203 millimetres). Without prejudice to the provisions of Annex B, paragraph III (a), if the armament carried includes guns exceeding 6–inches (152 millimetres) in calibre, the total number of guns carried shall not exceed 10. Ii alternatively, the armament contains no guns exceeding 6-inches (152 millimetres) in calibre, the number of guns is not limited. In either case the number of anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding 4.6-inches is not limited.”

articles xi and xii.

Articles XI and XII were passed.

article xiii.

Mr. Hughes asked permission to reserve this Article until the discussion on Annex B.

article xiv.

Mr. Hughes withdrew the reservation he had made on the previous day, and the Article was adopted.

article xv.

Article XV had been adopted the previous day.

article xvi.

Article XVI was adopted as amended on the previous day.

article xvii.

Article XVII was adopted as amended on the previous day.

article xviii.

Article XVIII had been adopted on the previous day.

article xix.

Article XIX awaits the receipt by Baron Kato of a telegram from his Government.

article xx.

Article XX was suppressed on the previous day.

article xxi.

Article XXI had been passed on the previous day.

article xxii.

Article XXII—the first paragraph had been passed on the previous day.

Mr. Hughes said that M. Sarraut’s Delegation would accept the first alternative for the second paragraph in the form in which he had suggested under which the last lines would read as follows:—

“to consider what changes in the Treaty, if any, relating to subjects other than the provisions of Articles IV and VII, may be necessary to meet new conditions.”

Mr. Balfour said he saw great difficulties under that method, but he also saw an advantage. He understood that Mr. Hughes would delete the words in the original paragraph—“other than—”.

Mr. Hughes, interrupting, said that he would not propose to delete these words.

M. Sarraut said that in order to avoid protracting the discussion, he would say at once that to reach agreement, he would accept the Article as amended by Mr. Hughes.

Mr. Balfour said that the object of the whole paragraph was to provide for the case where technical and scientific developments might occur, and it was proposed that in that event the Powers should meet together to see how far the Treaty should be modified to meet the new conditions. The second object was to prevent the ratio being discussed. The wording as now proposed by Mr. Hughes would prevent the discussion not only of the ratio, but of the absolute tonnage. He apprehended, with regret, that there might be great improvements in aircraft during the next eight years and this might lead to a desire on the part of the nations to construct ships of larger size than 35,000 tons, in order to render them more effective, not offensively, but defensively, against the new forms of attack. This ought to be allowed. If, however, Mr. Hughes’ wording were adopted, it would not be practicable.

Baron Kato asked to be quite clear as to whether the words in the fourth line from the end, if any, were to be omitted.

Mr. Hughes replied, “No”. His suggestion had been, instead of defining the omission of the ratio, to refer to the relevant paragraphs. In view of Mr. Balfour’s doubt, however, he did not want to press his proposal. Mr. Balfour had pointed out that the object of the paragraph was to avoid discussion of the ratio, but the effect would be to prohibit the discussion of total tonnage. He thought there might be developments which might necessitate a larger tonnage.

Baron Kato said he did not mind which formula was adopted.

Mr. Hughes thought that, in view of Mr. Balfour’s remarks, it would be better to return to the original paragraph.

M. Sarraut asked, if the United States Delegation withdrew their remarks.

Mr. Hughes replied that they did owing to Mr. Balfour’s explanation.

M. Sarraut said that in these circumstances he had no alternative but to revert to his original position, which he had taken up yesterday for reasons which he had given. He had accepted the American text in a spirit of conciliation in order to reach agreement, but he was now obliged to revert to his original position. The word “ratio” is what the French Delegation objected to. The word had not been used in the preceeding Articles of the Treaty. The French Delegation had always maintained that, owing to their special circumstances, the ratio could not be applied to them. It was true they had accepted certain limitations of tonnage, so that the word did correspond to the realities. They had agreed to the tonnage, however, without admitting the principle of the ratio. Why was it necessary to insert this word here? The Powers were bound by the table of replacement which could not be modified within the terms of the Treaty. There was no object, therefore, to be gained by inserting the word “ratio” here. As to what Mr. Balfour had said, he agreed that some modification of tonnage might be necessitated by future developments and Mr. Balfour’s argument was a sound one. There was no reason, however, why the Conference in eight years should not take that into account, and he saw nothing which would prevent them from doing so. The reasons given, however, were not sufficient to justify the proposed alteration. To sum up, he would accept the American modification because it reached the same idea without introducing the idea of the ratio. To introduce the ratio was useless because all necessary guarantees were provided by the Annex and all the Powers would be bound by it until 1937 under the tables in the Annex. The idea of the ratio could not be changed by the will of any Power, since unanimity was necessary for an alteration. In these conditions, he had accepted the American proposal in a spirit of transaction conciliation, but if the American proposal was withdrawn, he would have to revert to his original position, although he had every desire for an agreement.

