Disarmament Conference File No. 250/9
Memorandum by the Secretary to the British Empire Delegation of a Meeting of Heads of Delegations Held at the Pan American Union, January 10, 1922, 3 p.m.91
Secret
- Present:—
- united states of america
- Mr. Hughes
- Mr. J. R. Clark
- the british empire
- Mr. Balfour
- Sir Maurice Hankey
- france
- M. Sarraut
M. Camerlynck (Interpreter)
- M. Sarraut
- japan
- Baron Kato
M. Ichihashi (Interpreter)
- Baron Kato
- italy
- Senator Schanzer
- united states of america
The Committee had before them a draft of the Naval Treaty (Appendix I), together with a preamble proposed by Mr. Hughes (Appendix II).
preamble.
Mr. Hughes said that the American Delegation would wish to leave out the following words at the beginning, after the word “desiring”:—“to strengthen the friendly relations which unite them”.
Mr. Balfour said the words might go in or be left out. The British Delegation would not make a point either way.
This was adopted, and the preamble was accepted in the following form:— [Page 145]
“The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, desiring to contribute to the maintenance of the general peace, and to reduce the burdens of competition in armament, have resolved, with a view to accomplishing these purposes, to conclude a Treaty to limit their respective naval armament, and to that end have appointed their plenipotentiaries:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Who, having communicated to each other their respective Full Powers, found to be in good order and due form, have agreed as follows”.
arrangement of the treaty.
The following plan, proposed by Mr. Hughes, was adopted for the re-arrangement of the Treaty:—
Preamble.
Chapter I—General provisions relating to the limitation of naval armament (Articles I to XXI inclusive of the first draft of the Treaty in Appendix I).
The original caption of Chapter II read “Definition of terms, Rides relating to the execution of the Treaty”.
Senator Schanzer enquired as to the meaning of the entire arrangement particularly as to the meaning of the caption of Chapter II.
Mr. Hughes explained the general plan and proposed transposing “definition of terms” to the end of the caption.
This was agreed to.
Mr. Hughes then proposed to change “Section 1” etc. to “Part I”, etc.
This was agreed to.
Chapter II—Rules relating to the execution of the Treaty—definition of terms.
- Part I—Vessels which may be retained by the Contracting Powers.
- Part II—Rules for scrapping vessels of war.
- Part III—Replacement—Rules and Tables.
- Part IV—Definitions.
- Part V—Standard displacement.
Chapter III—Miscellaneous provisions (Articles XXII to the end of the first draft in Appendix I).
article i.
Mr. Hughes then read Article I, which was adopted.
article ii.
Senator Schanzer pointed out that the first Articles were intended to be of a general character, whereas the annexes bore a particular character. He thought that the last two paragraphs of Article II should be transferred to Annex A, since they dealt with particular questions, such as the names of the ships to be retained and disposed of. These appeared rather a matter for an Annex.
[Page 146]Mr. Hughes pointed out that the aim was to reach agreement. The American Delegation were anxious to put the matter which was now included in the Annexes into the body of the Report, in order that they might appear in the Treaty in front of the signatures; otherwise it would be necessary to sign the Annexes. The matters dealt with in Article II stood together, and it was unavoidable to mention particular ships. He thought, therefore, it would be better to retain them as they were.
Senator Schanzer pointed out that these paragraphs had arisen out of the difficulty in regard to the Mutsu, and he thought it was rather too particular in detail for so early a paragraph.
Mr. Hughes said that Article II pointed out that all capital ships built or building of the United States, the British Empire and Japan would either be retained or disposed of as provided in Annex B, that is to say, most of them would be scrapped. It was impossible to state this without mentioning the ships referred to in the last two paragraphs. Mr. Hughes then said that there were several points which he would have to reserve, as the discussion proceeded, in order that he might consider them with his own Delegation. The reason for this was that one of his legal advisers had made some suggestions to him at the last moment which he had not had an opportunity yet to discuss with his colleagues. For example, on Article II the point had been made that on the completion of each of the new ships the appropriate ship to be scrapped should immediately be scrapped instead of waiting until both ships had been completed.
Mr. Balfour asked if, in the event of this or any other matter being taken up by the Delegation, Mr. Hughes could notify the British Empire Delegation in advance of any proposed alterations.
