Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922, Volume I

Disarmament Conference File No. 250/12

Memorandum by the Secretary to the British Empire Delegation of a Meeting of Heads of Delegations Held at the Pan American Union, January 12, 1922, 11 a.m.⁸

Secret

• Present:—
  • united states of america
    • Mr. Hughes
    • Colonel Roosevelt
    • Mr. J. R. Clark
  • british empire
    • Mr. Balfour
    • Admiral Chatfield
    • Sir Maurice Hankey
  • france
    • M. Sarraut
    • Captain Frochot
    • M. Camerlynck (Interpreter)
  • italy
    • Senator Schanzer
    • Commander Ruspoli
  • japan
    • Baron Kato
    • Admiral Kato
    • Captain Uyeda
    • Mr. Ichihashi (Interpreter)

disclosure of conference proceedings.

Mr. Balfour said he was rather distressed at the Article which had appeared in the “New York Times” of the same morning to which his attention had been drawn and which contained the implication that the British Empire Delegation had opposed the proposals of the United States Delegation in regard to the scrapping of ships. Internal evidence of the article showed that the writer had had access to a good deal of information to which he ought not to have had access. Mr. Balfour handed Mr. Hughes a copy of the newspaper in question.

Mr. Hughes said he had not seen this article before and he was very surprised to see it, first because the Treaty was supposed to be still a confidential matter—and actual paragraphs and Articles of the Treaty were referred to in the newspaper in a manner that showed a minute understanding of the entire situation; and secondly, because he himself, at a meeting with the representatives of the Press on the previous day, had actually refused to discuss the Treaty at all. In fact, he had said nothing at all except to his intimate advisers. That this article should cover the work of the preceding afternoon was extraordinary. He hoped the Delegation would use the utmost care, as this was a matter of the greatest importance.

Colonel Roosevelt said that he had not seen even his own naval experts since the previous day.

Mr. Hughes said he felt particularly distressed about the matter. It looked as though someone had succeeded in obtaining the form of the draft Treaty. He himself had said that he would not discuss the matter until it could be released to the Press. The references to the proceedings of the previous afternoon in the newspaper were very extraordinary. He could only express the hope that the various Delegations would use the utmost care about discussing these matters even with their own entourage. This was a matter of very great importance. Further, he felt distressed because some of the references would almost seem to reflect on himself, whereas, as a matter of fact, until this morning, when he saw the President of the United States and his own Delegation, he had not said a word about the matter, not even to the Under-Secretary of State.

Senator Schanzer said he had been surprised two or three days ago to see a column in the “Washington Post” giving the general purport of the Treaty. He said Ms Delegation did not see the newspaper men.

M. Sarraut said that the journalists in Washington were very well informed, though he had no idea where they obtained their information. On the previous evening, when he had received the Press, he could see plainly from some of the questions that were asked, that the Press representatives knew a great deal about the scrapping arrangement and also knew about the Annexes of the Treaty.

Senator Schanzer said he had told nothing to anyone. He had constantly been asked for information regarding the meetings and had always refused to give it.

Mr. Hughes, reading from a note passed to him by Mr. Balfour, said that he was informed that on the previous day, the “Washington Post” had mentioned the preamble to the Treaty, before it had even come before the Committee. This seemed very extraordinary, more particularly as the physical limitations of time would themselves handicap most of the Delegates in giving information to the Press. He said he regretted the incident; that being acquainted with the way in which such matters were developed, he always refused to say anything at all about a matter that could not be fully discussed.

annex b. paras. 2 (a), (b), (c) and (d).

The discussion was then renewed in regard to Annex B.

Mr. Hughes said that the present proposal was that (a) and (b) should be retained and that (c) and (d) should be struck out. In (e), for the word “permanent” it was proposed to put “exclusive”. He asked if these changes were agreed to.

Mr. Balfour said that, so far as he was concerned, they were agreed to.

Baron Kato agreed.

M. Sarraut agreed.

Senator Schanzer agreed.

The retention of (a) and (b) was agreed to.

The elimination of (c) and (d) was agreed to.

(e) was agreed to with the substitution of the word “exclusive” for the word “permanent”.

annex b para. 2 (f).

Mr. Hughes read the provision as follows:

“Converting certain capital ships which are designated for scrapping under Article III, to seagoing gunnery training ships, as may be decided at a future conference.”

This provision seemed to imply the reference of the matter covered thereby to a future conference; if this was the intent of the paragraph, he felt it was not clearly presented by the language quoted. Under the circumstances, two questions arose:—

(1) Why insert any reference to the matter at all, if it were something that was to be decided by some subsequent conference.

(2) The provision was seemingly out of place in Annex B, because the postponement of a question for decision by future conference did not appear to be in any way connected with the proposition of scrapping vessels.

The chief difficulty with the paragraph was that it permitted in its present form any power to retain all of its capital ships pending this future conference referred to, which, when it convened, was to decide upon the question of the transformation of the capital ships into “seagoing gunnery training ships.”