Senator Schanzer said he would be quite willing to accept Mr. Balfour’s proposal, which appeared to him reasonable, but as M. Sarraut could not agree to it, he thought it would be better to go back to the American proposal.

Mr. Balfour said he was not sure if he thoroughly understood M. Sarraut’s objection. All were agreed in substance that there was force in his contention that among the changes required after eight years, there might be a change in the tonnage of capital ships. Could it be denied that such a change was inconsistent with Article VII?⁴ If Mr. Hughes’ amendment referring specifically to Article VII were adopted, therefore, it would not be possible to make improvements in the capital ship to meet the advance in mines, torpedoes, aircraft, etc.

M. Sarraut said that he admitted that Mr. Balfour’s idea possessed substance. He understood it and admitted it. The Powers could not be bound ever-lastingly by the Treaty. If improvements were discovered, it would be absurd and stupid not to take advantage of them. He only desired to seek a formula by which Mr. Balfour’s idea could be put into the draft, and he had no wish to obstruct the agreement. He did not wish, however, to include in this Article, ideas which were provided for elsewhere in the Treaty, and particularly those which would change the character of the Article. Consequently, he would propose to reserve the Article for the present and to seek a formula which might be submitted at an early meeting of the Conference. He felt sure that it was possible to find such a formula.

Mr. Hughes suggested that Mr. Balfour’s fundamental idea was correct, namely, that the total tonnage might have to be increased, though the ratio should not be altered. He thought, however, that possibly they were discussing something which was merely verbal. The first paragraph of the Article provided for a Conference in case the national security of a State was affected. Any changes made must be by unanimous consent. The second part of the Article related only to technical and scientific developments. Here again, unless there was unanimous consent of all the Powers concerned, the Treaty could not be changed. If all the Powers wished to make a change, it could be done, but any Power that disliked a change could prevent it by refusing consent. If any Power, therefore, wished to obstruct a change, it could deprive the Power proposing the change of the right to include these developments. In fact, any Power could block a change if it were hostile to the idea. The question was whether it was desired to prevent a Power having the technical ability to say, “This, at any rate, must be discussed.” It was evident the French objected to words “relative strength”. The point was should there be retained the technical advantage of saying this must be discussed. He must point out that quite apart from the Conference, there would be diplomatic opportunities for discussing such a matter and that any Power would have the power to block.

M. Sarraut asked if Mr. Hughes had a definite proposal.

Mr. Balfour, … after a short adjournment to consult his experts, suggested that the last few lines should read as follows:—

“To consider what changes in the Treaty, if any, may be necessary to meet such developments.”

He pointed out that the words which M. Sarraut had objected to appeared unnecessary, since the whole Article was governed by the words “technical and scientific developments” in the first line of the paragraph. Any alteration in the ratio would be a political question and not a technical and scientific question. Consequently, he believed that his advisers would be satisfied if it read as he had proposed. These words would limit the scope of the Conference to technical and scientific developments. …

Mr. Hughes said he would like to consult his experts about this.

M. Sarraut said he would accept this formula.

Senator Schanzer accepted.

Baron Kato accepted.

Mr. Balfour said he would be in a painful position if his Delegation refused to accept.

article xxiii.

Mr. Hughes, in fulfilment of his promise on the previous day, handed round the following draft, which he then read:—

“Whenever any Contracting Power shall become engaged in a war which in its opinion affects the naval defence of its national security, such Power may after notice to the other Contracting Powers suspend for the period of hostilities its obligations under the present treaty other than those under Articles XIII and XVII, provided that such Power shall notify the other Contracting Powers that the emergency is of such a character as to require such suspension.