Mr. Hughes agreed to do this, but expressed doubts as to whether the point would arise.
articles iii and iv.
Articles III and IV were passed without discussion.
article v.
Senator Schanzer said he did not want to propose an addition to the Article, but he wanted to be clear that the term “jurisdiction” extended not only to the national territory but to the colonies and protectorates of the countries concerned.
Mr. Hughes did not suppose that any of the Powers would endeavour to evade the provisions of the Treaty by the excuse that it had no control over a colony, and said he assumed of course that each power would carry out the treaties in whatever territory they controlled.
Mr. Balfour said that there were, of course, parts of the British Empire over which the British Government had no control, but [Page 147] these Dominions and India would append their signatures to the Treaty. The British Government itself had control in the Crown Colonies, Protectorates, etc., over such matters.
Mr. Hughes pointed out that the Treaty would be signed for the British Empire, which appeared to meet the case.
M. Sarraut said that it would be impossible for any French colony to build outside the control of the French Government.
Mr. Hughes said that if there were any danger it might be necessary to provide by definition that the jurisdiction extended over colonies, but in fact there was no danger.
Senator Schanzer thought it would be sufficient if it were mentioned in the procès-verbal of the full Naval Committee.
articles v, vi, vii, viii and ix.
Articles V, VI, VII, VIII and IX were adopted without discussion.
article x.
Mr. Balfour said that his advisers considered this Article to be ambiguous. It appeared to provide that an aircraft carrier might have ten 8-inch guns and in addition any number of 6-inch guns. This, he believed, was not the original intention. The understanding of his experts had been that an aircraft carrier might have up to ten 8-inch guns, but in that case it could carry no guns of 6-inch.
Mr. Hughes asked if Mr. Balfour’s understanding was that they could not have both 6-inch and 8-inch guns?
Mr. Balfour said they could only have both provided that the total did not exceed ten.
Baron Kato pointed out that Article X should be read in conjunction with Annex B, para. 3 (a).
Mr. Hughes agreed.
Senator Schanzer said he would like to put the view of the Italian naval experts. Italy was only to have two aircraft carriers; hence she must have a very strong armament for them. As Italy was only to have very few of these ships that they must be defended very powerfully. Consequently, his experts considered that they should be allowed to have up to ten 8-inch guns, with 6-inch guns in addition.
Mr. Hughes summed up by stating that the Italian view was that aircraft carriers might have any number of 6-inch guns, as well as up to ten 8-inch guns. The British view, on the other hand, was that if they carried ten 8-inch guns they must not have any 6-inch guns. These, he pointed out, were opposing proposals.
Mr. Balfour said that the British view was that they did not desire, and he thought no-one desired, that aircraft carriers should become a kind of super-cruiser. He was informed that if they [Page 148] were provided with a large number of guns they would become bad aircraft carriers even though they might be good cruisers. Hence there might be a tendency for a Power to use them in war rather as a cruiser than as an aircraft carrier, not mala fide, but merely because their construction had resulted in their being useful cruisers and bad aircraft carriers.
(At this point Mr. Balfour handed round the following re-draft of Article X:—
“No aircraft carrier of any of the Contracting Powers shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches (203 millimetres). Without prejudice to the provisions of Annex B, para. 3 (a), if the armament carried includes guns exceeding 6 inches (152 millimetres) in calibre, the total number of guns carried shall not exceed 10. If alternatively, the armament contains no guns exceeding 6 inches (152 millimetres) in calibre, the number of guns is not limited. In either case the number of anti-aircraft guns is not limited”.)
M. Sarraut associated himself with Senator Schanzer. He said that Article X had been fully discussed by the Sub-Committee and adopted unanimously.
Mr. Balfour interjected that he was informed the British Empire Delegation representative had adhered to the same view throughout.
M. Sarraut said that Admiral De Bon informed him that this had been unanimously adopted for technical reasons. It was quite true that these aircraft carriers might possibly be utilised as super-cruisers. It was necessary, however, to take into account the difficulties of the French and Italian navies, which would only possess two of these very costly ships. If one was out of repair they would only have one available. Having so restricted a tonnage they would not possess any large number of cruisers. Hence these aircraft carriers would have to depend largely on their own efforts for defence.