Senator Schanzer said he did not wish to discuss the form of the provision, but the substance, and he would ask that this might be retained in the Treaty. The question was one of great importance to Italy, but solely from an economic point of view. Italy had no ships to scrap at present, but in 1931, when they reached the period of scrapping, they would wish to keep two old ships as seagoing gunnery ships. He wished to emphasise that his reason was purely economic, in order to save his country from having to build new gunnery ships. He pointed out that other provisions in the second Annex would enable the United States of America and Great Britain to retain certain ships. He had no military object in asking for this, but only economic reasons.

Mr. Hughes asked which ships Italy wished to retain.

Commander Ruspoli said that at the present time Italy had ten battle-ships and three armoured cruisers. Of these 13 ships, two were used as gunnery vessels. In 1931, Italy would only have five capital ships. If two were used as gunnery ships, she would only have a squadron of three. Of these ships, the Dante Alighieri even now possessed little military value and Italy would like to retain two old ships, with a guarantee that they would not be converted into war ships, but on the contrary they would be dismantled and made unfit for belligerent use.

Mr. Balfour said that he understood what Italy and France required was that when the next Conference occurred, they should have the right to raise this question and that this right should be recognised at the present time.

Senator Schanzer said they would prefer to settle the question now. Just as in other parts of the Annex there were provisions in regard to aircraft carriers, so he asked now that France and Italy should have the right when the scrapping period was reached, to retain two old ships for gunnery purposes.

Mr. Balfour asked for information as to what was intended by the words at the end of this Article—“as may be decided at a future Conference”?

M. Sarraut said he could give an explanation of the origin of the phrase, which, he agreed, really meant nothing at all. Originally, paragraph (f) was inserted for the special reasons given by France and Italy, and which Senator Schanzer had clearly set forth. The Committee of experts had considered the reasons why France and Italy wished to retain these two ships as gunnery ships. Their extreme weakness as capital ships had been pointed out and it had been explained that if two ships were taken out of the total number of five, for purposes of gunnery training, the navies of France and Italy would be ridiculously weak. It had been considered that France and Italy should have the ships for their special purposes. Then every other nation had asked to have the same privilege. This led to the present text being drafted, which remitted the solution to the next conference, which really meant nothing at all, since the question was an immediate question which ought to be dealt with now. It seemed natural that France and Italy should be allowed to retain these ships as gunnery ships. They only required to keep two very old ships for purposes of gunnery training. There was no question of military value, for these ships were practically worthless as fighting machines.

Mr. Hughes said he gathered that the experts really had never reached a conclusion and had remitted the matter to a further conference. He also gathered that the real point was that in nine years’ time, when France and Italy reached the period of scrapping, they would require two old ships for gunnery training. If the matter was to be discussed properly, it would be better to consider the real proposition and not the suggestion in the draft paragraph (f). He made the suggestion that the French and Italian Delegations should put forward a regular proposition, giving the names of the ships, when they wished to retain them, and under what conditions. He asked if the Italian Delegation could answer these questions immediately.

Commander Ruspoli said that Italy would wish to retain the Dante Alighieri and a ship of the type of the Leonardo da Vinci, or the Guilio Caesare.⁹

Mr. Hughes asked what it was proposed to do to make them harmless as fighting ships.

Commander Ruspoli said this was to be settled by a future conference. The original idea had been to render these ships useless for fighting purposes by taking out half or a third of their boilers. The French Delegation had thought that for training purposes it was necessary for the ships to retain their speed. The idea of the Italian Delegation had been that they possessed gunnery ships at the present time and they ought to have the same right in 1931 when they reached the scrapping period.

Mr. Hughes asked what were the ideas of the French Delegation, and could they state what ships they desired to retain.

M. Sarraut said he thought he could take upon himself to indicate that France would desire to retain two ships of the Jean Bart class, but he would prefer to consult Admiral de Bon both on this point and on the subject of the guarantees to render the ships unfit for military purposes. Although, therefore, he could not answer the questions definitely to-day, he thought that no difficulty would arise. They had not discussed the matter in detail because the matter was so simple they had not thought it could give rise to discussion here.

Mr. Hughes gathered that the question for France and Italy might be decided at the present Conference, namely that in 1930 France should have the right to retain two ships of the Jean Bart class, which instead of being scrapped might be kept for the purpose of gunnery training ships, with perhaps the power of substituting some other ships later on. In the case of Italy whose scrapping commenced in 1931, the Dante Aleghieri¹⁰ and three years later a ship of the Giulio Cesare or Leonardo da Vinci classes would be retained for gunnery purposes instead of being scrapped. Conditions would be prescribed providing for rendering these ships useless for fighting purposes.

Senator Schanzer said that the real question was to know if the Delegations of the United States, Great Britain and Japan would accept in principle that France and Italy should each keep two ships as gunnery training ships. If that principle was accepted, as he assumed it would be, it must be understood the ships were not to be kept for military purposes but only to avoid building new ships as gunnery training schools. If his colleagues were disposed to accept the French and Italian proposal, the two Delegations concerned could prepare a definite proposal for consideration at the next Meeting.