The remaining Contracting Powers shall in such case consult together with a view to agreement as to what temporary modifications if any should be made in the treaty as between themselves. Should such consultation not produce agreement, duly made in accordance with the Constitutional methods of the respective Powers, any one of said Contracting Powers may, by giving notice to the other Contracting Powers, suspend its obligations under the present Treaty, other than those under Articles XIII and XVII.

On the cessation of hostilities⁵ the Contracting Powers will meet in conference to consider what modifications, if any, should be made in the provisions of the present Treaty.”

Senator Schanzer accepted the draft, but suggested that in the first part of the Article for the words “period of hostilities” should be substituted the same words as in the last part of the draft, namely, the words “on the re-establishment of peace”. In making this suggestion he pointed out that there were three periods; namely, first the period of hostilities, then the period of armistice, and then the period of full peace.

Mr. Hughes said that this raised a serious question which required an explanation. It often happened that a long period supervened after a war before full peace was established. The United States, for example, had only reached a state of peace with Germany last July.

Mr. Balfour interjected that Great Britain was still at war with Turkey.

Mr. Hughes, continuing, said he had known cases where technical peace had only been restored after about twenty years, and there were cases where peace had never been formally restored. For a Power to keep the right to suspend the Treaty until final peace was reached, with replacements continuing all the time, would be to destroy the agreement. Of course if there were a renewal of hostilities, a Power which had reverted to the agreement on the close of the original hostilities would be free again. Sometimes, however, a Power only, so to speak, glided into peace. This would make the wording proposed by Senator Schanzer unacceptable.

M. Sarraut said there was force in both contentions. Mr. Hughes’ point was very strong, but there was something to be said for Senator Schanzer’s. The aim should be to prevent a Power from abusing the period which intervened between the cessation of hostilities and the technical peace in order to violate the agreement and build ships. On the other hand, supposing an armistice did not lead to peace and hostilities were to break out again, a Power which had reverted to the agreement would be placed at a great disadvantage.

Mr. Hughes said there was no way of compelling a Power to accept a Treaty except by force, but all the nations here represented were honourable nations, and it might be assumed that they would not abuse respect the Treaty whatever its terms. It was very important, however, to get the idea of the need to observe the Treaty into the document itself, in order to obtain the sanction of the conscience of nations, which was the real guarantee of the Treaty. While Each nation must decide for itself when it was safe for it to revert to the Treaty, yet there must be some provision providing for the reimposition of the Treaty restrictions at the end of hostilities. History, however, showed that a long period often elapsed after a war before technical peace was re-established, and therefore the reimposition of the Treaty restrictions ought not necessarily to await a status of technical peace. If hostilities were resumed, then the Power would be free again.

Senator Schanzer said he did not object, but he would like to suggest that in the last sentence the words “re-establishment of peace” should be deleted and that the following should be substituted:—“termination of hostilities.”

Mr. Balfour suggested the phrase actual hostilities.

Mr. Hughes agreed to this Senator Schanzer’s suggestion, and explained his view that hostilities must be real, not mere skirmishes with some discontented tribe, for example. The real protection, however, was that the Power which was drawn into a war informed the other Powers that a state of emergency had arisen. He agreed with Senator Schanzer, however, to put in the words “termination of hostilities” in the last paragraph.

Mr. Balfour said he was entirely of the opinion of his colleagues, but he was not quite sure that the idea was satisfactorily carried out by the draft. It was satisfactory and adequate so far as the beginning of hostilities was concerned, but he was not so satisfied in regard to the period at the end of hostilities. There was often a period when real hostilities had ceased but when there was sniping and sharp-shooting, and hostilities of a secondary order. He was wondering whether the word “emergency” could be utilised.

Mr. Hughes stated that used in this connection the term “emergency” had a technical meaning in American statutes.

Mr. Balfour said “emergency” had no special colloquial meaning in England, though he was not sure whether it had a special legal meaning or not.