Mr. Hughes said he had not had an opportunity to discuss this with his experts, he did not know that any question existed, and reserved it for further consideration.
articles xi and xii.
Articles XI and XII were adopted without discussion.
articles xiii and xiv.
Articles XIII and XIV were reserved at Mr. Hughes’ request, as his experts had shortly before the meeting given him some new points in regard to them for consideration.
Senator Schanzer pointed out that in Articles XIII and XIV the calibre in millimetres should be inserted as it had been in Article XII.
Baron Kato pointed out that there would probably be a good many small errors in drafting which ought to be referred to the Drafting Committee for the final text.
[Page 149]Mr. Hugues said that so much of the material in this text affected the meaning of the Treaty that it was essential to raise it reach an agreement in the this full Committee on the text itself, as nearly as was possible; otherwise great delay might be involved. When the Committee of Heads of Delegations had completed their examination of all the Articles, a fresh draft would have to be prepared. He thought it would be a mistake, however, to refer to the Drafting: Committee when the drafting was so much of the essence of the Treaty itself.
Mr. Balfour said his own legal advisers were most anxious that the lawyers should look the final draft through from the purely legal point of view, as it was almost certain that small questions; would arise.
Mr. Hughes pointed out that during the last week they had been through the draft again and again.
Mr. Balfour urged that there would be questions of editing to consider; for example, consequential alterations due to the rearrangement that had just been agreed on. He thought it was very important that the Treaty should be very carefully examined from a technical point of view, to avoid errors.
Mr. Hughes pointed out that the Treaty would not be finally passed until it had been approved by the full Naval Commission Committee, and before that there should be time to make these editing alterations.
article xv.
Article XV was adopted without discussion.
article xvi.
Senator Schanzer proposed to insert in line 3, after the word “shall”, the following words:—“in a reasonable time”.
Mr. Hughes suggested to substitute the word “promptly”.
This suggestion was adopted, so that the first lines of Article XVI are as follows:—
“If the construction of any vessel of war for a non-Contracting Power is undertaken within the jurisdiction of any of the Contracting Powers, such Power shall promptly inform the other Contracting Powers”, etc.
article xvii.
Mr. Hughes pointed out that although this Article provided that a vessel of war under construction for another Power must not be used by a nation which became involved in war, it did not provide for the case of a ship which had just been constructed but had not yet been delivered. He proposed that an addition should be made to meet this case.
Article XVII was adopted with the addition of the following words at the end:— [Page 150]
“or which may have been constructed within its jurisdiction for another Power and not delivered”.
article xviii.
Article XVIII was adopted without discussion.
article xix.
Mr. Hughes said that no draft Article was before the Committee, and the United States had no text to propose.
Baron Kato said that when the question of the status quo as regards fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific had been discussed, he thought that he had made himself quite clear. Later, the question had been raised in the expert Sub-Committee and some doubt seemed to have arisen. He had originally made it clear that Japan would observe the status quo in the islands of Oshima, Bonin, the Pescadores and Formosa. He still stuck to this. He urged, however, that the statement in the communiqué of December 15th92 should be inserted in Article XIX and that any necessary explanatory statement should take the form of a separate declaration.
Mr. Hughes asked what Baron Kato meant by a Declaration?
Baron Kato said that he intended that any mention of the islands which had not been referred to by name in the announcement of December 15th, should be made in a separate Declaration, which would have the same authority as the Treaty. For reasons of domestic politics, he wished to avoid their inclusion in the Treaty itself.
Mr. Hughes said he understood Baron Kato wished not to particularise the islands in the Treaty.
Baron Kato said that that was his point—that he did not wish to specify the islands in the Treaty, but to make it clear that they were included in the status quo arrangement by means of a Declaration.
Mr. Balfour asked what Baron Kato proposed to insert in the Treaty.
Baron Kato said he would like to include an extract from the communiqué of December 15th in the Treaty, but to omit any specific mention of the particular islands, which he would leave to a separate Declaration.
Mr. Hughes asked if M. Sarraut and Senator Schanzer would pardon him if he discussed this matter with Mr. Balfour and Baron Kato, who were specially interested.
