Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

279. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

SecDel MC/52

New York, September 26, 1960, 11 a.m.

SECRETARY’S DELEGTION TO THE FIFTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, September 19–28, 1960

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. T.C. Achilles, Counselor of the Dept.
  • Mr. B.E.L. Timmons, Advisor, USDel UNGA
• Italy
  • Foreign Minister Segni
  • Mr. Gaetano Martino, Chairman, Italian Delegation to the UNGA
  • Ambassador (to the U.S.) Brosio
  • Mr. Straneo, Director of Political Affairs, Italian Foreign Ministry
  • Mr. Sensi, Chief of Cabinet to the Foreign Minister

SUBJECT

• Bilateral Discussion between the Secretary of State and the Italian Foreign Minister

The Italian Foreign Minister opened the discussion by bringing up the Alto Adige question,¹ which he termed one which deeply concerns the Italian Government. He said that following the advice of “Italy’s friends”, Italy had decided not to oppose inscription of the item, provided that the original Austrian wording was changed. This had been accomplished in the General Committee; now the matter will be discussed in Committee and later in the GA Plenary. The Foreign Minister again emphasized the importance of this “internal political question” in Italy. Bolzanc-Trento on the one hand, and Trieste on the other, was the reason why Italy entered the First World War in 1915, which had cost her 600,000 lives.² It would be wrong to think that the Alto Adige question is for Italy one of prestige or territorial expansion. It is not. The Minister also alluded to his conversation with President Eisenhower last year, at which the Secretary was present, in which the Minister had explained the importance of the Alto Adige problem.³

The Minister said Italy’s conscience in the matter is clear and she does not fear the UNGA discussion. Italy does, however, need the aid of the U.S. and her other friends in the forthcoming debate.

The Secretary said that the U.S. had talked to a number of UN members and found there was general agreement that the Alto Adige item was a juridical matter. In his statement Ambassador Wadsworth had said the item should not be inscribed at all. This had provoked a sharp reaction from the Austrians.⁴ The Secretary assured the Foreign Minister that the U.S. would support in the UN discussion the position Italy has taken and would also support it with others.

The Foreign Minister expressed his appreciation, emphasizing again the question concerns not only the Italian Government but the whole Italian people and the Italian state itself.

The Secretary remarked that the problem was a complicated one for the new states, and expressed the hope that the Italian Delegation would talk to them and also provide written materials giving background and facts.

The Foreign Minister said Italy was preparing a reply to the Austrian memorandum, which contains misleading statements.

Messrs. Segni and Martino spoke of propaganda emanating from Austria and Germany designed to influence the Latin American countries and others. Chancellor Adenauer had been quite correct in his approach to the matter but the same could not be said of some of his Ministers, such as Herr Seebohm, who had spoken in favor of Austria. Mr. Martino said that much Austrian propaganda (some examples were shown) comes from a center in Innsbruck which has Austrian Government support.

The Secretary inquired as to the timing of the discussion of the Alto Adige question. Mr. Martino replied that it was the fifth point on the Special Political Committee’s agenda. The Secretary said he felt it should be gotten out of the way as soon as possible. The Foreign Minister spoke of the importance of ending the discussion now, and of ensuring that it is not brought back to a subsequent GA. He cited as an example of the political use to which Austria puts the Alto Adige question the fact that just as the GA opened Austria had sent Italy a note protesting an alleged border intrusion, although the incident was supposed to have taken place during Italian Army maneuvers last June or July.

The Foreign Minister, saying that he knew the Alto Adige region well and the “peaceful life” that prevails there, charged that Austria was attempting to make the Alto Adige a major question. The region is open to foreigners, who can see the political and press freedom that prevails; German-language newspapers in the Alto Adige are constantly attacking the Italian Government. However, Mr. Segni said, if the UNGA suggests a commission of inquiry, the Italian Government would be “absolutely opposed”, it could not and would not accept it or let it enter.

Mr. Segni went on to say that earlier he had proposed to Chancellor Raab of Austria bilateral talks or a submission of the Alto Adige question to the International Court of Justice. This was not only logical but was also in accord with the Treaty obligations between the two countries.

The Secretary remarked that he thought this could usefully be emphasized in what the Italian Delegation would be saying to the delegations of other countries.

Concluding this portion of the discussion, the Secretary assured the Foreign Minister that since the U.S. had counseled Italy that the best tactics seemed to be to allow the matter to be inscribed, the U.S. definitely feels a sense of responsibility and we will do our best to help Italy.