Mr. Hughes said further explained that the use of the word “emergency” was open to the objection that it was used in America to describe a general condition as distinguished from actual war. “The continuance of emergency” was often used in America as a term defining the position right up to the end of a war. He had several thoughts. First, that whenever any Power was engaged in a war and wished to apply this Treaty it must be a real war. Second, that there must be the power of suspension for the period of hostilities. Third, that the emergency must have some relation to the real position. There might have been only some single incident, such as one bombardment, but this might be sufficient to make a Power know that it was on the brink of war. Fourth, as regards a state of hostilities, no Power could ever accept a position in which it was not free to take such action as it thought necessary. The Senate of the United States, for example, would never pass this Treaty unless the country was free in time of war. But on the question of giving notice, whether of the outbreak of emergency or the suspension of hostilities, there might be room for a difference of opinion. A nation at war must decide for itself what the position was; he did not see that other powers could pass upon this. When a condition had been reached where it was patent that hostilities had ceased, his idea was that the Powers should meet in conference. He wanted to avoid a Power saying that no peace existed notwithstanding that hostilities had ceased, and continuing to build outside the provisions of the Treaty.

Mr. Balfour said Mr. Hughes had answered his objection.

Mr. Hughes, during the translation of his foregoing remarks into French, reinforced his explanation and argument to Mr. Balfour.

M. Sarraut said that under the French Constitution they had a formula which surmounted the inconvenience of the period between the conclusion of hostilities and the technical re-establishment of peace. This intermediate period was known as the “cessation of hostilities”. It was declared by Parliament, and it could not continue for more than a year after the war. This might perhaps be applied to the present case. It must be clear, however, that no action could be taken until hostilities had really ceased. No Parliament could sanction reversion to the Treaty unless there was no risk of war breaking out. For example, it could not agree to the demolition of a quantity of war material when there was a risk of war breaking out again.

Senator Schanzer pointed out a difference between the Italian and French position. In Italy the cessation of war was a juridical position and not one of fact. It was declared by Royal Decree, which was sometimes published a long time after the conclusion of peace. In these circumstances, as the procedure in the different countries varied, it would be better to adopt the American formula, which was based on fact.

Mr. Sarraut said he was prepared to accept Mr. Hughes formula, as it placed the nations on their honor and all were honorable nations.

Mr. Hughes proposed the adoption of the Clause as suggested by him, with the substitution in the last sentence of the words “on the cessation of hostilities” for the words “on the re-establishment of peace”.

(N. B. Mr. Hughes thought the word “cessation” better than “termination”.)

Mr. Balfour, referring to the United States Senate’s unwillingness to curtail its powers in war and to the exclusion of Articles XIII and XVII, supposed the position of a nation which found itself with a ship on the stocks, nearly finished, for a foreign Power. In such conditions a people would snatch at anything which would increase their force. What this Article compelled the parties to the Treaty to do, if they wished to use the slip, was to destroy the ship in order to put another ship on the stocks: that is to say, a country which wanted all the ships it could get would be asked to destroy a ship which was nearly finished and to build another ship on the same slip. He would not say that Article XVI was wrong, but it raised a serious difficulty.

Mr. Hughes said that this was a case of competing considerations, and the question was which was the more important. The Powers represented here were all dealing fairly and confidently with one another, but they had to consider the effect on public opinion of what they decided. The whole of the Treaty was an enormous appeal for peace, which was producing a strong sentimental reaction. It was necessary to use hypothetical illustrations, but they must not be considered as reflecting on any particular country. If a power may have within its jurisdiction, vessels of war of which it may rightfully avail itself under the Treaty, if you have this general situation in connection with an ability and a right to build ships for others, then you have a situation where certain powers might always have available fleets very much larger than the Treaty ostensibly provides. The people will resent this. Supposing a Power had a ship under construction, a vessel of war, whether a capital ship or otherwise, which might at a certain moment be available, there would undoubtedly be a great temptation for that Power to use the ship; but as the ship was being produced at the expense of another Power and for another Power it would be very dishonourable for the State to use it if it had promised not to do so. He had great confidence that if this Article were not put into the Treaty there would be room for a great deal of criticism that the object of the Treaty was not being carried out, and he was equally confident that if it was inserted in the Treaty this Article would be carried out. As regards the actual position, the ship would either be ready for launching or only just begun, or at some intermediate stage. The question would only arise where it was in a state where it could not be moved. It seemed to him, however, to be very important that there should be no power to use the ship in view of the number of ships which nations like Great Britain and the United States, for example, might be building for other nations.

M. Sarraut said he had one question to ask, though perhaps he would be accused of splitting hairs. Supposing a Power had under construction a ship for another Power with which it went to war, would it be obliged to deliver the ship to its enemy?

Mr. Hughes said that this was a simple matter, as the Power constructing the ship would capture the ship under construction and seize it as a belligerent.