M. Sarraut agreed.
Mr. Hughes said that he understood Baron Kato’s proposal was that any allusion to the islands should not appear in the Treaty, but should be made in the form of a separate statement. In the announcement of December 15th, reference had been made to the [Page 151] islands of Japan proper. He supposed that Baron Kato intended that there should be some exchange of Notes to make it clear that Formosa, the Pescadores, the Bonin Islands and Oshima should come within the provisions of the Treaty, that is to say, there should be an exchange of Notes making a specification to clarify the Treaty. He was not opposed to this. He thought that all would wish to make some specifications. It might be useful by a Declaration or by means of an exchange of Notes, to make the position perfectly clear, or it might be done by means of a marked map or chart.
Baron Kato said that, according to the Japanese definition of the islands composing Japan proper, Bonin Islands and Oshima were included. To avoid that the difficulty that resulted from this fact he proposed an exchange of notes. Otherwise, that is to say, if the islands were named in the Treaty, there would appear to be a conflict between the Treaty and the Points of Agreement announced on December 15th. To clear this point up, the Japanese Delegation were willing to meet any demand for an exchange of Notes or a Declaration.
Mr. Balfour asked why Baron Kato wished to re-publish the statement of December 15th, since this document gave a very imperfect representation of the Japanese views. This statement made it clear that it did not apply to the islands of Japan proper. Apparently, however, in the view of the Japanese at home, the islands of Japan proper included some of the islands to which the status quo was to apply. Was it not, in these circumstances, absurd to republish the statement?
Baron Kato said that the only reason he had for insisting on the repetition of the original statement, was that it had been made public already in Japan. As long as it was made clear in the exchange of Notes that the particular islands he had mentioned were not included, no difficulty would arise. Otherwise, there would appear to be a conflict between the Treaty and the statement of December 15th. That was the reason he insisted that the Treaty should reproduce the statement of December 15th.
Mr. Balfour recalled the circumstances in which the statement had been drawn up. It had been dictated by Mr. Hughes to a stenographer in the presence of Baron Kato and of Mr. Balfour himself, after a long and successful negotiation conducted by the Secretary of State in regard to the building of capital ships. While the spirit of the agreement reached was properly reflected in the document, the statement of December 15th had no legal authority or status and did not pretend to be explicit in its terms. It was not an infallible document. It had two defects. First, it assumed that the islands of Japan meant what they were understood to mean was proposed to republish—incorporate into the treaty—statements which meant one [Page 152] thing in London, Paris, Rome and Washington, and not what they apparently meant in Japan. It would be unfortunate to re-publish a document containing these misunderstandings. The second objection was that the whole discussion had turned on the islands of the Pacific, the main land was never included, but in the announcement of December 15th the mainland was not even mentioned as being excluded. There had been no mention that the agreement was confined to the islands. As it stood, Port Arthur and other Japanese interests on mainland territory would be included. This had clearly not been the intention of those who had taken part in the discussion, which had been concerned only with the islands. The discussion had taken place in connection with a Naval Agreement, and the sole object had been to make each of the two Great Naval Powers, the United States and Japan, feel that the other Power was not creating bases within striking distance of its interests. The Japanese had felt that if the United States of America turned any of the Philippine Islands or Guam into a naval base, they could not accept the 5:3 ratio. This had been the sole object of the Agreement and we ought not now to extend beyond this original object. To include in the Treaty a statement which was clearly erroneous in two important points, would be an action of very doubtful wisdom.
Baron Kato replied that he had made his statement on the assumption that the statement of December 15th was correct. If another proposal was made he would consider the suggestion.
Mr. Hughes said that his thought was that it was necessary that any statement in the Treaty should be very definite and certain. It would be very prejudicial to the Treaty, particularly in the United States Senate, if there was any ambiguity anywhere. An agreement had been reached the other day (the “Four Power” Treaty)93 which had seemed to him sufficiently clear, but nevertheless, a number of points had been raised suggesting ambiguity. He agreed with Mr. Balfour in all that he had said as to the spirit and intention of the agreement in regard to the status quo for fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific. The United States of America had certain interests and possessions in the Western Pacific which were in no sense regarded as a menace to Japan. The idea had arisen, however, that if naval bases were created in these possessions, they might be regarded in Japan as a menace, and consequently might prejudice the acceptance by Japan and the maintenance later on of the ratio in regard to capital ships. This particularly applied to Guam and Manila. There were, however, a number of ports, including Hawaii, the ports of Japan proper, Australia and New Zealand, where there was no need to interfere with the right of fortification. All this had been expressed in [Page 153] a very general way, but lie thought fairly accurately, in the announcement of the Points of Agreement made on December 15th. Now, however, the time was coming to embody the same arrangements in a Treaty. He, himself, was not a stickler for meticulous exactness form. It now transpired that in Japan the idea was entertained that Japan maintained that the statement in the Treaty must not definitely mention islands which were just as much a menace to the possessions of the United States in the Western Pacific, as Guam and the Philippines if converted into naval bases would be to Japan. In any case, whatever they agreed upon must be made public in some sort of Declaration. If then, this was accepted, it was really only a matter of form as to whether the arrangement should be stated in one document or in two, or in one document with a map appended.
