Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

280. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

October 12, 1960, 10:05–11:05 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • The President
  • Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secy
  • General Goodpaster
• Italian
  • Antonio Segni, Foreign Minister
  • Carlo Alberto Straneo, Director General for Political Affairs
  • Manlio Brosio, Ambassador to the US

The President received Mr. Segni at his request.¹

After the usual amenities, during which the President expressed his pleasure at seeing Mr. Segni again, he asked whether the Foreign Minister would be making a speech to the United Nations General Assembly. Mr. Segni replied in the affirmative saying that he would probably deal mainly with the question of disarmament. There then ensued some discussion of Chairman Khrushchev’s speech yesterday² which the President thought was part of his attempt while here to frighten the smaller UN members. Mr. Segni agreed that Khrushchev’s presentation had been mostly direct or indirect threats. Referring to Khrushchev’s position that disarmament must come first then the Soviets would accept even the most violent anti-Communist inspection, the President said that the United States had gone very far toward indicating our readiness to make disarmament and inspection simultaneous but in the last analysis we must be sure that disarmament has actually taken place. We were certainly not going to be in the situation of throwing our arms in the Atlantic and then have the Soviets face us with an unwelcome surprise. Mr. Segni agreed and said he had pointed out to the Italian Parliament that there must be no unilateral Western disarmament.

The President then raised the question of the South Tyrol, saying he understood troubles between Italy and Austria still continued on this issue. Mr. Segni confirmed this understanding and referred to his conversation with the President on the subject last year.³ He commented that while the South Tyrol was not important in the international picture it was of great importance for Italy. If the Italians should be defeated on this issue there would be an internal crisis. In reply to the President’s question, Mr. Segni said that the issue had been inscribed on the UNGA agenda and would be debated next week in the Special Political Committee. When the President commented that Italy could surely make a more reasonable presentation than Austria on this subject, Mr. Segni said the Italians expected a majority but to obtain this they relied on US support. The President commented that he sometimes felt uncomfortable to have such issues arise between good friends of ours. He did not understand why the Austrians continued to press the matter but added he was of course not an Austrian. He then inquired as to where efforts stood in respect to a direct compromise of the issue between the two countries. Mr. Segni said the Italians had told the Austrians that if they had a complaint about the Italian observance of the 1946 treaty⁴ then this complaint should be taken to the International Court of Justice but the Austrians had refused. Again in reply to a question, Mr. Segni confirmed the President’s impression that the Austrians were seeking to discuss this matter in a political rather than a judicial atmosphere. He said that in trying to influence the Latin American delegations at the UN the Austrians had even been mourning the Treaty of St. Germain of 1920. The President then asked Mr. Kohler to review the US position, which was stated as support of the Italian position that the question should be referred to the ICJ, then asked Mr. Segni whether this was satisfactory to the Italians. Mr. Segni confirmed that it was but pointed out that there were two ways of going to the ICJ and that the Italians were seeking a decision rather than the advisory process. The President confirmed that we supported this position.

Mr. Segni then said that he was worried about the attitudes of the newly admitted nations in the UNGA. The President agreed this was a problem and mentioned that we had been making efforts to assure them that we are reasonable and do not seek to dominate them. In this connection he mentioned that he was receiving fifteen heads of the delegations of the new African states at the White House on Friday. He also referred to talks he had had in Paris last winter with leaders of the new states of the French community⁵ when he had felt that they were disposed to cast their fortunes with the West. He was always seeking ways to persuade them of our good faith and good intentions. He felt we would probably never succeed with respect to Guinea, that we would have troubles with Ghana and that the Congo was a question mark. He suggested to Mr. Segni that he should seek to see Prime Ministers Abubakar of Nigeria and Olympio of Togo as excellent men with the possibilities of exercising great influence in the African area. Mr. Segni interjected that the Italians had a number of firms doing public works in Nigeria and had good relations there. The President resumed by saying that the Nigerian Prime Minister had brought in a set of books about his country and that he had been surprised to learn of the size and importance of some of the cities in Nigeria. He repeated that Nigeria and Togo could be good friends. Mr. Segni said that he would certainly follow the President’s advice with respect to seeing the Africans. He repeated that the Italians had economic interests not only in Nigeria but also in Rhodesia and even in the Congo where they were building roads. He said he thought the Africans knew that, like the United States, Italy had no ambitions in Africa. The President commented that he would suggest that Mr. Segni add this subject to his speech in the UNGA. He thought it would help to persuade the Africans of our friendly intentions.