The Foreign Minister then inquired as to the results of the Secretary’s talks with Lord Home and Couve de Murville on the handling of the Khrushchev attacks on the UN and the West.

The Secretary replied that as the talks took place on the same day that Khrushchev had spoken, there had not been much time for reflection.⁵ It had been agreed that Khrushchev had taken a very destructive line. Couve had had to return to Paris, and the role the French would play in this GA was not clear, as they were almost wholly preoccupied with Algeria.

Mr. Segni said that if the Secretary had no objection he would like to counter in his speech Khrushchev’s suggestion of moving the seat of the UN. The Secretary said he certainly had no objection to such a reference.

The Foreign Minister then turned to General de Gaulle’s ideas for a revision of NATO. The Italian Government, Mr. Segni said, approached this matter with greatest caution and care.

The Secretary said he had been very frank on this score with Couve. If General de Gaulle were to be successful in implementing his ideas on NATO, the U.S. would have to withdraw all U.S. troops from Europe. Our justification for keeping them there is the existence of the integrated NATO command, which alone makes a defense possible. The U.S. was not happy over General de Gaulle’s recent press conferences,⁶ and he (the Secretary) had told Couve how unfortunate was this public airing of differences.

Mr. Segni said he too had been surprised by the press conference, in which the General had said things publicly that he had not mentioned two days earlier in the private discussions with the Italian Government. Mr. Segni added that military integration i.e., in the view of the Italian Government, was an absolute necessity. He thought that there should not be any radical changes in NATO.

The Secretary spoke of the Ten Year planning program of NATO and said the U.S. Government hoped shortly to talk informally to Italy about some of our ideas. In response to Mr. Segni’s question he said this would be done through Ambassador Brosio. This would be a preliminary to a discussion in NATO at the December Ministerial meeting. The Secretary said he thought the ten year program should not be discussed in NATO until countries had had an opportunity to exchange ideas. The U.S. thinks that in various fields there can be actions that taken together will lead to the integration of Europe. If pursued separately however they could lead to the reverse. The U.S. conceives of integration as both political and military; “the defense of Europe belongs to all of us”. Mr. Segni said NATO Secretary-General Spaak was of the same idea. The Secretary said Spaak would be here next week and he hoped to see him.

The Secretary said that the U.S. would have some ideas on MRBM’s which would be different than the previous.

At the end of the discussion Mr. Segni expressed the hope that, when he returned to the United States in October, it would be possible for him to pay a call on the President in Washington. The Secretary thought this would be possible (having in mind the fact that in October much of the pressure arising from the attendance at the UNGA of Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers would be eased).

The meeting ended with expressions by both the Secretary and the Foreign Minister of the usefulness of the discussion.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1766. Secret. Drafted by Timmons. The meeting was held in the Waldorf Towers.
1. The Austrians had asked that the Alto Adige issue be put on the U.N. General Assembly schedule, claiming that Italy was not living up to the 1946 De Gasperi-Gruber agreement. They demanded that Balzano province with its large ethnic German population be granted an autonomous status similar to that of Sicily. Italy rejected Austrian claims that it fostered ethnic and linguistic discrimination and insisted that it was ready to negotiate directly with Austria or refer the matter to the International Court of Justice for arbitration. The Italians claimed that Austria’s moves were prompted by the desire to annex the Alto Adige. The issue was referred to the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly on October 17. After 10 days of discussions, the committee recommended bilateral talks between Italy and Austria with recourse to the International Court of Justice for arbitration if these talks failed. The General Assembly approved this resolution on October 31. For documentation, see U.N. General Assembly, 15th Session, Special Political Committee Meetings 176–185. The report of the Special Committee is U.N. doc. A/4553. A text of the resolution is in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1960, p. 179.
2. The 1915 Treaty of London guaranteed Italy postwar control of these areas in return for Italian military intervention against Austria and Germany.
3. See Document 247.
4. On September 23, Wadsworth underlined U.S. “regret” that the Austrians had brought the Alto Adige issue before the U.N. General Assembly. The Austrian Government subsequently modified the text of its resolution but insisted that the matter be considered by the General Assembly.
5. In a September 23 speech to the General Assembly, Khrushchev attacked Western colonialism and demanded that the position of Secretary-General be transformed into a three-man body comprising representatives of the three major groups of states.
6. At his September 5 press conference, de Gaulle announced that France wished a revision of the North Atlantic Treaty to provide special representation for the United States, United Kingdom, and France and that the French Government favored the creation of an integrated European defense force.