Mr. Balfour said that his legal advisers considered that the only way effectively to dispose of controversy was to embody the arrangement in a map.
Baron Kato said that he agreed in every word that Mr. Hughes had said on the subject of publication. What he had been trying to do was to save a political situation of some difficulty for the Japanese Government. Some of the Government’s critics made a great point of these islands and he was trying to forestall them.
Mr. Hughes said he first wanted to make sure he understood Baron Kato’s difficulties. The statement of December 15th referred to the “islands of Japan proper.” He understood that in Japan that statement designation was taken to include the Bonin Islands, and Oshima, but not the Pescadores and Formosa. Hence, the position was that there were certain islands which came within the scope of the status quo agreement which were regarded in Japan as part of Japan proper. Baron Kato, however, fully recognised that the islands must be included in the agreement, but did not want them to appear in the Treaty, as this would give the appearance of contradicting the previous public announcement of December 15th. He asked why, therefore, the arrangement should not be defined by latitude and longitude, so as to show the islands which were referred to, without mentioning Japan proper. There were, no doubt, innumerable small islands around all the principal territory, which would make naming of islands difficult if not impossible.
For example, there were innumerable islands along the coast of the United States of America one island of Japan—more than a hundred and fifty. It would be impossible to name all these islands. Consequently, it seemed to be a good deal easier to apply the method of statement of latitude and longitude and this might then be made out on a map or chart.
Baron Kato suggested that the lines of latitude and longitude might be included in a note.
[Page 154]Mr. Hughes asked whether it would be possible to include it in a Declaration annexed as an Appendix to the Treaty?
Baron Kato said he wished, if possible, to avoid the mention of these islands, whether as part of the Treaty or in an Annex thereto.
Mr. Hughes remarked that, as Baron Kato has said, everything that was done must be made public. If a chart could be agreed on, then some appropriate Article might be included in the Treaty, which should incorporate the chart.
Mr. Balfour suggested that it might describe latitude and longitude.
Baron Kato said that if he could be allowed a short time, he would send a telegram to his Government and he thought it possible that they might accede to the proposal, namely that an Article as suggested by Mr. Hughes might be embodied in the Treaty. His present instructions, however, did not enable him to agree without referring home.
Mr. Hughes said that it was important that Baron Kato and the Japanese Government should realise his position. There was no question whatsoever as to what Baron Kato had intended and he himself had no doubt that this Treaty would be ratified if Baron Kato would allow a statement to appear in the Treaty of what had been agreed. If, however, something were stated in the Treaty which appeared to be different from what was in the Treaty actually done, it would give an opportunity for an acrimonious debate. He did not want any opportunity for such a well-founded discussion of this sort and this was as important to Japan as it was to the United States. The meaning of what was included in the Treaty must stand out perfectly clear by itself on the face of the document and must be free from all ambiguity.
Baron Kato said he understood the position perfectly and he himself was in agreement with the proposal, but if any suggestion were made for altering the form from what had been stated in the announcement of December 15th, he would have to take it up with his Government. He would make his telegram as brief as possible in order to obtain a reply. He had demanded full powers from his Government, but on this point they had made an exception.
Mr. Hughes said there were two alternatives. First an Article couched in general language, based on the statement of December 15th, and second, a definitive statement. In order to accede to the latter, Baron Kato must obtain instructions from his Government. He himself thought this was the preferable course. He suggested therefore, that he and Mr. Balfour should each indicate what they proposed, then the arrangement could be got into shape and Baron Kato could communicate it to the Japanese Government.