Mr. Balfour said he certainly did not raise any objection to a scheme on the basis sketched out by Senator Schanzer. He thought, however, it should be clear on the face of the document that these ships were retained by France and Italy for special reasons peculiar to these countries, and that another nothing should be inserted which could not be distorted to convey the impression that a secret arrangement had been arrived at between the Powers, enabling ships to be retained which nominally were to be scrapped. If in addition to this and to their age which itself rendered them of little use for fighting purposes, the ships were disarmed for general purposes, there ought to be no public misapprehension that this provision contravened the principles at which the Conference was aiming.

Senator Schanzer said that after all the treatment asked for by France and Italy was not so very exceptional. He pointed out that Article III (a) of the Annex provided for ships being retained for conversion into aircraft carriers. This was merely an application of the same principle.

Mr. Hughes said that he would come to that later, but he must demur to the idea that the principle was to save the same.

Baron Kato agreed with Mr. Balfour as to the conditions in which France and Italy should be given this privilege.

Mr. Hughes summed up by stating that he understood that the French and Italian Delegations would bring in a proposal based on the following principles:—

(1) It was to be limited to France and Italy.

(2) It was to be limited to two old ships which were due for scrapping, the same to be designated by class or by name.

(3) The ships were to be rendered useless for fighting purposes.

Mr. Hughes’ proposal was adopted.

article iii (a).

Mr. Hughes read the draft article as follows:—

“A number of capital ships, completed or laid down, not to exceed two for each Contracting Power may be considered as scrapped as capital ships when converted to aircraft carriers, provided that the total tonnage displacement of each capital ship when converted to an aircraft carrier shall not exceed 33,000 tons standard displacement; that the number of guns with a calibre in excess of six inches (152 millimetres) to be carried on such aircraft carriers shall not exceed eight; that this tonnage shall be counted in the total tonnage limit of aircraft carriers for a Power converting such capital ships; and that future replacements shall not exceed 27,000 tons standard displacement for any aircraft carrier.”

Mr. Hughes then suggested the following addition in the above clause, after the words “six inches (152 millimetres)”,

“but not to exceed 8 inches (203 millimetres)”.

He then proceeded to discuss the reasons why the principles which had been applied in paragraph II (f) to the gunnery ships required in France and Italy did not also apply to this case. He explained that each of the Powers was entitled to a certain tonnage in aircraft carriers, namely, the United States of America and Great Britain to 135,000 tons, Japan 81,000 tons, France and Italy 60,000 tons each. Therefore the Powers start with the right to aircraft carriers. The countries could each divide their tonnage within these limits as they saw fit. Thus, if the United States wanted to build two ships of 33,000 tons, which was allowed by this paragraph, she would be using 66,000 tons, which of course would be taken out of her total tonnage limit of 135,000 tons. The further aircraft carriers that she wished to build would have to be taken out of the residue of 69,000 tons. It was not proposed to allow any excess tonnage on this account. The number of guns in the 33,000-ton ships was also to be limited to eight, whereas ten were allowed in the case of the other aircraft carriers. The point he wished to make was that the only advantage obtained was not in the number of aircraft carriers, or in the total tonnage, but merely in the individual tonnage of the two ships. It was simply a case of reasonable economy being obtained by adapting existing ships. The proposal did not affect the principle of the scheme; it merely provided that the American Navy, by altering the design, could use these particular ships. If the United States Government did not avail themselves of this advantage they could build two new ships of 27,000 tons and thereby save 12,000 tons of their total for other ships. The only advantage in fact was that the United States of America would be able to build these two 33,000-ton ships. if this provision was not made, it would be necessary to destroy these two ships and then begin immediately to build two others. Moreover, the proposal was not limited to the United States of America. The question was whether tonnage which had been constructed and nearly completed should be thrown away or not. The same principle applied to Japan, and Great Britain could also adopt the plan if she wished. The United States had no desire to obtain any advantage for themselves in the matter.

Mr. Sarraut said the position of Mr. Hughes was perfectly logical and reasonable.

Mr. Schanzer agreed with Mr. Sarraut.

Mr. Balfour said that Mr. Hughes had put his point with perfect clarity of view, and had shown that this scheme was in the interests of economy for the United States or any other Government which chose to make use of it. He also gathered that the view was that all the Powers should be treated with equal measure. He did not think, however, that it would work out quite equally. He did not profess to know how Japan was affected. For all he knew she might be building some ships equivalent to the Lexington’s which could be converted into aircraft carriers. Great Britain, however, had no such ship. It was true that Mr. Hughes seemed to have contemplated that Great Britain would have the right to convert the super-Hood’s, for which material had been collected, into aircraft carriers similar to the Lexington’s. He was afraid, however, that this could not be done. Under the Scrapping Rules the material could not be kept collected together for five years when Great Britain might wish to construct a ship of this kind.