M. Sarraut said in that case that Power would be able to use it,

Mr. Hughes replied in the affirmative. No-one ever handed over property to an enemy. His main point was that we were in a position where it was essential to make good what had been promised to the world, and that, to use a colloquial expression, no-one should “discover a joker”. There was much cynicism in the world, and many people were trying to criticise this Treaty. He thought, therefore, that even more important than the actual scrapping of ships was the development of a right sentiment in the world. If the Powers were to give the impression that the whole thing was a mockery it would fail.

Mr. Balfour said that he personally was of Mr. Hughes’ opinion. He thought that he had perhaps exaggerated the inconvenience to a Power in the case where a ship being constructed for another State was either complete, nearly complete or easily moved. He sympathised, however, with Mr. Hughes’ broad argument. It was vital that the Treaty should be regarded as genuine and water-tight. While this might be difficult, it must be done. Hence, so far as he was concerned, though the present Article might present difficulties for a belligerent, he thought it would be a grave mistake to present the Treaty in a form which might lead to hostile criticism. It might be said: “This looks well on paper, but the Powers possessing great means of naval construction have been very careful to leave themselves a loophole for increasing their naval power”. Great Britain being, with the United States, perhaps the principal of such Powers, would be open to this criticism. He therefore accepted Mr. Hughes’ view that any possible loophole must be closed, and that a limitation must be placed concerning shipbuilding for other Powers. The provision in this respect must be honest, and of a kind that could not be ignored in an emergency by any Power, and least of all by those Powers possessing capacity for naval construction.

Mr. Hughes hoped that Article XXIII, with the slight amendment, namely, the substitution of “cessation of hostilities” for “re-establishment of peace”, would be accepted as satisfactory.

M. Sarraut accepted the Article in principle, subject to consultation with his experts in regard to the wording.

article xxiv.

Article XXIV had been deleted on the previous day.

article xxv.

The following draft was read by Mr. Hughes and adopted:—

“The present Treaty shall remain in force until 31st December, 1936, and in case none of the Contracting Powers shall have given notice two years before that date of its intention to terminate the Treaty, it shall continue in force until the expiration of two years from the date on which notice of termination shall be given by one of the Contracting Powers, whereupon the Treaty shall terminate as regards all the Contracting Powers. Such notice shall be communicated in writing to the Government of the United States, which shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the notification to the other Powers and inform them of the date on which it was received. The notice shall take effect on that date.

Within one year of the date of the receipt by the Government of the United States of a notice of termination by any Power, all the Contracting Powers shall meet in Conference.”

article xxvi.

Article XXVI had been adopted on the previous day.

annex a.

Mr. Hughes suggested that the reference to the tonnage of the ships should be cut out.

Mr. Balfour said that his technical advisers did not wish to do this for what seemed to be very good reasons. They said that in certain cases of replacement it was necessary to know the tonnage of the ships to be replaced. He understood that one provision of the replacement clauses was that if a ship was wrecked it could be replaced. In this event it was necessary that it should be replaced only by the same tonnage, and for this reason it was desirable to have a record in the Treaty of what the tonnage of the ship was.

Mr. Hughes suggested then that it would be better to reduce the ships to the standard measurement.

Mr. Balfour said that he was informed that there were technical difficulties in making the necessary calculations.

Mr. Hughes said that in these circumstances it would be better to keep the tonnage stated as it was.

This proposal was adopted.

Mr. Hughes said that his advisers had suggested that the various passages of the text in Annex “A” between the several lists of ships should be deleted as they appeared elsewhere in the Treaty.

This point was reserved for consideration.

(The Committee adjourned at 1 p.m. until 3.30 p.m.)

Washington , 11 January, 1922.

1. No agreed official minutes of this meeting were made. The American delegation used the memorandum prepared by Sir Maurice Hankey.

   The file copy of this memorandum bears corrections by Mr. Clark. Words which he crossed out are indicated by canceled type; words which he inserted are printed in italics.

2. Unless otherwise noted, references in this memorandum are to the draft printed supra.
3. Ante, p. 148.
4. Article IV of the draft limits the total replacement tonnage of capital ships; article VII limits the total tonnage of aircraft carriers.
5. In the draft circulated by Mr. Hughes at this time the opening words of this paragraph appear to have been “On the re-establishment of peace”.