[Page 155]Baron Kato said he would be glad to have such a definitive statement.
Mr. Balfour said that his statement would include the following propositions. First the status quo arrangement must apply only to insular possessions in the Pacific: second, it must not include the islands either off the coast of Canada, and he presumed that Mr. Hughes would wish this to apply also to the islands off the coast of the United States of America, or to the islands in the neighbourhood of Australia and New Zealand. Third, his view would be adequately expressed by the following formula:—
“The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the following provisions shall apply to their respective possessions lying between the Equator and the parallel of 30° N. and between the Meridians of 110° E. and 180° E.”
He then handed Baron Kato a copy of a map of the Pacific on which these lines were drawn.
Mr. Hughes said he would accept Mr. Balfour’s proposal.
Baron Kato said that as this involved some changes he would ask his Government to agree to this, but he was not in a position to say what the attitude of the Government would be.
Mr. Balfour asked what changes were involved in acceptance of this map, from the statement of December 15th? The British Empire Delegation had not appreciated that there was any change.
Baron Kato said that the statement of December 15th had included the whole region-of the Pacific. This was now limited to the area shown on the map.
Mr. Balfour asked if there were any bases shown on the map within striking distance of Japan.
Baron Kato said that from a strategic point of view he had no objection to any base outside this region, but since the original announcement had applied to the whole region, there might be difficulties in getting it accepted by his Government. However, he would do his best. He was willing to accept the 30° of latitude as the northern limit.
Mr. Hughes said it did not really change anything. As regards the United States of America, he himself had previously excepted the Hawaiian Islands.
Baron Kato repeated that as a practical proposition he had no objection whatsoever to the agreement.
M. Sarraut said that although France was disinterested in this question, he would like to see the area on the map.
Sir Maurice Hankey obtained a map showing the area and communicated it to M. Sarraut.
Mr. Hughes pointed out that Australia and New Zealand had also been excluded from the status quo arrangement. The spirit of [Page 156] the agreement was therefore maintained by Mr. Balfour’s proposal. The effect of applying the status quo arrangement to the area proposed by Mr. Balfour would be to prevent the United States of America and Japan from making bases within reach of one another.
Baron Kato said that from a practical point of view as a strategist he had no objection to the proposal. He was only afraid that the changes might be misunderstood in Japan.
Mr. Hughes said it was necessary to face the situation. Supposing a situation was reached in which the agreement was suggested to include some islands which had not definitely appeared on the face of the document, it would be contrary to the spirit of the agreement. It would be provocative of further trouble which both wished to avoid. He could see no way of settling it satisfactorily except by that now proposed.
Baron Kato said he would do his best to secure the agreement of his Government in the shortest possible time.
article xx.
Article XX was omitted as it had been agreed to include the definitions in the body of the Treaty instead of in an annex.
article xxi.
Article XXI was adopted without discussion, M. Sarraut suggesting, and Senator Schanzer agreeing that this should apply to new tonnage.
article xxii.
The first paragraph of Article XXII was adopted without discussion.
Mr. Hughes pointed out that there were two alternative drafts for the second paragraph. The second alternative provided for the Conference in eight years but created no machinery for summoning the Conference, in fact it was not self executing. The first alternative provided that the United States should summon the Conference. This was mere messenger service. He confessed that he was not attracted by the second alternative.
Mr. Balfour said he preferred the first alternative for the reason Mr. Hughes had given, and also because it definitely ruled out the ratio of relative strength in capital ships and aircraft carriers from the scope of the future Conference.
Baron Kato said he preferred the first alternative. He pointed out a clerical error in the last line but one where the words “and VII” should be inserted after Article IV.
M. Sarraut considered that a Treaty should be clear and simple and in as concise terms as possible. Whatever was said in one part of a Treaty should not have to be repeated. The formula proposed by the United States involved a repetition and might be curtailed. The first suggestion it contained was that the Conference should be [Page 157] summoned by the United States. To that he had no objection whatsoever. It would be sufficient to add a few words to show that the United States should summon the Conference. The limitation of ratio appeared to him superfluous for the reason that the Treaty provided fully for the replacement of capital ships and aircraft carriers for the whole period covered until its expiration. Why was it necessary to repeat this in Article XXII when it already appeared in the annex to the Treaty, which stated definitely and clearly in the form of a table how the replacement was to be effected? Hence he would prefer to adopt the second alternative adding a few words to show that the Conference would be summoned on the initiative of the United States.
