Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

18. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick) to Secretary of State Dulles⁰

June 5, 1958.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Relations with de Gaulle

Reference is made to your discussion yesterday, June 4, as to how our relations with de Gaulle personally should best be handled.¹ Undoubtedly this will figure in the talks with Mr. Macmillan and it would be helpful if we could reach general agreement with him on this matter.²

Given de Gaulle’s experiences with the U.S. and U.K. Governments during the war and his general suspicions regarding the U.S., he can be expected to be distrustful of a close U.S.–U.K. association. He will probably look upon it as tantamount to a world directorate deciding and coordinating international policies, including NATO, irrespective of and possibly in conflict with basic French interests. I would assume, therefore, that de Gaulle would seek to restore promptly the “Big Three” meetings.

It would seem that the best way to meet this problem is to envisage the holding of “Big Three” meetings but not to exclude continuation of bilateral conferences. Despite the many disadvantages of “Big Three” meetings, our consent to holding them will play, I think, an important part in our relations with de Gaulle. Certainly our refusal to agree to a meeting of the Three, should de Gaulle propose it, would have a significant effect on his views toward the United States. Moreover, U.K. participation in our talks with de Gaulle might prove advantageous in some respects from our point of view. However, given the advantages of our bilateral association with the U.K., we should continue to hold bilateral meetings. This will have to be met, however, by similar bilateral meetings with the French. Admittedly it may prove difficult to hold bilateral meetings once the precedent of tripartite conferences is re-established. However, if sufficient importance is given to bilateral meetings with de Gaulle, this may serve to relieve or postpone some of the pressures for tripartite conferences. It is moreover possible that de Gaulle himself may in some instances prefer bilateral talks.

In this connection it seems particularly important, as I recommended in my memorandum to you of May 27, (Tab A)³ to establish early high level contact with de Gaulle. It would be helpful if we could schedule an early visit by de Gaulle to this country, given the President’s relationship with him. However, de Gaulle is currently confronted with many urgent domestic problems and might not find it possible to come over here in the near future. I suspect also that he might not wish to come here, at least at the outset. Under the circumstances it seems to me that your thought of making an early trip to Paris to have an informal exchange of views with de Gaulle would be most helpful and soundings should be made to see if de Gaulle is in accord.⁴ Given the proximity of London, it might be preferable for Macmillan to visit Paris first before your going there in order not to give any appearance of undue haste or anxiety on our part regarding de Gaulle’s policies. I would recommend that at the time of your visit after ascertaining whether he would be receptive, you extend de Gaulle an invitation to visit this country at a time convenient to the President.

There has been a press report from Paris that de Gaulle is considering an eventual visit to this country and might sent Couve de Murville over in advance for discussions here and to arrange such a visit. We should be prepared to indicate that we would be happy to receive Couve de Murville here. We do not think that this would take the place of a personal exchange between you and de Gaulle, however, and feel that an appropriate opportunity should be taken to arrange such a meeting.⁵

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.00/6–558. Confidential. Drafted by Looram, sent through Murphy and the Executive Secretariat, and initialed by Elbrick.
1. No record of this meeting has been found.
2. See Document 346.
3. Document 12.
4. When Dulles discussed with the President on June 2 the possibility of a personal exchange between a high official in the U.S. Government and de Gaulle, the President said that if anybody went, Dulles should be prepared to do it. (Memorandum of conversation with the President by Dulles, June 2; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers) On June 4, the President told Dulles he should be prepared to go to France. (Memorandum of conversation with the President by Dulles, June 4; ibid.)
5. In a June 6 memorandum to the Secretary, Murphy stated he disagreed with the procedural suggestions in Elbrick’s memorandum. First, he wrote that it was not yet clear if de Gaulle would be as content with bilateral as with tripartite meetings. Second, Murphy said there was a strong inconsistency between the tripartite procedure and NAC. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/6–658)