Mr. Segni then raised the question of Europe, referring especially to the conversations that Prime Minister Fanfani and he had had with President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Debre.⁶ He said the Italians had been firm with respect to their support of NATO and military integration. They had taken the position that the basic structure of NATO is sound and that before we consider reform we should consider how to make improvements in the operations of NATO as presently organized. In this connection he said the Italians were awaiting with great interest the suggestions the US would make in connection with the 10-year planning for NATO.

The President replied that he was a firm supporter of NATO which he believed was the salvation of the free world. He had himself helped to set up the military side of NATO in the beginning. He thought we should all note however that there had been changes in the past ten years as a result of the Marshall Plan and the industrial renaissance of Europe. Thus while he agreed that we should not change basic methods there should be a constant review of where each member of NATO could make the maximum contribution. The United States had worldwide responsibilities ranging from Korea through Formosa and Southeast Asia—with a serious problem currently in Laos—through Iran to Turkey and Greece. In addition there was the obligation of the industrialized western nations to help the lesser developed countries. While he was completely dedicated to NATO, he wanted to ask our allies to consider what they could do to make the burden easier. The United States was faced with an outflow of gold not on the basis of trade accounts but as a result of grants and expenditures throughout the world. While $60 billion was owed to the United States our allies had some $16-$18 billion in short term claims on us. The United States had become the world’s banker and it was necessary to maintain faith in the US dollar. The United States had undertaken this great load voluntarily and could and would support it but looked to our allies to carry their share. With respect to support of NATO he reiterated he completely agreed.

Mr. Segni said he completely understood the President’s position. He realized that the European countries must contribute to the development of the LDC’s. In this connection he referred to a discussion of the subject last year with Under Secretary Dillon when he had stressed Italian views as to the importance of Latin America where the Italians had had much emigration and had widespread interests.⁷ He referred to his idea that NATO should play a role in coordinating aid to Africa and Latin America and the President recalled that they had discussed this last year. The President added that he had also talked about this question with Chancellor Adenauer and President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan. Mr. Segni said the Italians greatly admired the vast effort the United States was making and fully agreed with the importance of coordinating the effort between the United States and the European countries. In this connection he referred to Italian-German relations saying that they had close cooperation but that he had to say that sometimes German political figures—he excepted Adenauer— acted or spoke in ways that are embarrassing. He felt that unwittingly they risked arousing the fire of German nationalism. The Austrian attitude on the South Tyrol also strengthened pan-Germanic feelings. The President commented that it was important that nationalism should not run wild.

The President then referred again to the activities of Chairman Khrushchev saying he was glad to learn the Chairman was going home.⁸ Apparently he had come here with the intention of using a combination of blandishment and terror to force the Afro-Asians to his side. While he had not been successful the President thought Khrushchev’s bad deportment had been an effort to see if he could bulldoze the new nations. When Khrushchev propagandized NATO as being an evil he knew full well that it was purely a defensive organization. These tactics demonstrated how important it is that the West remain on guard.