Mr. Balfour said that if he rightly understood M. Sarraut he thought it unnecessary and therefore bad drafting to refer to the ratio, since this had been fixed in the annex to the Treaty. That conclusion would be justified if no changes in the Treaty were possible. This Article, however, envisaged changes, in fact this was its very object. If words were not put in to exclude the ratio it would be assumed that the Conference could deal with questions of the ratio. Therefore the Treaty must say what mutters may not be considered at this Conference.
Mr. Hughes added to what Mr. Balfour had said that the intention of the paragraph of which alternative drafts had been provided was that a conference should assemble after eight years. It was not called on any question affecting the security of the States, but merely to consider any alterations involved by technical and scientific developments. It was not intended that any change should be made in the ratio for capital ships or aircraft carriers. If reference to the latter were omitted, all questions could be brought up. Of course if the security of any State were menaced, such questions could be brought up under the first paragraph of the Article. Apart from this, however, the Article was only intended to refer to technical and scientific developments.
M. Sarraut said he was not entirely convinced by what his colleagues had said. His object in formulating his observations had not been with the idea of giving a loophole to escape from the Treaty. He pointed out that the idea of the ratio did not figure in the Treaty. It was true that certain figures had been fixed as regards the tonnage for each nation, which resulted in the fixation of certain proportions. The actual idea of the ratio, however, did not appear. The Annex to the Treaty, however, fixed the tonnage for the whole period covered by the Treaty. Why, therefore, was it necessary to refer to it again here? He thought it would be better to adopt the second alternative. Nothing had been further from [Page 158] his thoughts than that this should give an opportunity for escaping from the Treaty in eight years.
Mr. Hughes proposed, in order to meet M. Sarraut, that the last four lines of the first alternative should read as follows:—
“to consider what changes in the Treaty, if any, relating to subjects other than the provisions of Articles IV and VII, may be necessary to meet new conditions”.
M. Sarraut said that this seemed to amount to the same thing. He said he would like to consider the matter further.
Article XXII was therefore reserved.
article xxiii.
Senator Schanzer proposed to substitute in the second line for the words “engaged in hostilities” the words “engaged in war”. This would be to adopt the same wording as in Article XVII.
Mr. Hughes said that there was a point of substance here. There were times when hostilities of a minor character occurred, in which all each of the greater nations were was apt to become engaged in all parts of the world. They might be quite small, and they should not enable a Power to escape from the Treaty. If this was a sufficient reason to escape from the Treaty it would not have much value. He himself thought, therefore, that the Article in its present form hardly went far enough. At the present moment he had not a formula to propose. It seemed to him, however, that whether the term “hostilities” or “war” were employed, before a Power took any step involving suspension of obligations under the Treaty, that Power must in some way be put on its honour to give its reasons and justify itself. He would be prepared to propose a formula on this subject.
M. Sarraut said there was substance in this suggestion.
Mr. Hughes undertook to bring forward a draft.
Mr. Balfour also accepted the spirit of the proposal, and suggested to insert in line 2 after “naval operations” the following words:—“and of such a character as to menace their national security.”
Mr. Hughes thought this was rather broad language but said his thought had been that the Power wishing to suspend the Treaty must say to the other Powers that it was involved in a situation which affected its national security.
Article XXIII was reserved.
article xxiv.
Article XXIV was deleted without discussion, as the Annexes are to form part of the Treaty.
article xxv.
Mr. Hughes said that the United States Delegation did not like the present form of this Article. The Treaty was to endure for [Page 159] fifteen years. They did not like to countenance a situation in which one party might give notice of withdrawal and the other parties might then find themselves in an equivocal position. All sorts of difficulties might arise as to whether, though still remaining within the Treaty, they ought to denounce, and there might be apprehensions as to whether some second Power might delay until the end of a period of one year and then give notice of denunciation, not leaving time to other Powers to do the same. He could foresee all kinds of difficulties. He suggested that the Treaty should be for fifteen years without the option of withdrawal except as stated in paragraph XXV. It should then continue until some Power desired to terminate it. In the event of this occurring, that Power should give notice, and all the other Powers should then be free. Within one year of the date of the receipt of a notice of termination by any Power, however, all the Powers should meet in conference. He then read the attached draft of a new Article on the subject (Appendix III).