Mr. Hughes asked why she should delay for five years?

Mr. Balfour said that Great Britain might not desire to build immediately.

Mr. Hughes pointed out that Great Britain already possessed five aircraft carriers, which while America had not only one. Great Britain’s reason for postponing building was because she wished to.

Mr. Balfour admitted that this was a fair criticism, and the point had escaped his mind. He asked whether Mr. Hughes would have any objection to generalising the paragraph.

Mr. Hughes asked if Mr. Balfour had his proposal framed. He Mr. Balfour then read the following draft:—

Any of the Contracting Powers may without increasing its total tonnage of aircraft carriers build not more than two such aircraft carriers each of a tonnage of not more than 33,000 tons, and for this purpose may convert any of their unfinished ships which would otherwise be scrapped.

The restrictions on armament contained in Article X will apply to such aircraft carriers with the further restriction that the number of guns with a calibre in excess of 6 inches (152 millimetres) to be carried shall not exceed eight.

Mr. Hughes asked whether it would he might make a suggestion; he saw no objection in principle but would it not be better to put this paragraph in the main part of the Treaty and not include it among the exceptions to the Scrapping Rules? It might be put, for instance, in paragraph VII¹¹ as a separate paragraph. It might also be well to insert something to show the provision was inserted for the sake of economy. Later, however, he suggested it would really appear better in Article IX of the Treaty. He said he would be prepared to bring up an Article based on Mr. Balfour’s principle on the following day.

M. Sarraut observed that if two aircraft carriers of 33,000 tons were authorised, the tonnage of France must be increased from 60,000 tons to 66,000 tons (it would seem M. Sarraut must have meant 72,000 tons) in order to allow the French to build similar shilps. This would be necessary as a matter of symmetry.

Mr. Hughes asked if France wished to build two such ships.

M. Sarraut replied that he did not know.

Mr. Hughes again explained that this arrangement was merely an arrangement within the tonnage limitation already agreed to by the Powers. He said that at the time this agreement was reached, Admiral de Bon had voiced his satisfaction with 60,000 tons and Italy had previously indicated her satisfaction with 54,000 tons which had been raised to 60,000 tons in order to place her upon an equal footing with France; that therefore, there appeared to him no reason why the mere fact that a part of the tonnage allotted to the United States was to be consumed in the building of two ships of exceptionally large tonnage should have any effect whatever to the total tonnage allotments already agreed to.

M. Sarraut seemed to have some difficulty with reference to the number of vessels.

Mr. Hughes pointed out that only two vessels of this type were contemplated. He suggested that if the proposal were accepted in principle, then they should strike the provision out as paragraph 3A and insert it in the main document.

(The proposal was agreed to in principle.)

paragraph iii (b).

Mr. Hughes read paragraph III (b), as follows:—

Not more than one completed capital ship for each Contracting Power may be considered as having been scrapped when it has been converted to a ship designated solely for turret training instruction. This converted ship shall conform to all the provisions of Annex B, paragraph IV, except sub-paragraph 3, and sub-paragraphs 1 and 2, in so far that not more than two turrets with their guns and all working parts either hydraulic or electric, together with all fire control tops, may be retained.

Mr. Hughes said this appeared to him to be giving the right to retain the capital ship and so fell within the principles that underlay the provisions as to harbor ships and as to the conversion of ships for commercial purposes. He thought it should go out. He had, however, no knowledge of the genesis of the proposal, and therefore spoke with entire impartiality.

Baron Kato said he understood that this had been a Japanese proposal. When Japan reached a stage when she would possess nothing except her new ships she would no longer possess a vessel suited for turret training instruction. The Japanese proposal had been to retain one ship tied up in harbour and incapable of movement, and to utilise it solely for the purpose of turret training instruction.

Mr. Hughes said that he was informed that in the American Navy no difficulty was found in employing regular ships for instruction in turret training, and he believed that the gunnery of the American Navy was fairly good. No difficulty was found in using ships for this purpose. The point was not one merely of the theoretical merit of the proposed training, but for it had a definite relation to the whole programme. He feared if the paragraph were retained it might be considered by the general public as a means of retaining an additional capital ship. In the light of the former practice of navies, he felt sure that it would be interpreted even by intelligent men in this sense. The Conference had a great moral objective in view, and what he feared was that this might be taken as an infringement of it. This was not a question of challenging the intention of anyone, or suggesting a possible misuse, but merely of obviating a situation which could be the basis of a criticism that might be addressed to the bona fides of the Treaty itself.

Baron Kato said that the method of training in Japan differed from that in the United States of America, and that was why he had felt the necessity to keep this vessel. However, if the public were likely to entertain doubts as to the good intentions of Japan in this matter he was willing to give it up. He hoped, however, that his statement was not susceptible of misinterpretation. Of course it would mean that Japan would have to change her method of turret training.

