185. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Tripartitism
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
- Ambassador Hervé Alphand, French Embassy
- Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE
Ambassador Alphand, who was calling on the Secretary at his request, remarked that he had not seen the Secretary since Paris and wished to go over a number of things, particularly the subjects which had been discussed between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Couve de Murville in Washington at he time of the SEATO meeting.1 He said he had particular reference to the agreement which had been reached regarding the desirability of better organizing our tirpartite consultation. He noted that an agreement on the method of organization had been reached and that the Secretary had asked Mr. Merchant to undertake this function for the United States while the French would probably designate M. Lucet. The Secretary remarked that the British had not named anyone as yet. Ambassador Alphand inquired as to how we thought this would work. Would the three designees correspond directly or would they proceed through the Embassies. He thought the latter was the better procedure. The Secretary said that he assumed the first occasion for a tripartite Foreign Ministers’ meeting would be at the time of the UN General Assembly in New York. He thought that the three representatives who had been designated would be able to prepare this meeting better than had been the case in the past. Ambassador Alphand asked if the three would actually meet. Mr. Merchant said he had not been in communication with the others. He thought that the preliminary work should be handled through the Embassies and that the three might meet perhaps two weeks before the tripartite Foreign Ministers’ meeting in order to see that all of the papers were in order, [Page 391] etc. Ambassador Alphand commented that this would be easy to arrange.
Ambassador Alphand next raised the question of publicity and said that the French position was that they were opposed to any publicity on this subject. The Secretary agreed that this was a good idea. [10–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Ambassador Alphand closed on the note that there was no need for reports to the NATO Council.
Ambassador Alphand then passed on to the military aspects of tripartitism. The Secretary noted that the President’s first reaction to the suggestion contained in General de Gaulle’s letter of June 10, enclosing a copy of a letter to Prime Minister Macmillan,2 had been that it would not be a good idea to use the Standing Group since this was an integral part of NATO and it was not desirable to use the same mechanism. Ambassador Alphand said that it had not been the French plan to use the Standing Group as such but to use the personnel thereof in their personal capacity. Therefore he continued, the NATO Standing Group as such would not be used. The Secretary said was it the French idea that the Standing Group representatives would simply adopt another hat? Ambassador Alphand replied in the affirmative saying that of course the U.S. could use a different man if it so wished. The Secretary then asked what would be the agenda for such military talks. Ambassador Alphand wondered if the President would make a new suggestion on this subject. The Secretary said he thought that it would be desirable for the French to give us an agenda and we could then decide who should be designated for such talks and when they might take place. Ambassador Alphand said that he thought the French interest was in the “strategic plans of the West”. The Secretary then noted that if it were the French intention to discuss Africa, for example, we wondered if that would include Algeria which appeared to us to be the most important single problem in Africa today. The Secretary again referred to his suggestion that the French furnish us with an agenda as a means of our getting the most appropriate U.S. representatives. Ambassador Alphand asked again if we would object if the French Standing Group representative were to discuss various military problems with us. The Secretary said this would be satisfactory if it did not pose a problem for NATO. He said he thought the President was somewhat worried about the idea of Standing Group representatives wearing two hats.
The Secretary then said that with regard to military talks on Africa he thought this had been agreed upon some time ago and we had sent two Colonels to Africa in order to brief themselves and prepare for such talks. However, we had never heard anything further from the French [Page 392] regarding these military talks on Africa. We had thought that our previous talks some time ago had been preparatory and we were awaiting word from the French as to when and if they wished to proceed.3
Finally, Ambassador Alphand referred to tripartite political talks on Africa and asked if further talks on the Congo and the Horn of Africa were envisaged as a follow-up to the June 1 tripartite Foreign Ministers’ meeting. Mr. Merchant noted that we had held tripartite political talks on Africa in Paris since June 1 and had, for example, covered the subject of the Congo.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/6–2460. Secret. Drafted by McBride and cleared by S and M on July 1. A summary of this conversation was transmitted in telegram 5529 to Paris, June 24. (Ibid.) Herter and Alphand also discussed MRBMs; the Secretary of State said that there had been no answer to the alternatives proposed by Gates and that perhaps the whole question should be restudied. A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., S/S-S Files: Lot 69 D 150.↩
- See Document 178.↩
- Document 182.↩
- For a summary of the tripartite talks on Africa April 16–21, 1959, see Document 107. A copy of the memorandum of conversation covering the tripartite talks on Africa, June 1, when Herter, Lloyd, and Couve de Murville discussed the Belgian Congo and the Horn of Africa, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1686.↩
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A summary of the tripartite political talks on Africa in Paris, June 9, concerning the Congo, Cameroon, and various other problems, is in despatch 1926 from Paris, June 15. (Ibid., Central Files, 770.00/6–1560)
In a memorandum of conversation, June 25, Herter wrote:
“After the conversation with Ambassador Alphand yesterday afternoon, recorded by Mr. McBride, Alphand asked to see me alone. He said he felt no record should be kept of this conversation. What he wanted to do was to discuss the whole question of assistance to France in its nuclear capability, [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. He pointed out the obvious savings to France if it were not forced to push further with its own research and development in the nuclear field, and how greatly a solution of this problem could help the over-all NATO relationships.”
Herter continued:
“I told Alphand that with respect to France’s progress in the nuclear field, we were giving continuing thought to this whole matter but that I doubted whether any solution on this or on the MRBM question could be arrived at very quickly.” (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers)
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