Senator Schanzer asked if he was right in assuming that on notice of expiration being given by any single Power the Treaty would be demolished?
Mr. Hughes said this was the intention, but the Treaty would not end until the expiration of two years. In the meantime, however, a conference would have to take place. This might lead either to withdrawal of the notice of expiration or it might lead to a new Treaty being entered into by one or more of the Powers concerned.
Senator Schanzer asked whether the Power giving notice would be invited to take part in the conference.
Mr. Hughes replied in the affirmative. His main desire had been for some perfectly simple system. His colleagues had not wished to get into the awkward situation which might be created under the original draft.
Mr. Balfour said that he thought Mr. Hughes’ plan avoided a danger in regard to which his colleagues had felt apprehensions, namely, that one Power might obtain a start in a new competition of armaments.
Mr. Hughes agreed that this was provided for. The arrangement for terminating the agreement could not take effect before fifteen years. In the event of one Power wishing to denounce the Treaty all the Powers would then know that unless something happened at the Conference the agreement would terminate. They would receive information from their Naval Attachés, and so forth, as to what other Powers were doing, and if they saw danger threatened they could make preparations accordingly. He did not see how the Power giving notice could obtain any advantage, because it could not start building until two years after the date of the notice.
[Page 160]M. Sarraut said that what interested him was the idea of inviting to the Conference the Power which was denouncing the Treaty.
Mr. Balfour said his first thoughts were favourable to the amendment, but he would like to discuss it with his colleagues and have it examined by his advisers.
Senator Schanzer suggested to substitute the words “31st December, 1936” for “1st January, 1937”.
This was adopted.
(N. B. The former date appears in the draft in the Appendix.94)
article xxvi.
Article XXVI was adopted without discussion.
annex a.
Baron Kato suggested that the lists of tonnage ought to disappear, because they were given in the tons adopted for their measurement by the various nations, and not according to the new international ton measurement.
Mr. Hughes drew attention to Article XXI and said he understood the intention to be that all figures should now appear in the new measurements.
Baron Kato suggested that the tonnage should either be reduced to the international basis or omitted.
Mr. Hughes agreed that this was a matter that ought to be looked into by the experts.
Mr. Hughes then proposed an adjournment.
M. Sarraut said he would be glad of this, as the Annexes had not yet been completely translated into French. M. Sarraut asked whether it would be Heads of Delegations to meet on the following day?
Mr. Hughes replied in the affirmative. He thought it desirable to continue working in the small body, not because the other members of the Conference could not make very valuable contributions to the discussion, but simply for the sake of more rapid procedure at the present stage.
Mr. Balfour fully concurred in this proposal.
M. Sarraut asked if the full Committee could meet on Thursday?
Mr. Hughes hoped that this would be the case.
M. Sarraut asked whether there was likely to be a Plenary Meeting before Friday or Saturday? He would like notice, in case he had to prepare a speech.
Mr. Hughes said he hoped to bring the Treaty before the full Committee on Thursday, and then if agreement were reached a Plenary Session might follow on the next day.
[Page 161]Baron Kato said he could not hope to receive an answer from Japan in regard to Article XIX by Thursday.
The Committee then adjourned until the following day at 11 a.m.
-
No agreed official minutes of this meeting were made. The American delegation used the memorandum prepared by Sir Maurice Hankey.
The file copy of this memorandum (not including the appendixes) bears corrections by Mr. Clark. Words which he crossed out are indicated by canceled type; words which he inserted are printed in italics.
↩ - Ante, p. 127.↩
- Ante, p. 33.↩
- i.e., appendix 3.↩
- In the place of Erin, subject to concurrence of Main Committee. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- See note to Article 2. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Should read “Dante Alighieri.”↩
- Should read “Conte Di Cavour.”↩
- Should read “Giulio Cesare.”↩
- For correction of this figure in the second draft, see p. 225.↩
- 2 West Virginia Class.↩
- 2 35,000 ton ships standard tons.↩
- Should read “Giulio Cesare.”↩