Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

12. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick) to Acting Secretary of State Herter⁰

May 27, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Policy Considerations toward a de Gaulle Government

Following up our memorandum to the Secretary, which is attached & copy of which was sent to you estimating the policies of a de Gaulle Government,¹ I am submitting herewith some suggested U.S. policy considerations with regard to such a government.

U.S. relations with de Gaulle will be admittedly difficult; they need not, however, be necessarily restricted to a “holding operation”. We should concentrate, at least in the initial phase, on those objectives which are primary to U.S. interest and/or on which we may have some prospect for success: (1) NATO and (2) western solidarity in our relations with the Soviet Union. On North Africa we should maintain a discreet posture; on European integration we should leave exclusively to the Europeans to save what can be saved. In fact, on many issues—even those of direct interest to us—we may have to rely heavily on the Europeans, including the U.K., to try to exercise some salutary influence. De Gaulle will not last forever and may decide to withdraw from the scene after a limited period of time. It is not impossible, moreover, that he may succeed in resolving some of France’s basic problems, notably Algeria and governmental instability.

North Africa: There is some reason to hope that de Gaulle will wish to move toward a liberal, albeit paternalistic, policy both with regard to normalizing relations with Tunisia and Morocco and to resolving the Algeria issue. Depending on the circumstances of his return to power, even he may have to move cautiously on this front. Without appearing to abandon the Tunisians and Moroccans to France, we should give de Gaulle every chance to succeed. He will be most suspicious of U.S. interference in this sphere. Any such indication could well have the result of diverting him from a liberal policy and strengthen those forces on the Right who will be attempting to do just this. Moreover, nothing would serve more than this to undercut our efforts to keep NATO together.

At the outset of de Gaulle’s taking over, we should make our position on North Africa quite clear to him reiterating the line we have often taken with the French: we have no basic differences on objectives; until now we have had differences only on the means. We consider Africa to be the hinterland for Western Europe and that close African relations with Europe are both natural and desirable. We strongly believe in the necessity for maintaining but not imposing Western, i.e. French, influence in North Africa. We do not believe that this can be done by military means. Until now we have accordingly felt that French policies were on the contrary leading to the end of Western influence in the area. Any French policies, we should tell de Gaulle, that can achieve the above objectives will be assured of our support.

NATO: De Gaulle will not willingly break up NATO. We and the rest of the members must see to it that his rigid temperament and nationalistic tendencies do not result in the gradual disintegration of NATO. We may have to give in this connection greater deference to French views on NATO military and political policies, and this irrespective of the fact that French policies and energies will be focused primarily on Africa. This situation will probably require a review of our policies on sharing atomic information with the French and warrant a resumption of Big Three meetings. In the meantime U.S. military assistance to France should be continued as heretofore. If the LOC Agreement² is not concluded by the time of de Gaulle’s coming to power, we should seek to conclude it as soon as possible thereafter. The whole question of the IRBM’s will have to be raised with de Gaulle personally.

East-West Relations: This may prove from our point of view the most difficult and dangerous area of de Gaulle’s policies. While endeavoring to maintain the French-German rapprochement, de Gaulle may in time be tempted to make an independent approach to the Soviet Union—both in the interests of world peace and to indicate once again that France is not merely following U.S. policies. The Soviet Union may in this connection be disposed to giving de Gaulle assurances on non-interference in North Africa in return for closer bilateral relations. There will undoubtedly be a tendency on de Gaulle’s part to recognize Communist China, given the favorable sentiment of French public opinion in this regard.

We should have a frank exchange of views earliest with de Gaulle on overall East-West matters. Tactically, we would do well to appear to leave some of the initiative to him on these matters. In any event our thinking should be very closely coordinated with the French. The U.K. may be able to be more effective than ourselves in restraining any precipitate action by de Gaulle in regard to Moscow, but obviously not in a position to dissuade him from recognizing Communist China.

European Integration may have to be put into suspense during the period of de Gaulle’s government. One way to save it might be to give to de Gaulle the initiative of launching a new concept of an association of European states. In this connection de Gaulle may tend to favor the Free Trade Area over the Common Market. He will probably oppose EURATOM. In any case, this is up to the Europeans; any activity on our part in support of European integration will only provoke a most adverse reaction in de Gaulle and thus prove counter-productive.

U.S.-French Relations: During this difficult and trying period, we may have to rely heavily on personal diplomacy. The President’s relationship with de Gaulle will be an asset. It would be helpful if de Gaulle would agree to make an early visit to this country and this possibility should be explored. I suspect, however, that de Gaulle might not wish to come here, at least at the outset. Under the circumstances, it might prove necessary for the Secretary—and possibly even the President—to visit France. A much less satisfactory alternative would be for the new French Foreign Minister to make an early trip over here. A strong effort will in any event have to be made at an early stage to disabuse de Gaulle personally of some of his misconceptions and suspicions with regard to U.S. policies and to have a full and frank exchange of views on East-West issues. As stated above we should continue to provide France with military assistance as heretofore. Presumably de Gaulle will initiate an austerity program, endeavor to put France’s finances on a sound basis and do everything possible to avoid having to ask us for financial assistance. However, if he should eventually have to request such assistance, we should be prepared to give it sympathetic consideration.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.00/5–2758. Confidential. Drafted by Looram, initialed by Elbrick, and concurred in by the Offices of European Regional Affairs and Northern African Affairs. A handwritten notation on the source text by Murphy, dated May 27, reads: “I feel that at present there are so many points in de Gaulle’s thinking and purposes about which we can only speculate with in some cases little of a solid nature to base an opinion.”
1. A copy of this memorandum, dated May 19, which summarized the policies of a possible de Gaulle government, is ibid., 751.00/5–1958.
2. Not further identified.