Mr. Hughes expressed the highest appreciation of the spirit Baron Kato had shown. He hoped the Baron would not think that he himself could misinterpret the purpose of the provision or what he Baron Kato had said. He recalled, however, that the Treaty would be subjected to bitter criticism, no matter what it contained, and therefore special care ought to be exercised on each point, to ensure that it contained nothing which could properly bring into question the sincerity of its authors, or which could enable insincere people to convince sincere people that it was not genuine. Hence he felt especially grateful to Baron Kato.

Mr. Balfour said he was unable, in the absence of greater technical knowledge, to judge the magnitude of Japan’s sacrifice, which he feared was not inconsiderable. The paragraph, however, did not apply to the British Navy, and he had no objection to its withdrawal.

The deletion of paragraph III (b) was adopted.

paragraphs iv (a) and v.

Mr. Hughes pointed out the changes necessary in the headings, etc., as the result of the elimination of these paragraphs, and then read paragraph IV (a) as follows:—

Subject to the special exceptions contained in paragraphs II and III, when a vessel is designated for scrapping, the first stage of scrapping, which consists in rendering a ship incapable of further warlike service, shall be immediately undertaken.

He said that this was a highly technical matter which he did not feel competent to discuss. It purported to deprive the warships of their fighting qualities. The matter had been exhaustively considered by experts, and though he was no judge himself he presumed they had prescribed what was necessary. The only point in the paragraph which occurred to him related to Mr. Balfour’s suggestion of the previous day, that the engines should be removed. He presumed that the words “propelling machinery” in sub-paragraph 7 included engines.

Mr. Roosevelt said this had been the intention, but it was only right that the wording should be so clear that the general public could not misinterpret it.

Mr. Hughes said that he had also been impressed by the suggestion Mr. Balfour had made on the previous day for an International Commission, composed of one expert from each Naval Power, which should inspect the scrapped ships and report that they had been rendered unfit for fighting. He did not make this suggestion in order to cast the smallest doubt on the sincerity and good faith of all the Powers concerned, but merely to allay any possible public suspicion. Even before the Conference had been summoned some of the representatives of the public whom he had seen had said,—“How do you know that all this will be carried out?” He had constantly been interrogated as to how the Treaty would be enforced. The advantage of Mr. Balfour’s proposal was its simplicity. Now that the Treaty had been so much simplified by the deletion of paragraphs II (c) and (d) of Annex “B”, not more than five experts would be required, and arrangements could be made for substitution. Only three powers were immediately concerned. If there were well grounded reasons against this proposal, they should be stated. If no sound reason was given against this proposal, why this proposal should it not be carried out, it ought to be adopted in order to reassure the public in all nations?

Mr. Balfour recalled that the original scheme contemplated two stages in the destruction of vessels: first, an intermediate stage, during which the ship would be rendered useless for fighting purposes, and with which this clause dealt; and, second, the final stage, when the ship could be destroyed. From the point of view of economy the British Government preferred that plan, but undoubtedly it would be easier to carry out the scheme if the intermediate stage were abolished. Hence, he was in favour of the general principle of abolishing it. Moreover, he rather thought that Mr. Hughes had felt that the mere existence of an intermediate stage would destroy not the existence of the scheme but its moral effect in America, Europe and Japan. He had great sympathy with Mr. Hughes in this, but if the plan of immediately destroying ships were to prevail, then this clause should be omitted. This paragraph, therefore, was intimately connected with the following paragraph, V (a), which read as follows:—

In the case of vessels to be scrapped under the first paragraph of Article II of the present Treaty, the vessels shall be rendered incapable of further warlike service, in accordance with paragraph IV of this Annex, within fifteen months from the coming into force of the Treaty, and the scrapping shall be finally effected within four years from such coming into force. Should any Contracting Power find that for economical or other reasons it cannot complete the scrapping within four years, the fact shall be represented to the other Contracting Powers and a further extent of time requested.

Mr. Hughes said that paragraph IV (b) was not so important as it was before paragraph II (c) and (d) were struck out, but it was clear that the question of the stages had a primary relation to this paragraph. If the period for the eventual scrapping were reduced to 18 months, a great deal of this would be unnecessary. On the other hand, if there was a long intermediate stage before final scrapping was provided for, the paragraph was important.

Mr. Balfour said he was quite willing to shorten time. Mr. Hughes: This matter only affected France and Italy only remotely, as they had few ships to scrap, and these not for eight or nine years. The question of immediate scrapping, however, affected the other three Powers. Mr. Balfour was quite right in saying that the question of time must be discussed. Paragraph V (a) fixed the ultimate period at which scrapping was to take place. He himself disliked making this period so long as four years. The suggestion that a thing was not to be done until four years would be received with scepticism. He did not like to bring this phase of the question repeatedly, but People would say it would never be done at all, and a general impression to this effect would get about. There would be abundant opportunities for evading it. There might be any number of situations arise in that time which would make nations wish to retain the ships; this would lead to negotiations and exchanges of diplomatic notes, and people would say that there was no serious purpose to destroy the ships. His concrete suggestion would be to reduce the period of ultimate scrapping to 18 months, and to provide that within six months the value of the ships as capital ships must be destroyed.