The President then referred to the resolution of the five neutral countries calling for a personal meeting between Khrushchev and himself and reviewed his letter to the five sponsoring leaders.⁹ Mr. Segni interjected that the President had done well to refuse such a meeting. The President said he had no disposition to go into a prize fight ring, shake hands and then leave. He did not intend to be a party to such a gesture. Mr. Segni again indicated his full agreement. The President continued that he had made a considerable effort to meet with the Chiefs of State or Heads of Government who were here, mentioning particularly the five in question—Nehru, Nasser, Nkrumah, Tito and Sukarno. He doubted that he had made any converts but he had explained his position. Sukarno had said that he understood the President’s reasoning but he still thought the President should have met with Khrushchev. The President characterized Sukarno as an “egotistical type.” Tito on the other hand he had found more reasonable. Mr. Segni commented that he thought Tito was coming much nearer to the West. The President replied that if Tito had been here alone he would have liked to have him travel all around the United States. Unfortunately there had been too many high-level heads of delegation to make this possible. However he had felt that Tito was a man who could be won over if a real effort were made. Perhaps he was engaging in wishful thinking but certainly Tito’s manner was not that of the Soviet. He had no bluster and listened to what was being said, unlike Khrushchev who does not listen but simply repeats his propaganda over and over. Mr. Segni said that the Italians were working to get closer to the Yugoslavs, both on a political and economic basis. The President commented that this was a good idea and welcomed the development of an economic relationship since people were always influenced where their pocket-books were concerned. Mr. Segni repeated that the Italians were trying constantly to improve this relationship and the President replied that we had noticed the steady improvement since the settlement of the Trieste problem. He continued that we were disappointed that there had not also been a settlement of the Tyrol problem between Italy and Austria. He commented that we had always tried to be very decent to the Austrians and help them. Because of the nature of things they had to be neutral but they should be oriented toward the West. Mr. Segni commented that there was a difference between their two neighbors in this respect. In the implementation of the Trieste agreement Tito and the Italians had both tried to be reasonable and had been able to work things out. However with respect to the 1946 agreement on the Tyrol the Austrians basically did not accept this agreement or even the arrangements dating from 1920. In this connection the President asked the present status of former Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber¹⁰ and was informed by the Italians that he had disappeared from public and political life. Mr. Segni then expressed their appreciation for the President’s interest and for US support on the Tyrol problem. He characterized this as a century-old question which aroused deep feelings among the Italian people and reiterated that if the allies should not support Italy then there would be a serious crisis in his country. The President reassured Mr. Segni as to our support and expressed his hopes that a settlement would soon be achieved. In this connection he mentioned the Indus waters problem as a successful settlement of an issue which had been practically a matter of war between India and Pakistan.

In reply to the President’s question Mr. Segni confirmed that he had talked with Secretary Herter in New York about the Tyrol problem. The President then directed Mr. Kohler to inform the Secretary of his own confirmatory talk with Mr. Segni and assured the Italians that the United States would not let this matter go by default.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 765.13/10–1260. Secret. Drafted by Kohler and approved by Goodpaster on October 20. The meeting was held at the White House.
1. Segni was in the United States attending the 15th U.N. General Assembly session.
2. In an October 11 speech to the U.N. General Assembly, Khrushchev proposed convening a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament at a European site in March or April 1961.
3. See Document 247.
4. The Gruber-de Gasperi agreement of 1946; see footnote 2, Document 239.
5. During the visit to Paris on his 11-nation tour December 18–20, 1959.
6. Fanfani and Segni met with French President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Debré in Paris on September 2.
7. See Document 248.
8. Khrushchev left New York for Moscow on October 13.
9. On September 29, a draft resolution calling on Eisenhower and Khrushchev to meet was presented to the U.N. General Assembly by Prime Minister Nehru of India, President Tito of Yugoslavia, President Nasser of the United Arab Republic, President Sukarno of Indonesia, and President Nkrumah of Ghana. For text of the resolution, see U.N. doc. A/4522. The text of Eisenhower’s reply is in Department of State Bulletin, October 17, 1960, pp. 595–596.
10. Karl Gruber was Austrian Foreign Minister 1945–1953 and subsequently Austrian Ambassador to the United States.