Mr. Balfour asked if no intermediate stage was desired.

Mr. Hughes thought that if the provision was that fighting value should be destroyed in six months, and that scrapping should be completed in 18 months, there would be no trouble.

Mr. Balfour said that Great Britain would meet materially with considerable difficulty and perhaps with impossibility in scrapping and disposing of ships within 18 months. If the destruction were to be carried out in that way they would probably have to sink the ships. He asked how many ships America would have to destroy?

Colonel Roosevelt said they would probably also have to sink 15 ships.

Mr. Balfour asked about the ships under construction for America: was it considered easy to deal with them?

Colonel Roosevelt said that the emasculation of these ships was comparatively easy, but that the entire scrapping was not such an easy proposition.

Mr. Hughes said the United States would have thirty ships to scrap.

Mr. Balfour asked whether the following was a fair statement of a comparison between the British and American problem:—The number of finished ships to be scrapped was almost the same in both cases, namely, 16 British and 15 American, the difference being that the British ships were Dreadnoughts and the American pre-Dreadnoughts, which meant that the British tonnage was greater. On the other hand, Great Britain had no ships in process of construction to destroy, whereas America had 13. It sounded to him as though the sacrifice were about equal.

Colonel Roosevelt agreed that it was about fifty-fifty. Both countries would have their troubles in this matter.

Mr. Hughes said the proposal was that in paragraph V (a)—(b)? the time within which the emasculation of the battleships must be provided for should be 6 months, and for the scrapping 18 months.

M. Sarraut asked what was the cost of the demolition of a ship? He was only thinking of the question of lightening the expense. Would not the expense be increased by scrapping the ships within a very short period?

Colonel Roosevelt said it would cost nothing to sink a ship, except the loss of the ship, and that as to the other method it was merely a question of what you could get for the material.

Mr. Hughes said that the real point was that no degree of economy which could be effected in the scrapping of ships, important as that economy might be in itself, ought to be allowed to interfere with the attainment of the real object of the Conference. If the time allowed for scrapping was very long, this fact would be used by the critics for bitter attacks on upon and defeat of the Treaty. In the light of this, the Conference could not afford to adopt any petty economies. The real and great economy was that the Powers would no longer be building and maintaining these great fleets. These other matters only involved very small savings. But on the important question of time, something must be worked out which would bear public discussion.

Baron Kato said that so far as Japan was concerned he thought the two processes of scrapping could be effected in 6 months and 18 months.

Mr. Hughes expressed his personal appreciation of what Baron Kato had said.

Baron Kato added that perhaps this was due to the smallness of the scrapping to be done by Japan, but he recognized the difficulties which Great Britain had to encounter.

Mr. Balfour said that no doubt the British problem was much harder than that of Japan, but he thought Mr. Hughes’ proposal was a good one, and while the British loss would be considerable, personally he thought the plan a good one. He felt, however, that he must revert to a relatively small point which he had mentioned on the previous day in connection with the two old Dreadnoughts, Colossus and Collingwood, which, before the present Conference had opened or was thought of, had been converted into boys’ training ships. Formerly the boys under training used to be housed in an old three-decker. This ship, however, had fallen into disrepair, and eventually for hygienic reasons the boys had had to be removed. No barracks were available, and they were very costly to build, so that the Admiralty had taken the two oldest battleships and converted them into barracks. They were not used for training purposes but were merely floating barracks. If they were given up it would be difficult to know where to lodge the boys, as to build barracks would be very costly. He felt rather ashamed at having to raise such a detail, but the Conference would realise that this was a point which affected the Treasury as well as the Admiralty. The inconvenience of this matter, of course, ought not to weigh against the great issues which the Conference was endeavouring to settle. He was, however, bound to put this point. He did not want to discuss it now, as he had telegraphed home on the matter.

Mr. Hughes asked whether, subject to this reservation, Mr. Balfour would accept his proposal to reduce the periods in paragraph V (a) to 18 months and 6 months?

Mr. Balfour agreed, subject to a reservation, until he had heard from his Government in regard to the Colossus and Collingwood.

Subject to Mr. Balfour’s reserve, Paragraph V (a) was adopted, with the substitution of 6 months for 15 months, and one year and six months for 4 years.

Admiral Chatfield suggested that in view of the shortened terms for scrapping the naval attaches at the various capitals could gather the necessary information concerning the matter.

paragraph v (b).

Mr. Hughes then read paragraph V (b) of Annex B, as follows:—

In the case of vessels to be scrapped under the second and third paragraphs of Article II, or under Article III of the present Treaty, the work of rendering the vessel incapable of further warlike service in accordance with paragraph IV of this Annex shall be commenced not later than the date of completion of its successor, and shall be finished within six months from the date of such completion. The vessel shall be finally scrapped, in accordance with paragraph II of this Annex, within eighteen months from the date of completion of its successor.

This was adopted.

paragraph vi.

Mr. Hughes read paragraph VI, as follows:—

Subject to the special exceptions contained in paragraph III of this Annex, no vessel which is to be scrapped under the present Treaty shall again be used as a vessel of war, or be restored so as to fit it for such use.

He thought that the first sentence, namely, “Subject to the special exceptions contained in paragraph III of this Annex” might be omitted.

M. Sarraut pointed out that provision for this was already included in Article XIII of the Treaty, which reads as follows:

Subject to the exception contained in Annex B, paragraph III, no ship designated in the present Treaty to be scrapped may hereafter be reconverted into a vessel of war, nor may it carry guns in excess of four of calibre not exceeding six inches, and four antiaircraft guns.

Mr. Hughes recalled that he had reserved Article XIII until the discussion of the relevant Annex. He proposed to substitute for the first words of Article XIII the following:—

Subject to the exceptions in Article XIX,¹² no ship, etc.

Mr. Hughes then said that he would bring forward an amended version of Article XIII.

article x.

Senator Schanzer asked to refer to the following redraft of Article X, which had been proposed by Mr. Balfour and adopted with the following addition suggested by himself at the end, “and guns not exceeding 4.6 inches”:—

No aircraft carrier of any of the Contracting Powers shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches (203 millimetres). Without prejudice to the provisions of Annex B, paragraph III (a), if the armament carried includes guns exceeding 6 inches (152 millimetres) in calibre, the total number of guns carried shall not exceed ten. If, alternatively, the armament contains no guns exceeding 6 inches (152 millimetres) in calibre, the number of guns is not limited. In either case, the number of anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding 4.6 inches is not limited.

He asked to state that a technical mistake had been made in calculating the figures, and the amendment was intended to refer to guns of 4.7 inches.

Baron Kato said that he had intended to raise the same point.

Senator Sehanzer’s amendment was accepted that in Article X as amended “4.7 inches” should be substituted for “4.6 inches”.

annex c.

Mr. Hughes said the American Delegation had nothing to suggest until paragraph (f), which reads as follows:—

While this Treaty remains in force, in case of loss or accidental destruction of capital ships or aircraft carriers, they may be immediately replaced by new construction in conformity with the provisions of this Treaty.

He suggested the insertion of the following drafting addition to the last line but one, after the word “construction”—

“subject to the tonnage limits prescribed in Articles IV and VII and in conformity with the provisions of this Treaty”.

This was accepted.

paragraphs (g) and (h).

Mr. Hughes read paragraphs (g) and (h), as follows:—

• “(g) Reconstruction of capital ships and aircraft carriers shall be limited to providing new means of defence against air and submarine attack. The Contracting Powers may, for that purpose, equip existing tonnage with bulge or blister, or anti-air attack deck protection, provided the increase of displacement thus effected does not exceed 3,000 standard displacement tons (3,048 metric tons) for each ship. No alterations in side armour, in calibre, number, or general type of mounting of main armament shall be permitted except in the case of France and Italy, which countries within the limits allowed for bulge may increase their armour protection and the calibre of the guns now carried on their existing capital ships so as not to exceed 16 inches.
• (h) Any capital ship or aircraft carrier allowed under the terms of the present Treaty upon which repairs or alterations may have been begun, or upon which money has been expended for such repair or alteration, on November 12, 1921, may complete such repair or alteration, but may undertake no additional repairs or alterations except as provided in the other paragraphs of this Annex”.

He suggested to amend the first lines of (g) to read as follows:—

“No retained capital ships and aircraft carriers shall be reconstructed except for the purpose of providing means of defence against air and submarine attack, subject to the following rules”.

This was adopted.

He suggested that the provisions of (h) were broad, he did not know how broad in fact; that apparently the idea was to cover one case only, and if this were true, he suggested redrafting.

Mr. Balfour then said he had an alteration to suggest for the elimination of paragraph (h) and the amendment of paragraph (g). He then handed in the following re-draft of the last part of paragraph (g) to replace the remainder of this paragraph and the whole of paragraph (h):—

“No alterations in side armor, in calibre, number or general type of mounting of main armament shall be permitted except (a) in the case of France and Italy, which countries within the limits allowed for bulge may increase their armor protetction and the calibre of the guns now carried on their existing capital ships so as not to exceed 16 inches, (b) The British Empire shall be permitted to complete, in the case of the Renown, the alterations to armor that have already been commenced but temporarily suspended”.

Mr. Hughes said that this change was agreeable to him. He understood that paragraph (h) had been put in solely in connection with the battleship Renown, and he thought this it was not very desirable to cover that one case in the manner originally suggested.

Mr. Balfour said that the reason for wanting to complete the alterations in the Renown was that these had been begun and all preparations had been made to complete them when the ship had been required to take the Prince of Wales to India and Japan.

It was agreed to suppress paragraph (h) and to adopt paragraph (g) in the following form:—

“No retained capital ships and aircraft carriers shall be reconstructed except for the purpose of providing means of defence against air and submarine attack, subject to the following rules. The Contracting Powers may for that purpose equip existing tonnage with bulge or blister or anti-air attack deck protection provided the increase of displacement thus effected does not exceed 3,000 standard displacement tons (3,048 metric tons) for each ship. No alterations in side armor, in calibre, number or general type of mounting of main armament shall be permitted except (a) in the case of France and Italy, which countries within the limits allowed for bulge may increase their armor protection and the calibre of the guns now carried on their existing capital ships so as not to exceed 16 inches, (b) The British Empire shall be permitted to complete, in the case of the Renown, the alterations to armor that have already been commenced but temporarily suspended.”

paragraph iii (f).

Reverting to paragraph III (f),¹³ Admiral Chatfield said he had a small amendment to suggest relating to the replacement of a ship which had been wrecked, and its effect on the carrying out of the scheme. Supposing, for example, the United States Navy were to lose a ship such as the Florida or the Utah, they would be entitled to replace it at once with a new ship. When the time came for the normal replacement of the Utah or the Florida, if she had not been lost, of course they should not be permitted to build another ship in her place. Consequently he would propose the following addition at the end of Annex C, paragraph (f):—

“the regular replacement programme being deemed to be retarded correspondingly to the loss sustained”.

Mr. Hughes pointed out that the word “advanced” should be put for “retarded”.

Admiral Chatfield agreed.

Annex C, paragraph (f) was adopted in the following form:—

“While this Treaty remains in force, in case of loss or accidental destruction of capital ships or aircraft carriers, they may be immediately replaced by new construction, subject to the tonnage limits prescribed in Articles IV and VII, in conformity with the other provisions of this Treaty, the regular replacement programme being deemed to be advanced correspondingly to the loss sustained”.

replacement and scrapping programme.

Mr. Hughes said that the tables were highly technical and he assumed the experts had seen to it that they were accurate; he would add that the American Delegation had decided that in the list of United States ships to be scrapped they would put the names of the 13 ships building or projected.

annex d.

Mr. Hughes said that the American Delegation disliked the definition of a “vessel of war”, and thought it would be better to leave this to ordinary international law. They would like to say that a “fleet auxiliary” as here defined was removed from the concept of a “vessel of war” as used in this Treaty.

Mr. Balfour agreed with Mr. Hughes’ amendment to remove the definition of a “vessel of war”, but suggested it was hardly necessary to retain the definition of a “fleet auxiliary”, which was not otherwise used in the Treaty. Such a vessel had not been defined before. The matter presented difficulties, and the word was not used in the present Treaty.

Mr. Hughes said the point was that the term “a vessel of war” was used all through the Treaty, and it appeared necessary to state that “a vessel of war” did not include a “fleet auxiliary”.

Senator Schanzer suggested that all the definitions should be omitted.

Mr. Hughes thought this matter had better be left over, in view of the lateness of the hour. He understood that the following action was to be taken:—

The French and Italian Delegations were to bring a fresh Article relating to the gunnery ships.

A new Article embodying the proposals of Great Britain in regard to aircraft carriers would be brought forward.

Great Britain reserved the question of the use of the old Dreadnoughts Colossus and Collingwood as boys’ training ships.

The definition of a “fleet auxiliary” had to be considered.

Most of the other amendments were a mere question of form. He thought, therefore, that during the afternoon a fresh draft of the Treaty should be prepared, and he would take the liberty to suggest that the State Department should recast it in accordance with the instructions of the Committee.

M. Sarraut asked when the Treaty would come before the full Naval Committee?

Mr. Hughes thought it would be advisable to have one more reading of the draft by the present body.

Mr. Balfour said that his Legal Adviser, Mr. Malkin, had told him that there were a number of quite small points of language, not raising any question of principle, which ought to be attended to. He asked whether he should get Mr. Malkin to tabulate these and bring them to the meeting on the following day, or whether he should communicate them to the State Department?

Colonel Roosevelt said he thought Mr. Malkin had already communicated them.

Mr. Hughes said that if Mr. Malkin would communicate his list the State Department would bear the alterations in mind in recasting the Treaty.

M. Sarraut thought that if the revise of the Treaty could not be circulated in time to be considered before the meeting on the following day, the meeting might be postponed until the afternoon.

Mr. Hughes thought it would be worth while to meet in the morning at 11 a.m. anyhow, in order to discuss the few outstanding points to which he had referred.

The Conference adjourned at 1–20 p.m., to meet on the following day, Friday, January 13, 1922, at 11 a.m.

Washington , January 12, 1922.

8. No agreed official minutes of this meeting were made. The American delegation used the memorandum prepared by Sir Maurice Hankey.

   The file copy of this memorandum bears corrections by Mr. Clark. Words which he crossed out are indicated by canceled type; words which he inserted are printed in italics.

9. Should read “Giulio Cesare.”
10. Should read “Dante Alighieri.”
11. i. e., art. vii.
12. Apparently an error; this is article “IX” in signed treaty.
13. The paragraph referred to is paragraph (f) of annex C.